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Abstract
With the rise in the shadow Internet economy, malware has developed into one
of the major threats to computers and information systems throughout the world.
Antivirus analysis and detection is a major resource in maintaining an organization’s
antivirus preparedness and responsiveness during malware outbreak events, thereby
contributing to the well-being of its IT health, and consequently to that of the econ-
omy as a whole.
Currently the majority of anti-virus detection systems are signature-based, which
means that they try to identify malware based on a single feature. The major disad-
vantage of such signature-based detection systems is that they cannot detect unknown
malware, but only identify variants of malware that have been previously identified.
Moreover more and more malware writers use obfuscation technology such as packing,
encrypting or polymorphisms, to avoid being detected by antivirus detection engines.
With a signature-based approach, frequent and recurrent updates of the malware
signature database are imperative as huge numbers of malware variants are released
every day. Therefore the traditional signature-based detection system is neither effi-
cient nor effective in defeating malware threats.
In the search for effective and efficient solutions to the malware problem, re-
searchers have moved away from the signature approach and the new detection and
classification methods can basically be categorized into two types: static methods
and dynamic methods. In the static method, researchers acquire useful information
from static disassembling code; in the dynamic method, they use information from
runtime trace reports of executable files.
Earlier studies in malware detection and classification focused on calculating sim-
ilarity between two pieces of code by using program comparison technologies. Most
program comparison technologies require the computation of the distances between all
xx
pairs of files, which invariably results in a computational complexity of O(n2). These
technologies are effective in the early stage of malware development. But given the
rapidly increasing number of malware released every day, these technologies should
be replaced by more scalable and effective methodologies.
When I started the research work in 2007, relatively little work had been done
on the study of improving the detection and classification accuracy by using machine
learning methods. And there was little published work dealing with the problem
of malware detection which is the problem of distinguishing between malware and
cleanware. From the point of view of performance, the best malware classification
accuracy at that time was 91.6% as mentioned in the literature review presented in
Chapter 2 of my thesis.
The aims of this thesis are to develop effective and efficient methodologies which
can be applied to continuously improve the performance of detection and classification
on malware collected over an extended period of time. And the target of such a system
is 97% malware detection and classification accuracy, which therefore significantly
improves on current work.
In developing the thesis, we test a set of hypotheses including the idea that com-
bining different features or characteristics of a malware file in the analysis may be
more effective in classification than a single feature. This is because malware writers
attempt to avoid detection by obfuscation of some features. We show that indeed
this hypothesis is valid by using a combination of static and dynamic features in de-
veloping an integrated test which is considerably more effective than the any of the
tests based on these features individually.
One of the claims in the research literature is that, over time, malware becomes
resistant to the older anti-virus detection methods. We demonstrate the robustness
of our integrated feature method by testing it on malware collected over 2003-2008
xxi
and malware collected over 2009-2010. The results indicate that it is indeed possible
to bypass obfuscation techniques by using a combination of several features.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Malware, short for malicious software, is a relatively new concept, but is not a
new research field. Intrinsically malware is a variety of hostile, intrusive, or annoying
software or program code designed to secretly access a computer system without
the owner’s informed consent. In a sense, the development of malware is closely
related to the development of software engineering. Since software engineering was
first officially proposed at the 1968 NATO Software Engineering Conference [Wir08],
the art of programming has evolved into a profession concerned with how best to
maximize the quality of software and how to create it. From its very beginning in the
1960s, malware has also evolved into the most significant threat to computer network
systems, especially in the last three decades. Along with the growth of the Internet,
there has been a dramatic growth in instances of malware in recent years [YWL+08].
According to the 2010 Annual Report from PandaLabs [Pan11], “Rounding up the
figures for 2010, some 20 million new strains of malware have been created (including
new threats and variants of existing families), the same amount as in the whole of
2009. The average number of new threats created every day has risen from 55,000
to 63,000.” One of the major threats on the Internet today is malware and the
underlying root cause of most Internet security problems is malware.
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Malware has already become a global problem which has affected different parts
of the world in different ways. According to the Microsoft security intelligence report
[Mic09] in 2009, threat assessments for 26 individual locations, including Australia,
Canada, China and the United States, shows that the vast majority of threats de-
tected on infected computers come from malware. For example, in the United States,
malware is the main security threat, which accounted for 72.9 percent of all threats
detected on infected computers. In Australia, this number was 76.2 percent.
With the rise in the shadow Internet economy, malware is no longer simply used
to damage, break or intrude on computer network systems, but now exists primarily
as a tool used by criminals to make a profit. As [Sch07] states the teenagers who
wrote viruses have grown up and now they’re trying to make money. The shadow
Internet economy is worth over $105 billion. Online crime is bigger than the global
drugs trade [Sch07].
Malware makers are often looking for one-time development of specific code to
generate new variants of existing malware, instead of developing new malware from
scratch. In this case, variants of existing malware can be developed easily and quickly,
and therefore, can be rapidly brought to market in the shadow economy. According to
statistical analysis of Microsoft Security Intelligence Report [BWM06], of the 97,924
variants collected in the first half of 2006, the top seven families accounted for more
that 50 percent of all variants found, and the top 25 families accounted for over 75
percent. This means there is a very big opportunity that any new malicious program
found in the wild is a variation of a previous program.
Thus, there is a need to develop an automatic malware detection and classification
system to identify the variants of existing malware, in order to guide analysts in the
selection of samples that require the most attention. Over the last decade, researchers
have adopted a variety of solutions in order to control malware. Much research has
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been conducted on developing automatic malware detection and classification systems
using static or dynamic analysis methods.
This thesis aims to develop effective and efficient methodologies which can be
used to continuously improve the performance of detecting and classifying malware
collected over an extended period of time.
In this chapter, I present the background information of my research topic by
describing the definition of malware, malware history, malware naming, and types of
malware. Following this I state my research problem and challenge in Section 1.2.
Section 1.3 provides an outline of the remainder of the thesis, and Section 1.4 sum-
marizes the chapter.
1.1 Background
In this section I comprehensively profile malware by presenting a definition of
malware, and malware history. I also identify and name different types of malware.
1.1.1 Definition of Malware
Malware is short for “malicious software”, and refers to software programs de-
signed to damage or perform other unwanted actions on a computer system. In
Spanish, “mal” is a prefix that means “bad”, therefore malware means “badware”.
Many people have tried to define malware by describing its essential characteris-
tics. As early as 1986, Fred Cohen presented the first rigorous mathematical definition
for a computer virus in his Ph.D thesis [Coh85]. He wrote “A virus can be described
by a sequence of symbols which is able, when interpreted in a suitable environment
(a machine), to modify other sequences of symbols in that environment by including
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a, possibly evolved, copy of itself.” Although his thesis only focused on viruses and
did not consider the more general issue of malware, he coined the term ’virus’ which
was a fundamental distinction. On November 10, 1983, at Lehigh University, Cohen
demonstrated a virus-like program on a VAX11/750 system. The program was able
to install itself to, or infect, other system objects. This is the birth of experimental
computer virus.
The definition of malware varies as the development of the computer system,
the Internet and malware continue. Software is considered malware based on the
perceived intent of the creator rather than on any particular features. So from a
practical point of view, the following definition is popularly accepted: Malware is
software designed to infiltrate or damage a computer system without the owner’s
informed consent. It is a combination of the words “malicious” and “software” and
the expression is a general term used by computer professionals to mean a variety of
hostile, intrusive, or annoying software or program code.
1.1.2 History of Malware
Every field of study has its own unique developing history. We cannot understand
malware without first understanding its history. By understanding the history of
Malware, and learning the names and significant events that have shaped the devel-
opment of this field of study, we are able to better understand references from experts
in this field. Following is a brief description of the history of malware.
With the emergence of computers, malware became increasingly common. As
early as 1949, computer pioneer John von Neumann presumed that a computer pro-
gram could reproduce, which is the most primitive conceptual description of malware.
In [VN68], he deduced that we could construct automata which could reproduce
themselves and, in addition, construct others. It is generally accepted that the first
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malware was a virus called the Creeper, which infected ARPANET, the forerunner
of the modern Internet, in 1971 1. It was created by engineer Bob Thomas, working
for BBN. The Creeper was not, however, malicious. Infected machines would simply
display the message, “I’m the creeper: catch me if you can,” but they did not suffer
any lasting damage. As a direct response to the Creeper challenge, the first piece of
anti-virus software, the Reaper was created, which was also a self-replicating program
that spread through the system in much the same way the Creeper did. The Reaper
removed the offending virus from infected computers, and just as quickly as it had
spread, the Creeper was caught.
Before the wide spread of the Internet, most communication networks were limited
by only allowing communications between stations on the local network, therefore the
earlier prevalence of malware was rather limited. As the Internet evolved, so did the
nature of the threat. It is not surprising then, the evolution of malware is directly
related to the success and evolution of the Internet.
According to the white paper from McAfee [McA05], one of the earliest viruses
named Brain was introduced in 1986, infecting the boot sector of floppy disks, which
was the principal method of transmitting files of data from one computer to another.
The first major mutation of viruses took place in July 1995. This was when the first
macro virus was developed. This virus was notably different from boot sector viruses
because it was written in a readable format.
The next major mutation of viruses took place in 1999 when a macro-virus author
turned his attention to the use of e-mail as a distribution mechanism. This saw the
birth of Melissa, the first infamous global virus. After Melissa, viruses were no longer
1Christopher Koch presents the history of malware in a cyber crime timeline in CIO (Chief
Information Officer) Magazine [Koc07], it shows that the earliest malware appeared between 1970s-
80s.
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solely reliant on file sharing by floppy disk, network shared files, or e-mail attachments.
Viruses had the capability to propagate through Internet applications.
Malware has since evolved into many types, such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses,
backdoors, and rootkits, with these new threats identifying and preying upon vulner-
abilities in applications and software programs to transmit and spread attacks. In
2002, these threats began to combine, and the blended threat was born. By utilizing
multiple techniques, blended threats can spread far quicker than conventional threats.
1.1.3 Type of Malware
With the rapid development and popularity of the Internet, malware has become
more and more complicated and has from the very first virus to worms, and Trojans,
and now the currently notorious rootkits. In this sub-section I attempt to clarify the
meaning of each of these terms to develop an understanding of what they are and
their potential dangers.
1.1.3.1 Worms and Viruses
The earliest and best known types of malware are worms and viruses. Worms
include programs that propagate via LANs or the Internet with malicious objec-
tives, including penetrating remote machines, launching copies on victim machines
and further spreading to new machines. Worms use different networking systems to
propagate, such as email, instant messaging, file-sharing (P2P), IRC channels, LANs
and WANs.
Most existing worms spread as files in one form or another, including email attach-
ments, ICQ or IRC messages and accessible files via P2P networks. There are a small
number of so-called fileless or packet worms which spread as network packets and
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directly penetrate the RAM of the victim machine, where the code is then executed.
Worms use a variety of exploits for penetrating victim machines and subsequently
executing code, and these exploits may include emails that encourage recipients to
open an attachment, poorly configured networks, networks that leave local machines
open to access from outside the network or vulnerabilities in an operating system and
its applications.
Viruses cover programs that spread copies of themselves throughout a single ma-
chine in order to launch and/or execute code once a user fulfills a designated action,
and it also penetrates other resources within the victim machine. Unlike worms,
viruses do not use network resources to penetrate other machines. Copies of viruses
can penetrate other machines only if an infected object is accessed and the code is
launched by a user on an uninfected machine. This can happen in the following ways:
the virus infects files on a network resource that other users can access; the virus
infects removable storage media which are then used in a clean machine; or, the user
attaches an infected file to an email and sends it to a “healthy” recipient. Viruses are
sometimes carried by worms as additional payloads or they themselves can include
backdoor or Trojan functionality which destroys data on an infected machine.
A virus requires user intervention to spread, whereas a worm spreads automati-
cally. Because of this distinction, infections transmitted by email or Microsoft Word
documents, which rely on the recipient opening a file or email to infect the system,
would be classified as a virus rather than a worm.
1.1.3.2 Trojans
Trojan is short for “trojan horse” and is derived from the Greek myth of the
Trojan War.
Trojan is a hidden program which secretly runs commands in order to accomplish
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its goals without being shut down, or deleted by the user or administrator of the
computer on which it is running. Trojan appears to perform a certain action but in
fact performs another similar to a computer virus. Contrary to popular belief, this
action, usually encoded in a hidden payload, may or may not actually be malicious.
Trojan horses are currently notorious for their use in the installation of backdoor
programs. A trojan, known as dropper, is used to begin a worm outbreak by injecting
the worm into users’ local networks.
This type of malware includes a wide variety of programs that perform actions
without the user’s knowledge or consent, including the collection of data and sending
it to a cyber criminal, destroying or altering data with malicious intent, causing the
computer to malfunction, or using a machine’s capabilities for malicious or criminal
purposes, such as sending spam.
Broadly speaking, a Trojan is any program that invites the user to run it, con-
cealing a harmful or malicious payload. The payload may take effect immediately
and can lead to many undesirable effects, such as deleting the user’s files or further
installing malicious or undesirable software.
1.1.3.3 Rootkits
A “rootkit” is a program (or combination of several programs) designed to take
fundamental control (in Unix terms “root” access, in Windows terms “Administrator”
access) of a computer system, without authorization by the system’s owners or legit-
imate managers. Access to the hardware (i.e, the reset switch) is rarely required as a
rootkit is intended to seize control of the operating system running on the hardware.
Typically, rootkits act to obscure their presence on the system through subversion
or evasion of standard operating system security mechanisms. Often, they are also
Trojans as well, thus fooling users into believing they are safe to run on their sys-
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tems. Techniques used to accomplish this can include concealing running processes
from monitoring programs, or hiding files or system data from the operating system.
Rootkits may have originated as regular, though emergency applications intended
to take control of an unresponsive system, however in recent years they have mostly
been malware to help intruders gain access to systems while avoiding detection.
Rootkits exist for a variety of operating systems, such as Microsoft Windows, Mac
OS X, Linux and Solaris. Rootkits often modify parts of the operating system or
install themselves as drivers or kernel modules, depending on the internal details of
an operating system’s mechanisms.
1.1.3.4 Backdoors
Backdoor is a method of bypassing normal authentication procedures. Once a
system has been compromised (by one of the above methods, or in some other way),
one or more backdoors may be installed in order to allow easier access in the future.
Backdoors may also be installed prior to malicious software, to allow attackers entry.
It has often been suggested that computer manufacturers preinstall backdoors on their
systems to provide technical support for customers, but this has never been reliably
verified. Crackers typically use backdoors to secure remote access to a computer,
while attempting to remain hidden from casual inspection. To install backdoors,
crackers may use Trojan horses, worms, or other methods.
1.1.3.5 Spyware and Adware
Spyware is any software installed on the system without the owner’s knowledge.
Spyware collects information and sends that information back to the attacker so the
attacker can use the stolen information in some nefarious way, to learn and steal
passwords or credit card numbers, change the settings of your browser, or add abom-
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inable browser toolbars. A trojan horse is one of the most common ways spyware is
distributed and is usually bundled with a piece of desirable software that the user
downloads from the Internet. When the user installs the software, the spyware is
also installed. Spyware authors who attempt to act in a legal fashion may include
an end-user license agreement that states the behavior of the spyware in loose terms,
which the users are unlikely to read or understand.
1.1.3.6 Bot
“Bot” is short for the word “robot”, which is another type of malware and is an
automated process that interacts with other network services. A typical use for bots
is to gather information (such as web crawlers), or interact automatically with instant
messaging (IM), Internet Relay Chat (IRC), or other web interfaces. Bot software
enables an operator to remotely control each system and group them together to
form what is commonly referred to as a zombie army or botnet [BCJ+09, CJM05].
Attackers use these zombies or bots as anonymous proxies to hide their real identities
and amplify their attacks.
A Botnet is a large pool of compromised computer hosts across the Internet. At-
tackers can use a botnet to launch broad-based, remote-control, flood-type attacks
against their targets. Currently the bots found in the wild are a hybrid of previ-
ous threats. This means they may propagate like worms, hide from detection like
many viruses, attack like many stand-alone tools, and have an integrated command
and control system. They have also been known to exploit back doors opened by
worms and viruses, which allows them access to controlled networks. Bots try to hide
themselves as much as they can and infect networks in a way that avoids immediate
notice.
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1.1.3.7 Hacker Utilities and other malicious programs
Hacker utilities and other malicious programs include:
• Utilities such as constructors that can be used to create viruses, worms and
Trojans.
• Program libraries specially developed to be used in creating malware.
• Hacker utilities that encrypt infected files to hide them from antivirus software.
• Jokes that interfere with normal computer function.
• Programs that deliberately misinform users about their actions in the system.
• Other programs that are designed to directly or indirectly damage local or
networked machines.
Functionality and infected methods of current malware have become more and
more complicated and diverse. Current malware is often a composite creation and
does not easily fit into the above categories. Instances of malware always combine
several approaches or technologies in order to avoid being detected by an anti-virus
engine. For instance, worms now often include trojan functions by containing a pay-
load which installs a back door or bot to allow remote access and control. They are no
longer purely worms, but hybrid malware instances that include all the functionality
of a virus, worm, trojan and/or spyware together.
1.1.4 Naming Malware
Many security vendors use naming conventions based on the CARO (Computer
AntiVirus Research Organization) naming scheme with minor variations. The CARO
malware naming scheme was created almost 20 years ago, and to date, it remains
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the naming scheme most widely used in anti-virus products. CARO is an informal
organization, and is composed of a group of individuals who have been working
together since around 1990 across corporate and academic borders to study computer
malware. At a CARO meeting in 1991, a committee was formed with the objective of
reducing the confusion in naming viruses. This committee decided that a fundamen-
tal principle behind the naming scheme should be that malware should be grouped
into families according to the similarity of its programming code. They proposed
and published a naming convention which is the rudiment of current adopted naming
schema. This naming schema revised in 2002 and is constantly kept up to date in
order to reflect any future modifications. [Bon05]. The full name of malware consists
of up to eight parts, separated points (.). The general format of a Full CARO
Malware Name is:
[<type>://][<platform>/]<family>[.<group>][.<length>].<variant>
[<modifiers>][!<comment>]
where the items in square brackets are optional. According to this format, only the
family name and the variant name of a piece of malware are mandatory and even the
variant name can be omitted when it is reported.
• The type part indicates the type of malware it is and the naming scheme permits
the following different types: virus, dropper, intended, Trojan, pws, dialer,
backdoor, exploit, tool or garbage. Currently, these malware types are the only
malware types permitted by the CARO Malware Naming Scheme. Notably,
there is no special malware type for a worm, with the reason being that it seems
impossible to reach an agreement among anti-virus researchers on what exactly
a worm is. In order to avoid confusion, this naming scheme does not use such
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a malware type at all. While the anti-virus producer may put this information
in the comment field if they absolutely have to report that something is a
worm. In addition, there are no malware types for spam, adware, spyware,
phishing scams, non-malicious applications or unwanted applications, however
these malware types may be introduced in the future. Currently, some anti-virus
vendors have chosen to report such things with their products.
• The platform part specifies the platform on which the malware works. This
can be an operating system (e.g., “PalmOS”), a set of operating systems (e.g.,
“Win32”), an application (e.g., “ExcelMacro”), or a language interpreter (e.g.,
“VBS”) or a file type.
• The family name is the only part that a virus scanner uses to detect the malware.
This is due to one of the fundamental principles that malware should be grouped
into families according to the similarity of its code in the Malware Naming
Scheme. This is useful for developers of anti-virus software because malware
that is programmed in a similar way usually needs similar methods of detection
and removal.
• The group part is used when a large subset of a malware family contains mem-
bers that are sufficiently similar to each other and sufficiently different from the
other members of the same family, yet at the same time the members of this
subset are not similar enough to each other to be classified as variants.
• The length part indicates the infective length of the particular piece of malware.
• The variant part is used to distinguish between different malware programs that
belong to the same family.
• The modifier part lists some properties of the malware that are deemed impor-
tant enough to be conveyed to the user immediately.
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• The comment part is used to report a malware that is not included in this
scheme.
Although this schema is widely used in anti-virus products, there is no product
that is absolutely compliant with the schema. Different anti-virus vendors customize
it according to their practical requirements, and family and variant names for the
same malware could differ between vendors, however in general, the variations are
minor and people can find out more by reading the detailed description.
1.2 Malware Detection and Classification
1.2.1 The Proposal of this Research Problem
Anti-malware analysis and detection system is a major resource in maintaining
an organization’s antivirus preparedness and responsiveness during outbreak events.
This preparation and response contributes to the well-being of the organizations IT
health, and consequently to the economy as a whole. Nevertheless, the use of such
software is predicated on an initial and accurate identification of malware that is used
to develop methods to aid the automation of malware identification and classification.
Malware identification and analysis is a technically intense discipline, requiring
deep knowledge of hardware, operating systems, compilers and programming lan-
guages. To compound the problem, successful identification and analysis by malware
analysts has been confounded by the use of obfuscated code in recent years. Mal-
ware writers have adopted obfuscation technology to disguise the malware program
so that its malicious intent is difficult to detect. Obfuscation techniques can in-
volve obscuring a program’s behavioral patterns or assembly code [Mas04, SXCM04],
encrypting some components, or compressing some of the malware data thereby de-
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stroying the detectable code patterns. There are freely available open-source and
commercial obfuscation tools which purport to harden applications against piracy
and de-obfuscation techniques. In the open source project UPX, for example,
(http://upx.sourceforge.net), the obfuscation is designed to be reversible, but hackers
make slight alterations to the source code to destroy this property. Manual unpacking
by an experienced person can still be done in this instance, but an automated process
becomes extremely difficult.
In the anti-virus industry, the majority of anti-virus detection systems are
signature-based which was effective in the early stages of malware. But given the
rapid development of malware technologies and the huge amount of malware released
every day, the signature-based approach is neither efficient nor effective in defeating
malware threats. Currently, we are in need of finding more effective and efficient
approaches.
To deal with the rapid development of malware, researchers have shifted from
a signature-based method, to new approaches based on either a static or dynamic
analysis to detect and classify malware. In the static analysis, researchers focus on
disassembling code to acquire useful information to represent malware, whereas in the
dynamic analysis, they monitor the execution of malware in a controlled environment
and extract information from runtime trace reports to represent the malware. In
using both static and dynamic methods, it is crucial to find key features that can
represent malware and that are effective in malware detection and classification.
One of the complaints about malware detection and classification is that once the
method is made public, a malware writer need only obfuscate the principal feature
used in the classification to avoid detection. In developing this thesis, I designed and
implemented several experiments based on static and dynamic methodologies. The
results of these experiments led me and my research colleagues to believe that an
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integrated method could be developed that incorporates static and dynamic methods
to complement each other to make the detection and classification effective and robust
to changes in malware evolution.
A second complaint about standard methods of classification is that they are based
on a given set of malware and may apply to that set, but may not fare as well on
more recent or future malware. In developing this thesis, we introduced more recent
malware families into our experiments to test the robustness of our method.
1.2.2 Importance of the Research Problem
The significance of an automatic and effective malware detection and classification
system has the following benefits:
• When new malware is found in the wild, it can quickly be determined whether
it is a new instance of malware or a variant of known family.
• If it is a variant of known family, the anti-virus analysts can predict the possible
damage it can cause, and can launch the necessary procedure to quarantine or
remove the malware. Furthermore, given sets of malware samples that belong to
different malware families, it becomes significantly easier to derive generalized
signatures, implement removal procedures, and create new mitigation strategies
that work for a whole class of programs [BCH+09].
• Alternatively, if it is new malware, the system can still detect the similarity
between the new malware and other known malware which provides valuable
information for further analysis.
• Analysts can be free from the grueling analysis of a huge number of variants of
known malware families and focus on the truly new ones.
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1.2.3 Description of the Research Team
The research work presented in this thesis is part of a broader project - “Analysis
and Classification of Malicious Code” - which is supported by ARC grant number
LP0776260 under the auspices of the Australian Research Council and by research
partner CA Technologies. During the course of this project I have worked closely with
my supervisor Professor Lynn Batten from Deakin University, Dr. Steve Versteeg
from CA Technologies, and Dr. Rafiqul Islam from Deakin University.
In the initial stages of the project, my role was to unpack malware from the CA
Zoo and set up a database to collect data from the malware. I also customized the
ida2sql so that it would manage the data in the format we wished to use for the
project.
Based on the data gathered, I performed preliminary testing to determine if any
of the extracted malware features might be useful in classification. I discovered that
we were able to distinguish between malware based on function length features. I
used this discovery as the basis of the function length tests discussed in Chapter 4.
In the next stage of my work, I added more malware samples and used string features
as a basis for testing and then compared the results with those for function length.
(Chapter 5.)
This led me to consider using the dynamic information from the malware (as
performed by other researchers) to see how the results compared with those on the
static features I had used. At this point, the extended team became interested in
malware detection rather than classification, and this led to the inclusion of cleanware
in the testing. The cleanware was at first treated as another family, but I developed a
test for the dynamic research which tested all the malware against the cleanware. This
is important because a significant amount of cleanware - such as auto-updating, uses
the same APIs which are commonly exploited by malware, therefore, naive approaches
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can incorrectly identify these cleanware programs as malware. My team finally wanted
to derive an integrated test using both static and dynamic features. To set this up, I
had to determine a common data set which had usable log input for both tests. This
meant I had to unpack more malware, find more cleanware and rerun the previous
tests all over again. At this point, I had to make some decisions about how to derive
a common sized vector to incorporate all the features we needed to include. The
integrated dynamic test results are shown in Chapter 8. We achieved our target of
(over) 97% accuracy with this final test.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis comprises nine chapters, and is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides the literature review of my research topic. In this Chapter, I
begin with an understanding of the general flow of traditional Signature-based Mal-
ware Detection and Analysis. Following this, I present two core problems of malware
detection and classification, then I present a review of the literature that incorporates
static and dynamic methods, with discussion on the merits and limitations of these
methods. To conclude this chapter, our proposed method is presented.
Chapter 3 introduces the architecture of our malware detection and classifica-
tion system. The system is separated into different layers according to the flow of
process. It includes a Data Collection and Data Preprocess Layer, a Data Storage
Layer, an Extraction and Representation Layer, a Classification Process Layer, and
a Performance Assessment Layer. I provide an explanation for each of these layers.
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Chapter 4 presents a simple and scalable method which is based on function
length features extraction and representation. Function length frequency and the
function length pattern are investigated.
Chapter 5 presents another static feature extraction and presentation method,
focusing on the PSI (Printable String Information).
Chapter 6 presents a combined static approach. FLF (Function Length Fre-
quency) and PSI (Printable String Information) static features are combined to im-
prove the performance of detection and classification.
Chapter 7 proposes a scalable approach for detecting and classifying malware by
investigating the behavioral features using a dynamic analysis of malware binaries.
Chapter 8 integrates both static and dynamic approaches to detect and classify
the malware in order to improve robustness and performance.
Chapter 9 presents the conclusion to this thesis.
1.4 Summary
In this chapter, I described the background information related to my research,
proposed my research problem, explained the importance of this research and stated
the aim of my research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, I present a literature review on my topic of research. First I
describe the traditional method used by the anti-virus industry, and in Section 2.2
I present literature related to malware analysis and extraction approaches as well as
the malware classification decision making mechanism. In Section 2.3 I explain our
proposed methodologies for malware detection and classification.
2.1 General Flow of Signature-Based Malware De-
tection and Analysis
Currently, the majority of anti-virus detection systems are signature-based. A
signature is a distinctive piece of code within an executable file which is used to
identify the file and which is expressed in terms of byte sequences or instruction se-
quences. Executable files are disassembled by Reverse Engineering Software, and then
anti-virus engineers examine the disassembled code to identify distinctive signatures
manually. Signatures are then stored in a signature database or signature repository.
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Signature-based detection involves searching the signature databases for the matched
pattern.
Figure 2.1 shows the general procedure for signature-based detection. When a
executable file arrives, it is sent to the anti-virus engine. The anti-virus engine initially
checks if the sample is packed or not; if it is packed then the engine unpacks it and
passes the unpacked version to a specific scanner of an anti-virus engine. A scanner
is a specific part of the engine which deals with a specific file type. Executable
unpacking is a feature built into an anti-virus engine and it uses the creation of
new scanning streams to write out an executable that is an unpacked version of
the currently scanned executable. A given scanner may use a specialized searching
algorithm and behaves in ways suitable to its file type. For instance, a Win32 scanner
processes Windows Portable Executable (PE) files; whereas a DOS scanner is used for
scanning MZ executables files, DOS COM files and any other binary files which are not
recognized by other scanners. The anti-virus engine then evaluates the disassembling
code of the file with the malware signature database by comparing specific bytes
of code against information in its malware signature database. If the file contains
a pattern or signature that exists within the database, it is deemed malicious. A
report is then generated giving detailed information and the anti-virus engine either
quarantines or deletes the file, depending upon the anti-virus engine configurations.
If no matched signature is found in that file, then the suspicious file is passed on to
anti-virus engineers for further analysis with the malware signature database updated.
The disadvantage of such a signature-based detection system is that it cannot
detect unknown malware. Since signatures are created by examining known malware,
the detection can only detect “known malware”. A signature-based detection system
cannot always detect variants of known malware. Therefore, signature-based detectors
are not effective against new or unknown malware. Another shortcoming is the size
and maintenance of a signature database. Since a signature-based detector has to use
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a separate signature for each malware variant, the database of signatures grows at an
exponential rate. Moreover, frequent and recurrent updates of the malware signature
database are imperative as new malware is churned out every day.
Suspicious 
File
Signature 
Matched?
Further 
Analysis
Signature 
Database
Malware File Directory Tree
Malware 
Report
Find New 
Signature?
YES
YES
Update Update
NO
Anti-virus Engine
Win32Text Win16 DOS
Other files Other filesOther files
Unpack 
Preprocess
Search
Figure 2.1. General Flow of Signature-based Malware Detection and Analysis
At the same time, we can see that in practice, a signature-based malware detection
system uses the most expensive resource, namely the analyst, to analyse malware. In
this situation, the classification of new malware by human analysis, whether through
memorization, or looking up description libraries or searching sample collections is not
an effective method as it is too time consuming and subjective [LM06]. The analyst
has few tools to automatically classify a particular program into a specific family.
To make matters worse, obfuscation technology is adopted by malware writers to
evade being detected by anti-virus systems. As a consequence, developing an effective
automatic malware detection and classification system would be significant for the
anti-virus industry. In recent years, many researchers have turned their attention to
the detection and classification of malware using many different approaches.
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2.2 Related Work
In research of malware detection and classification, the two core problems to be
resolved are:
1) Suitable Representation of Malware.
2) Choice of Optimal Classification Decision Making Mechanisms.
The representation of malware is heavily dependent on malware analysis and ex-
traction approaches. Different analysis and extraction approaches focus on different
aspects of malware and construct diverse feature sets. We must decide what kinds of
information can be extracted from executables and how this information should be
extracted, organized and used to represent the executables.
Choice of Optimal classification decision making is related to the classification
algorithms and performance evaluation methods used. We need to decide which
classification algorithms can be applied in our research and what is our generalized
classification process, and at the same time decide how to evaluate the performance
of our system.
All malware analysis and extraction approaches can basically be categorized into
two types: (i) based on features drawn from an unpacked static version of the exe-
cutable file without executing the analyzed executable files [Ghe05, KS06, SBN+10,
PBKM07, XSCM04, XSML07, TBIV09, TBV08, WPZL09, YLCJ10, DB10, HYJ09]
and (ii) based on dynamic features or behavioral features obtained during the execu-
tion of the executable files [CJK07, WSD08, AHSF09, KChK+09, ZXZ+10].
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2.2.1 Static Feature Extraction
Since most of the commercial software and malware is distributed in the form
of binary code, binary code analysis becomes the basis of static feature extraction.
Traditional anti-virus detection and classification systems are based on static features
extracted from executables by reverse-engineering [Eil05, FPM05, Eag08]. Static fea-
ture extraction based on binary code analysis is used to provide information about
a program’s content and structure which are elementary, and therefore a founda-
tion of many applications, including binary modification, binary translation, binary
matching, performance profiling, debugging, extraction of parameters for performance
modeling, computer security and forensics [HM05].
As I mentioned previously, static feature extraction produces information about
the content of the program, which includes code information, such as instructions,
basic blocks, functions, modules, and structural information, like control flow and
data flow. Much research is focused on this information from different perspectives.
We consider a number of these below.
Gheorghescu [Ghe05] focuses on basic blocks of code in malware, which are defined
as “a continuous sequence of instructions that contains no jumps or jump target”,
and on average contains 12-14 bytes of data. These blocks are used to form a control
flow graph. The author uses the string edit distance to calculate the distance between
two basic blocks. The string edit distance between two basic blocks is defined as the
number of bytes in which the blocks differ, which is also known as the edit distance.
Similarity queries can be answered by computing the hash function for each basic
block in the source sample and verifying whether the bit at the corresponding position
in the target filter is set. The author presents two methods for approximate matching
of programs. One is to compute the string edit distance, and another method is
the inverted index which is commonly used in word search engines. As the author
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mentions, these two methods have their drawbacks; edit distance is CPU-intensive
and the inverted index is I/O bound. The bloom filters [Blo70] method was introduced
because Bloom filters are efficient not only in query time but also in storage space
because they are fixed in size. Bloom filters is a space-efficient probabilistic data
structure that is used to test whether an element is a member of a set. Basic blocks
are represented in a Bloom filter, and similarity queries can be answered by computing
the hash function for each basic block in the source sample and verifying if the bit at
the corresponding position in the target filter is set. Their results were presented on
4000 samples of Win32 malware. An important contribution of this paper is that the
author demonstrates that it is possible to implement an automated real-time system
to perform this analysis on a desktop machine.
Kapoor and Spurlock [KS06] argue that a binary code comparison of the malware
itself is not satisfactory because it is error prone, can be easily affected by the injection
of junk code and because code comparison algorithms are expensive with poor time
complexity. They state that comparing malware on the basis of functionality is more
effective because it is really the behavior of the code that determines what it is.
Kapoor and Spurlock suppose that the more complex the function, the more likely
it is to define the code behavior. Weightings are assigned to code depending on the
complexity of the function. A function tree is then constructed based on the control
flow graph of the system, and used to eliminate ‘uninteresting’ code. Then, they
convert the tree description of a malware sample to a vector and compare vectors to
determine the similarity of malware. The benefits of this are: control tree extraction
and comparison, however a major drawback of this method is the intensive pre-
processing which must be done in determining the weight assigned to each function.
In [SBN+10], the authors used weighted opcode sequence frequencies to calculate
the cosine similarity between two PE executable files. These opcode sequences are
based on static analysis and have two contributions. One is to assign a weight to each
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opcode which computes the frequency with which the opcode appears in a collection
of malware and benign software, then determines a ratio based on statistics. In
this way, they mine the relevance of the opcode and also acquire a weight for each
opcode. The second contribution is [SBN+10] proposes a method which relies on
the opcode sequence frequency to compute similarity between two executable files.
Their experiment was tested on a collection of malware downloaded from VxHeavens
(http://vx.netlux.org) which comes from 6 malware families. In our opinion, code
obfuscation is a big challenge for this method.
Several authors use sequences of system calls, API calls and function calls of mal-
ware to detect malicious behaviors. Peisert et al. [PBKM07] use sequences of function
calls to represent the behavior of a program. Sathyanarayan et al. [SKB08] use static
analysis to extract API calls from known malware then construct a signature for an
entire class. The API calls of an unclassified sample of malware can be compared
with the ‘signature’ API calls for a family to determine if the sample belongs to the
family or not. The drawback is that obfuscation of API calls can affect the accuracy
of results. In their paper Sathyanarayan et al. mention that they used IDA to extract
API and they tested it on eight families with 126 malware in total. API Calls are also
used by [XSCM04, XSML07] to compare polymorphic malware, with their analysis
carried out directly on the PE (portable executable) code. API calling sequences are
constructed for both the known virus and the suspicious code. In their method, they
scan the whole section of CALL instructions for each code section of a PE file to
obtain a set of strings, which stores the names of the called APIs. They then used
Euclidean distance to perform a similarity measurement between the two sequences
after a sequence realignment operation is performed.
Ye et al. [YLJW10] present a classifier using post-processing techniques of as-
sociative classification in malware detection which is based on their previous work
they called Intelligent Malware Detection System (IMDS). Their method is based on
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the static analysis of API execution calls. Their experiment was tested on a large
collection of executables including 35,000 malware and 15,000 cleanware samples, and
used various data mining techniques which achieved close to 88% accuracy.
[WPZL09] presents a virus detection technique based on identification of API
call sequences under the windows environment. They first acquired API calls from
malware files by static analysis of the procedures, and then set up the sequence of API
calls. The authors choose Bayes algorithm as an approximate determinant of a virus
because the Bayes algorithm is a method used to calculate the posterior probability
according to prior probability. The machining learning method was applied during
that procedure and the technique was a significant attempt to solve the win32 virus
with low cure rate.
An intelligent instruction sequence-based malware categorization system is pre-
sented in [HYJ09]. It consists of three integrated modules: feature extractor, clas-
sification and signature generator. They used the IDA Pro disassembler to extract
the function calls from the unpacked malware and a clustering method was used to
classify. They tested their method on 2029 malware samples from 408 families and
acquired close to 79% accuracy across their data set.
Further research of static analysis is presented in [DB10], which describes archi-
tecture for automated malware classification based on massive parallel processing of
common code sequences found in static malware. In [DB10], only portions of this
architecture have been implemented and the cost appears to be significant.
In our published paper [TBV08], we present a fast, simple and scalable method of
classifying Trojans based only on the lengths of their functions. Our results indicate
that function length may play a significant role in classifying malware, and combined
with other features, may result in a fast, inexpensive and scalable method of malware
classification. I will elaborate about function length in Chapter 4.
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An effective and efficient malware classification technique based on string infor-
mation is presented in our paper [TBIV09]. Using K-fold cross validation on the
unpacked malware and clean files, we achieved a classification accuracy of 97%. Our
results revealed that strings from library code (rather than malicious code itself) can
be utilised to distinguish different malware families. In Chapter 5 , further explana-
tion of printable string information will be presented.
To make further progress, in [ITBV10] we combined the static features of function
length and printable string information extracted by our static analysis methodolo-
gies. This test provides classification results better than those achieved by using
either feature individually. We achieved an overall classification accuracy of over
98%. Further description will be presented in Chapter 6.
2.2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Static Analysis
In this section, I would like to elaborate on the advantages and disadvantages
of static analysis and extraction. Static analysis and extraction of executable files
provides information about the content and structure of a program, and therefore are
the foundation of malware detection and classification. These have been well explored
and widely adopted due to the following advantages :
1) Low Level Time and Resource Consumption. During static analysis, we have no
need to run the malware which is high in both time and resource Consumption.
In static analysis, the time for disassembling is positively propagated with the
size of the code, while the time for dynamic analysis is related to execution flow,
which becomes even slower especially in the case of a loop with thousands and
millions of iterations [Li04].
2) Global View. A huge advantage of static analysis is that it can analyze any
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possible path of execution of an executable. This is in contrast to dynamic
analysis, which can only analyze a single path of execution at a time. A static
analysis has a good global view of the whole executable, covers the whole exe-
cutable and can figure out the entire program logic of the executable without
running it [Li04, Oos08].
3) Easily Accessible Form. In static analysis and extraction, we examine the dis-
assembling code generated by reverse engineering software. The first step of
reverse engineering software is usually to disassemble the binary code into cor-
responding assembler instructions, and then group these instructions in such
a way that the content and structure information about the executable, like
functions, basic blocks, control flow and data flow, is easily accessible [Oos08].
4) Stable and Repeatable. Compared with dynamic analysis, the disassembling
code generated during static analysis is relatively stable and constant, which
means is easy for us to apply and test new classification algorithms or theories.
In addition, the repeatability of the disassembling procedure provides flexibility
to static analysis and extraction.
5) Safety and Data Independent. Once the disassembling information of the orig-
inal executable files is extracted and preserved, we do not need to operate the
original files anymore. This means during static analysis, the opportunities of
being affected by malicious code is reduced to zero.
While static analysis has its advantages, it also has its limitations:
1) Limitation of Software Reverse-engineering Techniques. Static analysis depends
on software reverse engineering techniques, with the disassembling code of exe-
cutables acted upon. The authors in [HCS09] mention that since most modern
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malware programs are written in high-level programming languages, a minor
modification in source code can lead to a significant change in binary code.
2) Susceptible to Inaccuracies Due to Obfuscation and Polymorphic Techniques.
Code and data obfuscation poses considerable challenges to static analysis.
More and more automated obfuscation tools implement techniques such as in-
struction reordering, equivalent instruction sequence substitution, and branch
inversion. Malware authors can take advantage of these tools to easily generate
new malware versions that are syntactically different from, but semantically
equivalent to, the original version.
3) Content-based Analysis. Authors in [GAMP+08] argued that in the static anal-
ysis method, the representation of malware focuses primarily on content-based
signatures, that is to say they represent the malware based on the structural
information of a file, which is inherently susceptible to inaccuracies due to poly-
morphic and metamorphic techniques. This kind of analysis fails to detect
inter-component/system interaction information which is quite important in
malware analysis. At the same time, it is possible for malware authors to
thwart content-based similarity calculations.
4) Conservative Approximation. The approximation is a standard static analysis
technique, with this technique implemented with a few approximations which
are always overly conservative [Sax07]. In addition, this approximation natu-
rally involves a certain loss of precision [Vig07].
In [MKK07], the authors explore the limitation of the static analysis methodology
from the point of view of obfuscation technology. In this paper, they introduce a code
obfuscation schema which demonstrates that static analysis alone is not enough to
either detect or classify malicious code. They propose that dynamic analysis is a
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necessary complement to static techniques as it is significantly less vulnerable to code
obfuscating transformations.
In [LLGR10], the authors point out that dynamic analysis of malware is often far
more effective than static analysis. Monitoring the behavior of the binary during its
execution enables it to collect a profile of the operations performed by the binary and
offers potentially greater insight into the code itself if obfuscation is removed (e.g.,
the binary is unpacked) in the course of its running.
Increasingly, more researchers are now working on dynamic analysis techniques
to improve the effectiveness and accuracy of malware detection and classification.
In the next section, I will introduce some related dynamic analysis and extraction
approaches.
2.2.3 Dynamic (run-time) Feature Extraction
In [CJK07], Christodorescu et al. argue that it is the behavior of malware that
should be used to classify it. Viewing malware as a black box, they focus on its
interaction with the operating system, thereby using system calls as the building
blocks of their technique. They compare these with the system calls of non-malicious
code in order to trim the resulting graph of dependencies between calls. In their
method, behavioral information for each piece of malware has to be collected and a
graph constructed for it. Their results are based on an analysis of 16 pieces of known
malware.
The authors in [WSD08] use dynamic analysis technologies to classify malware by
using a controller to manage execution, with the execution stopped after 10 seconds.
Initially they calculated the similarity between two API call sequences by construct-
ing a similarity matrix based on action codes (to our understanding action codes in
this paper are actually the sequence of API calls). The relative frequency of each
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function call was computed and the Hellinger distance was used to show how much
information was contained in malware behavior to construct a second matrix. Fi-
nally, two phylogenetic trees were constructed using the similarity matrix and the
Hellinger distance matrices separately. They tested this on a small set of 104 mal-
ware samples,and in my opinion, their algorithm has relatively high time and space
complexities. In this paper, the authors do not mention the classification accuracy.
In [AHSF09], the authors open a new possibility in malware analysis and extrac-
tion by proposing a composite method which extracts statistical features from both
spatial and temporal information available in run-time API calls. From the point of
view of space, spatial features are generally statistical properties such as means, vari-
ances and entropies of address pointers and size parameters. From the perspective
of time, the temporal feature is the nth order discrete time Markov chain [CT91] in
which each state corresponds to a particular API call. They use 237 core API calls
from six different functional categories and use a 10-fold cross validation procedure
with five standard classification algorithms. The cost of their method is great because
of its high computational complexity, while they archived good results with 96.3%
classification accuracy.
A novel malware detection approach is proposed in [KChK+09], with the authors
focusing on host-based malware detectors because these detectors have the advantage
of observing the complete set of actions that a malware program performs and it is
even possible to identify malicious code before it is executed. The authors first analyze
a malware program in a controlled environment to build a model that characterizes
its behavior. Such a model describes the information flow between the system calls
essential to the malware’s mission and then extracts the program slices responsible for
such information flow. During detection, they execute these slices to match models
against the runtime behavior of an unknown program.
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In [ZXZ+10], the authors propose an automated classification method based on
behavioral analysis. They characterize malware behavioral profile in a trace report
which contains the changed status caused by the executable and the event which is
transferred from corresponding Win32 API calls and their parameters. They extract
behavior unit strings as features which reflect behavioral patterns of different malware
families. Then, these features of vector space serve as input to the support vector
machine (SVM), with and string similarity and information gained used to reduce
the dimension of feature space to improve system efficiency. They tested on 3996
malware samples and achieved an average classification accuracy of 83.3%.
In our published work [TIBV10], we provide our dynamic analysis and extraction
methodology. We used an automated tool running in a virtual environment to extract
API call features from executables and applied pattern recognition algorithms and
statistical methods to differentiate between files. A more detailed explanation will be
given in Chapter 7.
2.2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Dynamic Analysis
As with static analysis, dynamic analysis also has its advantages and disadvan-
tages. Dynamic analysis outperforms static analysis due to the following characteris-
tics.
Advantages:
1) Effectiveness and precision. Observation of the actual execution of a program
to determine it is malicious is a lot easier than examining its binary code.
Observation can reveal subtle malicious behaviors which are too complex to be
identified using static analysis. Dynamic analysis is typically more precise than
static analysis because it works with real values in the perfect light of run-time
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[Net04]. In addition, dynamic analysis is precise because no approximation or
abstraction needs to be done and the analysis can examine the actual, exact
run-time behavior of the executables [ME03].
2) Simplicity. Static analysis is the analysis of the source or the compiled code of
an executable without executing it. It consists of analyzing code and extracting
structures in the code at different levels of granularity. This is a very intensive
process [Oos08]. As dynamic analysis only considers a single execution path, it
is often much simpler than static analysis [Net04].
3) Runtime Behavioral Information. The advantage of dynamic analysis comes
from the fact that malware executes its own designed-in functionality when it
is started and when it is being executed. During dynamic analysis, the data
collected, such as memory allocation, files written, registry read and written,
and processes created, is more useful than the data collected during static anal-
ysis. The dynamic runtime information can be directly used in assessing the
potential damage malware can cause which enables detection and classification
of new threats. That is to say dynamic analysis can be used to probe the con-
text information at run time since most values of register or memory can only
be produced and watched on the fly [Li04].
4) No Unpacking. In dynamic analysis, we execute the malware in a controlled
environment. During that procedure, malware automatically executes the un-
packing code then runs its malicious code every time.
5) Robust to Code Obfuscation. Compared to static analysis, dynamic analysis
is more effective in detecting obfuscated malware simply because the obfus-
cated code does not affect the final behavioral information collected during the
execution.
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In spite of the obvious advantages of dynamic detection methods in detecting
modern malware, dynamic analysis detection has its own built-in drawbacks or lim-
itations :
1) Limited View of Malware. It is time-consuming and impossible for us to exam-
ine all the possible execution paths and variable values during dynamic analysis,
which means dynamic analysis provides a limited view of malware. Static anal-
ysis provides an overview of malware because the disassembling code contains
all the possible execution paths and variable values.
2) Trace Dependence and Execution Time Period. The main limitation of any
dynamic malware analysis approach is that it is trace-dependent [BCH+09].
The author states that in dynamic analysis, analysis results are only based on
malware behavior during one (or more) specific execution runs. Unfortunately,
some of malware’s behavior may be triggered only under specific conditions.
In addition, the author provides three examples to illustrate its limitation. A
simple example is a time-bomb, which is trigger-based and only exhibits its ma-
licious behavior on a specific date. Another example is a bot that only performs
malicious actions when it receives specific commands through a command and
control channel. In addition, the time period in which malicious behaviors are
collected in dynamic analysis is another limitation. It is possible that certain
behaviors will not be observed within this period due to time-dependent or
delayed activities [BOA+07].
3) Lack of Interactive Behavior Information. Since we run malware automatically
without human interaction, interactive behaviors such as providing input or
logging into specific websites, is not performed during dynamic analysis which
limits the exhibition of further malicious behaviors [BCH+09].
4) Time and Resource Consumption. Dynamic analysis involves running malware
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in a controlled environment for a specific time or until the execution is finished.
It is a time-consuming task when we are faced with the challenge to analyse
huge amounts of malware files released every day. In addition, running malware
occupies a high level computer system and network resources [KK10].
5) Limitation of VM Environment and Detection Inaccuracy. The virtual machine
environment in which malware is executed is relatively monotonous and steady
compared with the real runtime environment, which also limits the exhibition
of further malicious behaviors. Additionally, dynamic analysis detection about
real functionality of the analyzed malware file can be inaccurate. [KK10].
2.2.5 Machine Learning based Classification Decision Mak-
ing Mechanisms
Another core problem in malware detection and classification is the choice of mech-
anisms for classification decision making. This task involves the following aspects:
1) Selecting suitable classification algorithms.
2) Generalizing classification processes based on the feature sets obtained in mal-
ware analysis and extraction.
3) Evaluating the performance of system.
As I mentioned in Section 2.1, the main drawback of a signature-based detec-
tion system is that it cannot detect unknown malware. Machine learning is capable
of generalizing on unknown data, and therefore can be a potential and promising
approach for detecting malware. In order to detect unknown malware, more and
more researchers are turning their attention in obtaining a form of generalization in
malware detection and classification by using machine learning methodologies.
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Machine Learning is defined by Ethem Alpaydin in [Alp04] as: “Machine Learning
is programming computers to optimize a performance criterion using example data or
past experience.” In [Nil96], the author points out that, like zoologists and psychol-
ogists who study learning in humans and animals, Artificial Intelligence researchers
focus on learning in machines. The core idea of machine learning is generalization. In
other words, machine learning is used to generalize beyond the known data provided
during the training phrase to new data presented at the time of testing. Machine
learning is a very open and practical field and it is broadly applied in many fields,
including Expert System, Cognition Simulation, Network Information Service, Image
Reorganization, Fault Diagnose, robotics, and machine translation.
[Sti10] points out that from a machine learning perspective, signature-based mal-
ware detection is based on a prediction model where no generalization exists, that is to
say that no detection beyond the known malware can be performed. As we mentioned
above, machine learning is capable of generalizing on unknown data, therefore, can
be used in a malware detection system. In the current literature, many publications
apply data mining and machine learning classification decision making mechanisms
[AACKS04, MSF+08, SMEG09, CJK07, SEZS01, SXCM04, WDF+03, HJ06]. Ma-
chine learning algorithms used in this area include association classifiers, support
vector machines, decision tree, random forest and Naive Bayes. There have also been
several initiatives in automatic malware categorization using clustering techniques
[KM04].
The authors in [SEZS01] firstly introduce the idea of applying machine learning
techniques in the detection of malware. They extract features from different aspects
of malware, including the program header, string, byte sequence and four classifiers
applied in their work, including the signature-based method, Ripper which is a rule-
based learner, Na¨ıve Bayes and Multi-Na¨ıve Bayes. [SEZS01] found that machine
learning methods are more accurate and more effective than signature-based methods.
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In [AACKS04], the authors applied the Common N-Gram analysis (CNG) method
which was successfully used in test classification analysis in the detection of malicious
code. They adopted machine learning techniques based on byte n-gram analysis in
the detection of malicious code. 65 distinct Windows executable files (25 malicious
code, and 40 benign code) were tested and their method achieved 100% accuracy on
training data, and 98% accuracy in 3-fold cross validation.
In [KM04], the authors applied machine learning techniques based on information
retrieval and text classification in detecting unknown malware in the wild. After eval-
uating a variety of inductive classification methods, including Na¨ıve Bayes, decision
trees, support vector machines, and boosting, their results suggested that boosted
decision trees outperformed other methods with an area under the ROC curve of
0.996.
The authors in [KM06] extended their previous work [KM04] by providing three
contributions. To begin with they show how to use established data mining methods of
text classification to detect and classify malicious executables. Secondly, they present
empirical results from an extensive study of inductive machine learning methods
for detecting and classifying malicious executables in the wild. Finally they show
that their machine learning based methods achieved high detection rates, even on
completely new, previously unseen malicious executables.
In [HJ06], the authors state that more general features should be utilized in mal-
ware detection because signatures are overfitted. They present a n-gram based data
mining approach and evaluate their machine learning method by using 4 classifiers,
including ID3 and J48 decision trees, Na¨ıve Bayes and the SMO.
In [MSF+08], they employed four commonly used classification algorithms, in-
cluding Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Decision Trees, Na¨ıve Bayes, and Support
Vector Machines.
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In [Sti10], they investigated the applicability of machine learning methods for de-
tecting viruses in real infected DOS executable files when using the n-gram represen-
tation. Although, the author states that detecting viruses in real infected executable
files with machine learning methods is nearly impossible in the n-gram representation.
However, the author notices that learning algorithms for sequential data could be an
effective approach, and another promising approach would be to learn the behaviors
of malware by machine learning methods.
In [Kel11], the author investigated the application of a selection of machine learn-
ing techniques in malware detection. In [Kel11], the author states that we need a
proactive approach not a reactive approach, which means malware should be identi-
fied before their signatures are known and before they have a chance to do damage.
The preliminary results from their project supports the idea that AI techniques can
indeed be applied to the detection of unseen malicious code with a feature set derived
from Win32 API calls, and the results also provide evidence to the superiority of some
techniques over others.
2.3 Our Proposed Method
As I mentioned in Section 2.2 , the two core problems of malware detection and
classification is suitable representation of malware and the choice of mechanism for
optimal classification decision making. The first problem of representation of malware
depends on the malware analysis and extraction approaches. The second problem
of decision making mechanisms is related to the choice of classification algorithms,
the generalization of classification processes and the evaluation of performance. My
system aims to construct a robust, flexible and generalizable malware detection and
classification system. In general, this system should have the following characteristics:
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1) Malware analysis and extraction should be based on simple and effective feature
sets.
2) These feature sets should be easily extracted, applied and combined.
3) These feature sets should present malware from different points of view in order
to apprehend malware in an overall way as accurately as possible.
4) These features should be robust enough against the evolution of malware.
5) The malware classification process should be generalizable.
6) There should be an effective evaluation of performance.
Given the above factors and the two core problems that I mention above, we set
up our malware detection and classification system. I provide a brief description of
it in the following two sections.
2.3.1 Integrated Analysis and Extraction Approach
We start our system by using static analysis and extraction approaches. In static
analysis, we analyze and extract simple and effective features from executable files,
including Function Length Frequency (FLF), and Printable String Information (PSI).
We cannot solely rely on one single approach, so therefore we introduce dynamic
analysis and extraction approaches into our system. All of the features from both
static and dynamic analysis are simple, can be easily extracted and are suitable to
apply to both small and large data sets. We can obtain function length information
by executing several database storage procedures and functions, and we can easily
fetch printable string information from our table strings window (see Section 3.4 in
Chapter 3). These features can be easily combined and applied to a large data set and
they also present malware from several different points of view. In addition, as we
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will show from our experimental results in Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, these features
are effective and robust enough against the evolution of malware.
As all methods have their strengths and weaknesses, dynamic analysis does not
aim to replace static analysis but does provide an additional layer of intelligence.
Static and dynamic analysis should complement the merits of each other.
The author in [ME03] mentions that researchers need to develop new analytical
methods that complement existing ones, and more importantly, researchers need to
erase the boundaries between static and dynamic analysis and create unified analyses
that can operate in either mode, or in a mode that blends the strengths of both
approaches.
Our proposed method aims to build a robust system which integrates dynamic
analysis and static analysis approaches. This allows the combination of their advan-
tages and minimizes their imperfections. In our system, static analysis uses binary
code analysis to examine the code which the malware is comprised and extract static
features to capture the capabilities of the malware without actually executing it.
Dynamic analysis provides a method for obtaining high-level, real-time behavior of
an executable, which involves running the executable in a virtual machine environ-
ment. we then merge both static and dynamic features into a broader feature which
is applied into our machine learning based classification decision making mechanism.
At the time of writing this thesis there was a lack of integrated malware detection
and classification platforms which include complementary static and dynamic analysis
in order to reach high and robust classification accuracy. Such an integrated platform
is a primary contribution of this thesis.
In order to evaluate the robustness and scalability of our system, the malware
executable files that we investigate stretch cross an 8-year span, from 2003 to 2010.
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2.3.2 Machine Learning based Classification Decision Mak-
ing Mechanisms
As I mentioned in Section 2.2.5, data mining and machine learning approaches
are applied as a classification decision making mechanism in malware detection and
classification in order to generalize the classification process, and therefore, to detect
unknown malware.
In Section 3.6 of Chapter 3, I will provide a detailed description of machine learn-
ing and data mining techniques applied in our system. In this section, I will intro-
duce four classification algorithms applied in our system: support vector machine
(SVM), decision tree (DT), random forest (RF) and instance-based (IB1), along with
boosting techniques. These algorithms represent the spectrum of major classification
techniques available, based on differing approaches to the classification. Good classifi-
cation accuracy obtained across all of these algorithms supports our claim of a robust
methodology. In order to estimate the generalized accuracy, K-fold cross validation
is applied because it is the most popular and widely used approach to measure how
the results of a statistical analysis will be generalizable to an independent data set.
2.4 Hypotheses and Objective of System
Correctly classifying malware is an important research issue in a malware detec-
tion and classification system. As I discussed in Section 2.2, all the classification
approaches can basically be categorized into two types: static methods and dynamic
methods. In both static and dynamic methods, it is crucial to find key features that
represent malware and are effective in malware detection and classification. There-
fore, we propose the following hypotheses while setting up the malware detection and
classification system.
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• Hypothesis 1 : It is possible to find static features which are effective in
malware detection and classification. This hypothesis is verified by the FLF
(Function Length Frequency) and FLP (Function Length Pattern) experiments
presented in Chapter 4, and the PSI (Printable String Information) experiments
presented in Chapter 5.
• Hypothesis 2 : Combining several static features can produce a better detec-
tion and classification performance than any individual feature can produce.
This hypothesis is verified by the combined static experiments presented in
Chapter 6.
• Hypothesis 3 : It is possible to find dynamic features which are effective in
malware detection and classification. This hypothesis is verified by the dynamic
experiments presented in Chapter 7.
• Hypothesis 4 : Combining static and dynamic features can produce better
detection and classification performance than any individual feature can pro-
duce. This hypothesis is verified by the integrated experiments presented in
Chapter 8.
• Hypothesis 5 : Good levels of malware detection and classification accuracy
can be retained on malware collected over an extended period of time. In
Chapter 8, this hypothesis is verified by the integrated experiments on two sets
of malware collected from different time zones.
.
In reality, there is no such system that can achieve a 100% classification accuracy.
Some researchers have achieved quite good results by testing different approaches on
different data sets. For instance, Bailey et al. [BOA+07] achieved over 91% accuracy;
Zhao, H., et al. [ZXZ+10] achieved an overall performance of approximately 83.3%
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classification accuracy; Ye, Y. et. al. [YLJW10] achieved approximately 88% accu-
racy. For our malware detection and classification system, we would like to aim for
97% classification accuracy. .
2.5 Summary
This chapter has presented a literature review related to my research. Based on the
problem description of traditional methods used by the anti-virus industry, I proposed
the two core problems of malware detection and classification. Following this, the
current static and dynamic methods were presented and I analyzed and stated the
merits and limitations of both static and dynamic approaches. I also proposed our
integrated method and proposed our hypotheses along with the targeted classification
accuracy of our system.
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Chapter 3
Architecture of the System
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I explore our proposed malware detection classification system
from the point view of system architecture. To make it easy to understand, I divide
our system into different layers according to the flow of process with each layer having
its own specific problems and corresponding solutions. First I outline these basic
layers of our malware detection and classification system and then I explain them in
detail section by section with a summary provided at the end of this chapter.
3.2 Overview of System
As I mentioned in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, our aim is to construct a robust, flexi-
ble and scalable malware detection and classification system. It should be based on a
set of simple and effective features which are easily extracted, applied and combined.
While these features present malware from different points of view, at the same time
these features should be robust enough against the evolution of malware. It also
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should have a generalized malware classification process and an effective evaluation
of performance. To set up such a system, we need to answer the following questions:
where do we collect our test samples? How do we deal with these samples to make
them suitable for our research? How do we store and maintain this data? We need
to answer two core problems of a malware detection and classification system which
I mentioned in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2. These are:
1) Suitable Representation of Malware.
2) Optimal Classification Decision Making Mechanisms.
Figure 3.1 provides a hierarchical structure of such a system. It is generalized into
the following functional layers:
1) Data Collection and Data Preprocess Layer: In this layer, we decide where we
collect test samples, including malicious software and benign software. We need
to select representative samples which are then preprocessed to make sure they
are well-formed and that they fit our research.
2) Data Storage Layer: We then need to choose a method to store this preprocessed
data, taking data accessibility and manoeuvrability into consideration. At the
same time, in the scenario of malware analysis, there is a potential risk of being
affected by malware due to operational accidents. Therefore, in this layer, data
security is also an important factor to consider in order to minimize this kind
of risk.
3) Extraction and Representation Layer: Once we have the stored preprocessed
data, we come to the core problem of malware detection and classification:
what information should we extract from the executable files and how should
we represent it in an abstract fashion based on the extraction.
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Figure 3.1. Architecture of Our Malware Detection and Classification System
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4) Classification Process Layer: On this layer, we need to select suitable classifica-
tion algorithms. This classification process also needs to be generalized based on
the feature sets obtained from the lower Extraction and Representation layer.
5) Performance Assessment Layer: The top layer is the statistical analysis of clas-
sification results and evaluation of performance.
In Figure 3.1, I outlined the architecture of our system. More detailed imple-
mentation information is presented in Figure 3.2. In this figure, I specify concrete
implementation that is designed to meet the requirements mentioned above within
each layer of our system.
CA VET zoo/CleanWare
Data Preparaon 
Reverse Engineering
(ida2sql)
Execute File 
Under a 
Controlled 
Environment
ida2DBMS
Log Files il
Data Collection and Data Preprocess
Data Storage
Unpacking
Static Features Extraction 
and Reprentation
Dynamic 
Features 
Extraction and 
Representation   
Extraction and Representation
WEKA-Integrated Classification
Classification Process
Evaluating on Test Set
Classification Performance Statistic Analysis
Performance Assessment
FD
K-fold Cross Validation
Training on Training Set
PSI DynamicFLF
IB1 RFDTSVMNB
Figure 3.2. Implementation of Our Malware Detection and Classification System
48
In the following section I explain the implementation of these layers in our system
section by section.
3.3 Data Collection and Preprocess
In this section, I list the experimental dataset that we collected and explain the
preprocess that we adopted in our research work.
3.3.1 Experimental Dataset
As I mentioned in Section 1.1.3 of Chapter 1, malware has become increasingly
complicated and has evolved into more and more types. However some types, in-
cluding Trojans, Viruses and Worms, are the most popular forms of malware and
comprise the main security threats faced by host, network and application layers.
According to the analysis from Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2007 (http:
//www.securelist.com / en/ analysis?pubid=204791987 ), in 2006 and 2007 the
vast majority of malware were Trojans, Worms and Viruses. In their analysis report,
TrojWare refers to Trojans and VirWare refers to Worms and Viruses.
From Figure 3.3 we can see that in 2006, the malware landscape was dominated
by TroWare and Virware, which accounted for 89.45% and 6.11% respectively, and in
2007 the numbers were 91.73% and 5.64%. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 graphically show the
distribution of malicious programs in 2006 and 2007.
Other anti-virus companies have also similar analyses. In 2009 and 2010, the
Symantec company released the Global Internet Security Threat Report of trends for
2008 and 2009 respectively [Sym09, Sym10]. According to their report of trends for
2008, in the top 10 new malicious code families detected in 2008, six of them were
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Total 2007 2006 % in 2007 % in 2006 Growth 
TrojWare 201958 91911 91,73% 89,45% 119,73% 
VirWare 12416 6282 5,64% 6,11% 97,64% 
MalWare 5798 4558 2,63% 4,44% 27,20% 
Total 220172 102751 100% 100% 114,28% 
 
Figure 3.3. Number of New Malicious Programs Detected by Kaspersky Lab in 2006
and 2007 [Gos08]
89.45%
6.11%
4.44%
TrojWare
VirWare
MalWare
Figure 3.4. Distribution of Malicious Programs in 2006 [Gos08]
91.73%
5.64% 2.63%
TrojWare
VirWare
MalWare
Figure 3.5. Distribution of Malicious Programs in 2007 [Gos08]
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Trojans and three of them were Worms. According to their report of trends for 2009,
of the top 10 new malicious code families detected in 2009, six were Trojans, three
were Worms, and one was a Virus. In 2010 Trojans ,Worms and Viruses still occupy
the leading position. For example, the Quarterly Report [Pan10] from PandaLabs
shows 77% of new mlware identified by PandaLabs during the second quarter are
Trojans, Viruses and Worms. Based on the analysis of these reports from the anti-
virus community, the selection of our experimental dataset focuses on Trojans, Worms
and Viruses.
Our project is supported by CA Technologies (www.ca.com). CA has a long
history of research and development of anti-virus products. Its VET zoo contains
huge amounts of malware collected by their research staff or provided by customers.
All the malware in our system was collected from CA’s VET zoo and have been
pre-classified using generally acceptable mechanical means. We chose three types of
malware, including Trojans, Worms and Viruses. We also collected clean executables
from Window platforms spanning Windows 98 to Windows XP, which we refer to
as cleanware. Table 3.1 lists all the malware families and cleanware tested in our
experiments.
From Table 3.1 of Chapter 3, we can see that our experimental data set includes
Trojans, Viruses and Worms spanning from 2003 to 2010. I provide a detailed de-
scriptions of each family in Appendix B. We divided them into two groups, the
first collected between 2003 and 2008 including “Clagger”, “Robknot”, “Robzips”,
“Alureon”, “Bambo”, “Boxed”, “Emerleox”, “Looked”, and “Agobot”, which we
called them “Old Families”. The second group was collected between 2009 and
2010, including “Addclicker”, “Gamepass”, “Banker”, “Frethog”, “SillyAutorun”,
“SillyDI”, “Vundo”, “Bancos”. We called these “New Families”.
The files that we collected were raw executable files, and were stored in the file
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Type Family Detection Date: No. of Samples
starting ⇒ ending (YYYY-MM)
Malware
Trojan
Bambo 2003-07⇒2006-01 44
Boxed 2004-06⇒2007-09 178
Alureon 2005-05⇒2007-11 41
Robknot 2005-10⇒2007-08 78
Clagger 2005-11⇒2007-01 44
Robzips 2006-03⇒2007-08 72
SillyDl 2009-01⇒2010-08 439
Vundo 2009-01⇒2010-08 80
Gamepass 2009-01⇒2010-07 179
Bancos 2009-01⇒2010-07 446
adclicker 2009-01⇒2010-08 65
Banker 2009-01⇒2010-06 47
Subtotal of Trojan 1713
Worm
Frethog 2009-01⇒2010-08 174
SillyAutorun 2009-01⇒2010-05 87
Subtotal of Worm 261
Virus
Agobot 2003-01⇒2006-04 283
Looked 2003-07⇒2006-09 66
Emerleox 2006-11⇒2008-11 75
Subtotal of Virus 424
Total of Malware 2003-07⇒2010-08 2398
Cleanware 541
Total 2939
Table 3.1. Experimental Set of 2939 Files
system in the form of binary code. To make them suitable for our research, we
needed to preprocess them. Because our system combines the static analysis method
and dynamic analysis method, there were two ways of data preprocessing: static and
dynamic.
3.3.2 Static Preprocess
In our static Preprocess, we unpacked the malware before passing them to IDA
Pro, the reverse-engineering software.
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3.3.2.1 Unpacking
Malware makers have always strived to evade detection from anti-virus software.
Code obfuscation is one of the methods they use to achieve this. As time has passed,
obfuscation methodologies have evolved from simple encryption to polymorphism,
metamorphism and packing. Packing is becoming increasingly popular, with lots of
packing tools available to malware makers, and more of them being created in short
periods of time. At present, there are a few dozen different packing utilities available,
most of which can be used by anyone with minimal computer skills. Each of these tools
may have many variants or versions, for instance, UPX(http://upx.sourceforge.net/)
has more than 20 known versions. There are several scrambler tools that can be used
to create modified versions of UPX.
Although unpacking technology is beyond the scope of our research, we do use
this technology in our project. The main idea of unpacking manually is to let the
packed executable run until the unpacking procedure is finished. We then dump the
unpacked executable from memory, with the dump hopefully occurring right after
the executable has been unpacked completely. In the early stage of my research,
I unpacked more than 200 packed malware files. There are many methods and
tools that we can use to unpack a packed executable automatically, such as PEid
(http://www.peid.info/) which can help us to find the common packer; UN-PACK
(unpack.cjb.net), which is a set of tools for file analyzing and unpacking; .NET Generic
Unpacker (http://www.ntcore.com/netunpack.php)which can dump .NET packed ap-
plications.
In our unpacking Pro-processing we used VMUnpacker 1.3 . VMUnpacker 1.3
is free software from Sucop company (http://www.sucop.com), and is based on vir-
tual machine technology, supporting 61 kinds of packers, including more than 300
versions. Figure 3.6 is the sectional drawing of VMUnpacker 1.3 running in a vir-
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tual machine environment. After we obtained the unpacked executable files, we used
reverse-engineering techniques to perform our static analysis.
Figure 3.6. VMUnpacker 1.3
3.3.2.2 Reverse Engineering Ida2sql
The main theory underlying static analysis is reverse-engineering. During static
analysis, we capture the malware’s capabilities by examining the code from which the
malware is comprised. We open the malware up with Reverse Engineering Software
or disassemblers without actually executing it. Reverse-engineering is the reverse
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process of compilation. To understand this, in Figure 3.7 I provide a brief description
of these two processes: compilation and reverse-engineering.
In the compilation process, the high level source code text is initially broken
into small pieces called tokens which are single atomic units of the language. These
tokens are combined to form syntactic structures, typically represented by a parsing
tree. The next stage is lexical, syntax and control flow analysis. During this stage,
further syntactic information is extracted. The source code is then translated into
assembly code by semantic analysis and an intermediate code generator, and finally,
the generated code is optimized and the corresponding machine code is generated.
Reverse-engineering is the process of deriving a higher-level engineering descrip-
tion of its function in the form of source code or other specification from a compiled
program. This can be used to provide insight into the execution plan and structure
of a program and the algorithms used in the program. In the reverse-engineering
process, the low level machine code of the executable is disassembled into assembly
code, and then assembly code is decompiled into high level code afterwards.
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Figure 3.7. Complilation and the Reverse-engineering Process
In the reverse-engineering analysis of malware, for the purpose of more specificity
and accuracy, malware analysts always use the assembly code generated by the dis-
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assembler. There are many reverse-engineering programs available, such as SoftICE
[OF96], WinDBG [Rob99], IDA Pro [Eag08], OllyDBG [Yus04] etc. These disassem-
blers will allow you to safely view the executable code without executing it, and also
allow you to write down the offsets of interesting breakpoints for further examination.
We chose IDA Pro as our main reverse-engineering analysis tool because IDA Pro
is a Windows or Linux hosted, programmable, interactive, multi-processor disassem-
bler and debugger that offers many features [Eag08] which are useful in this research.
IDA Pro can identify known library routines which saves time and effort by focusing
the analysis on other areas of the code, and its popular plug-ins make writing IDA
scripts easier and allows collaborative reverse engineering. Furthermore, its built-in
debugger can tackle obfuscated code that would defeat a stand-alone disassembler and
can be customized for improved readability and usefulness. It is a popular reverse-
engineering tool used by anti-virus companies, software development companies and
military organizations.
As I mentioned above, the main theory and technology adopted in static analysis
is reverse-engineering. In most cases, what we can obtain from reverse-engineering is
the assembly code of executable files. Compared to high level programming language,
assembly programming language is code intensive and is not easily understood. In
order to make reverse-engineering easier, many people and organizations have de-
veloped applications which can be used as the intermediary agents to manage and
exploit reverse-engineering information. Ida2sql is one of these applications.
Ida2sql was developed by a technical analyst from Zynamics GmbH (formerly
SABRE Security GmbH) (http://www.zynamics.com/). It is the upgraded prod-
uct of their previous tool named ida2reml which exports much of the contents
of the IDA database to a XML-like file format. In order to store the disassem-
bling information in a way that would be as least architecture dependent as pos-
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sible and allow for fast querying, and at the same time, trying not to make it
too difficult to use directly through SQL, they developed ida2sql. Ida2sql is in-
cluded in BinNavi, which is a binary code reverse-engineering tool that was built
to assist vulnerability researchers who look for vulnerabilities in disassembled code
(http://www.zynamics.com/binnavi.html), but is also available as a stand-alone mod-
ule for anybody to use. Ida2sql is actually a Python module in charge of exporting
the disassembling information from IDA Pro into the SQL Schema.
Meanwhile, we found that ida2sql generates a set of tables for each module and
stores this information in MySQL. In order to make it more applicable to our research,
I upgraded this software to the following aspects:
1) Database Migration. I customized the software to support both MySQL and
the Microsoft SQL Server because the latter is more popular and more powerful
than the former.
2) Improve Database Schema. I altered the structure of the schema using a fixed
number of tables.
3) Export More Information. For the purpose of our research, I also customized
this software to export more information, such as printable string information,
and function complexity, etc.
Another improvement I made to the ida2sql-based data preprocess is the strength-
ening of the automation of our system through the development of a utility called “Al-
lEnOne”. Ida2sql is implemented in IDAPython using python script and IDAPython
supports running Python scripts on start up from the command line. Such function-
ality is very useful when analyzing a set of binaries in batch mode. To make use of
this functionality, I developed the tool “AllEnOne”. Figure 3.8 is the interface of
this tool. With this tool we can manage the connection to our Ida2DBMS schema,
57
generate batch script exporting disassembling of large numbers of malware samples
into Ida2DBMS at the same time, and execute sql script to fetch information from
Ida2DBMS.
In Section 3.4, I provide more information on the customized database schema
ida2DBMS.
Figure 3.8. The Interface of AllEnOne
3.3.3 Dynamic Preprocess
In the dynamic analysis, we execute each file under a controlled environment
which is based on Virtual Machine Technology. We developed a trace tool named
“HookMe” to monitor and trace the real execution of each file.
58
3.3.3.1 Virtual Machine Environment
Figure 3.9 illustrates our dynamic analysis preprocess. We can see that the dy-
namic analysis preprocess is based on Virtual Machine Technology. To begin with,
executable files location information is fetched from our ida2DBMS schema and is
then passed to our VMrun-based Dynamic Analysis Script which controls the execu-
tions of the executables in the VMware environment. VMrun is the command-line
utility of VMware [VMw09]. The Dynamic Analysis Script, written based on VM-
run, automates the controlling of the executions in a batch mode. In Section 7.3.1 of
Chapter 7, I provide a detailed description of this implementation.
To set up our virtual machine environment, we install and configure VMware
Server 2.0.2. We then created a new virtual machine by installing Window XP Pro-
fessional as a guest operation system and also disabled networking. Before the start
of dynamic analysis, a snapshot of the virtual machine was taken and we needed to
revert to the snapshot for every execution. In this way, we were assured that the
virtual machine was rehabilitated every time.
After the execution, we obtained a log file which reflected the behaviors of the mal-
ware in terms of API function calls. In the next section, I discuss related technology
we applied in the trace tool HookMe.
3.3.3.2 Trace tool
We developed a trace tool which we called ”‘HookMe”’ to monitor and trace
the execution of malware. It is built around Microsoft technology called Detours
[HB99] which is designed to intercept Win32 functions by re-writing target function
images and performs API hooking of functions that are imported into an executable.
Basically, Detours is a library used to easily instrument and extend the operating
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Figure 3.9. Dynamic Analysis Preprocess
system and application functionality. Detours technology provides three important
functionalities:
1) Intercepts arbitrary Win32 binary functions on x86 machines.
2) Edits the import tables of binary files.
3) Attaches arbitrary data segments to binary files.
HookMe is implemented based on the first functionality. There are three concepts we
need to understand in this technology: Target Functions, Trampoline Functions and
Detour Functions.
• Target Functions. Target Functions are the functions that we want to intercept
or hook and are usually windows API functions.
• Trampoline Functions. These are actually copies of Target Functions, with in-
structions from the Target Functions preserved in Trampoline Functions. Tram-
poline Functions consist of the instructions removed from the Target Functions
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Figure 3.10. Detours: Logical Flow of Control for Function Invocation with and
without Interception [HB99]
and an unconditional branch to the remainder of the Target Functions. In this
way, Trampoline Functions keep the semantics of Target Functions.
• Detour Functions. A Detours function replaces the first few instructions of
the target function with an unconditional jump to the user-provided Detour
Function. Detour Functions are designed by the user to replace or extend the
Target Functions.
In [HB99], the authors describe the logic flow for control of function invocation
with and without interception which I present in Figure 3.10. From this figure, we
can see that the detour function replaces the target function, but it can invoke its
functionality at any point through the trampoline.
HookMe uses Detours to hook selected functions, and focuses on configuring De-
tours to specify what to collect and directs output to a log file. HookMe may au-
tomatically trace various events which happen during the execution of the malware.
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Figure 3.11. Trace Tool HookMe
It actually monitors the state changes in the system and generates a log file which
reflects the behaviors of the malware in terms of API function calls. Figure 3.11
illustrates the implementation of Detours technology in HookMe which we applied in
our dynamic analysis. HookMe runs the monitored executable file and rewrites the
in-process binary image of the related API calls invoked in the executable file. In this
way, HookMe intercepts the windows API calls, gets the information of API calls and
records this information in the log file.
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3.4 Data Storage
In this section, I will present the implementation of the Data Storage Layer in
our system. As I mentioned in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, our proposed method aims
to build a robust system which integrates both dynamic analysis and static analysis
approaches. There are two ways for data storage in our system corresponding to these
two different methods of analysis.
3.4.1 Static Data Storage
As I mentioned in 3.3.2.2, I customized and improved ida2sql to meet
our research requirements. We chose database management system DBMS
(http://www.microsoft.com/sqlserver/2005/en/us/default.aspx) as our data stor-
age because DBMS has the following benefits which facilitate our work:
• Integrated Management Interface. All the information we need in our static
analysis is stored in DBMS, so that we achieve a united environment where we
can easily access the binary information. At the same time, we can expand
our data collection simply by running a command or running a plugin in IDA.
In addition, we can utilize the functions of DBMS backup and restore. Fur-
thermore, our customized static analysis software supports analysis of a set of
executable files in an automatic and batch mode. In practice, we can schedule
a large amount of analysis when the server is idle.
• Standard Form for Binaries. Data structure of binaries in a database is con-
sistent with the structure of the program, including functions, basic blocks of a
function, instructions and operators.
63
• Fetch Data in a Simple and Effective Way. Using sql script, we can query
or fetch information, such as a specific instruction, all the instructions of a
function, or all the basic blocks of a function, etc. Writing sql script is much
easier and less error-prone than writing plugins for IDA.
• Faster to Test New Algorithms/Theories. Because all the information is stored
in the database, when a new algorithm or theory is developed, we need to
extract specific data from the database. This is much faster than testing the
new algorithm or theory on the original files.
• Data Independent. Once the binary information of the original files is analysed
and put into the database, we no longer need the original files. That means the
opportunities for being infected by malicious code is reduced to zero.
As I mentioned above, there are many benefits when we use DBMS to store
disassembling information. For instance, we can fetch information we are interested
in just by executing a sql script. To explain it more clearly, I present several examples
in Table 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 with each table displaying sql script. Following is
the execution result of that sql script.
We can obtain the basic information from all the files of a specific family, shown
in Table 3.2. After executing the sql script, we obtain a list of basic information for
all the files from the “Clagger” family. We can obtain the main function information
of files as explained in Table 3.3. After executing the script, the main function
information of some executable files assigned in the script can be fetched. In this
example, we obtain main function information by assigning ID values to corresponding
files. We can also fetch the list of instructions of a Basic Block from a File. The
example in Table 3.4 explains how to obtain the list of instructions of a basic block
by assigning the module ID value and basic block ID value in sql script. Table 3.5
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select * from modules where family=’clagger’.
Output of Execution Result
ID FILENAME ENTRYP TYPE FAMILY VARIANT ...
2 connect unpacked.exe 4203506 trojan Clagger A ...
3 fiks unpacked.exe 4203506 trojan Clagger A ...
4 gzwazd2h unpacked.exe 4206594 trojan Clagger AA ...
5 2853315 unpacked.exe 4220146 trojan Clagger AB ...
6 3044352 unpacked.exe 4205752 trojan Clagger AD ...
7 ID0220712 unpacked.exe 4201170 trojan Clagger AE ...
8 Ebay-Rechnung.pdf unpacked.exe 4228109 trojan Clagger AG ...
9 DD269901 unpacked.exe 4201106 trojan Clagger AH ...
10 TT-022-421-683 unpacked.exe 4204066 trojan Clagger AI ...
11 2727905 unpacked.exe 4202706 trojan Clagger AJ ...
12 2803317 unpacked.exe 4202354 trojan Clagger AK ...
13 web unpacked.exe 4203698 trojan Clagger AL ...
14 photoalbum unpacked.exe 4215506 trojan Clagger AM ...
15 xpfaease unpacked.exe 4206274 trojan Clagger AN ...
. . . . . . ...
. . . . . . ...
. . . . . . ...
Table 3.2. Fetch Basic Information of Executable Files from a Specific Family
shows how to fetch an instruction located at the specific address and Table 3.6 shows
how to fetch all the printable string information from a file.
From these examples, it is evident that extracting information from executable
files becomes much easier and flexible after we exported the executables into our
ida2DBMS schema.
After the static data preprocessing, we exported the disassembling informa-
tion into a database schema which we called ida2DBMS. Figure 3.12 illustrates
this schema. In this schema, there are 19 tables. The main tables are Modules,
Functions, Basic Blocks , Instructions, Strings window, fun len, callgraph, and con-
trol flow graph. Every entry in the Modules table represents an executable file,and it
describes attributes of an executable file, including storage location in the file system,
family and variant information, entry point, platform, MD5 values and import time
etc. Each entry in the Functions table contains information describing a specific func-
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select modules.module id, modules.name, modules.entry point,
functions.name fname, functions.address, functions.end address
from functions,modules
where functions.module id = modules.module id
and modules.entry point between functions.address and functions.end address
and modules.module id in (2,3,4).
Output of Execution Result
ID FILENAME ENTRYP FNAME FSTARTADDR FENDADDR
2 connect unpacked.exe 4203506 start 4203506 4203793
3 fiks unpacked.exe 4203506 start 4203506 4203793
4 gzwazd2h unpacked.exe 4206594 start 4206594 4206881
Table 3.3. Fetch Main Function Information of Some Assigned Executable Files
select instructions.module id, instructions.basic block id,
instructions.address, operand id,position,
instructions.mnemonic,str from operand tuples,instructions, operand strings
where operand tuples.module id = instructions.module id
and instructions.module id = operand strings.module id
and instructions.module id = 2
and operand tuples.address = instructions.address
and operand tuples.operand id = operand strings.operand string id
and instructions.basic block id = 146.
Output of Execution Result
ID BASIC BLOCK ID ADDR OPER ID POS MNEMONIC STR
2 146 4203340 14234 0 inc edi
2 146 4203341 14235 0 mov edx
2 146 4203341 14236 1 mov [esp+8+arg 0]
2 146 4203345 14237 0 neg eax
2 146 4203347 14238 0 neg edx
2 146 4203349 14239 0 sbb eax
2 146 4203349 14240 1 sbb 0
2 146 4203352 14241 0 mov [esp+8+arg 4]
2 146 4203352 14242 1 mov eax
2 146 4203356 14243 0 mov [esp+8+arg 0]
2 146 4203356 14244 1 mov edx
Table 3.4. Fetch the List of Instructions of a Specific Basic Block from a File
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Figure 3.12. Idb2DBMS Schema
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select instructions.module id,instructions.address, operand id, position,
instructions.mnemonic, str from operand tuples,instructions, operand strings
where operand tuples.module id = instructions.module id
and instructions.module id = operand strings.module id
and instructions.module id = 2
and operand tuples.address = instructions.address
andoperand tuples.operand id = operand strings.operand string id
and instructions.address = 4203341.
Output of Execution Result
ID ADDR OPER ID POS MNEMONIC STR
2 4203341 14235 0 mov edx
2 4203341 14236 1 mov [esp+8+arg 0]
Table 3.5. Fectch the Specific Instruction
tion, such as the start and end address of the function, or the type of function etc. A
function is composed of many basic blocks which are described in Basic Blocks table.
ID value and address information of the basic block are also provided in this table.
Similarly, each basic block is composed of many instructions which are described in
the Instruction table. String window table represents printable string information in
each executable file. The Callgraph table contains the call information among func-
tions and the control flow graph table contains information of the logic relationship
among basic blocks in a function. The fun len table describes length information of
functions. In Appendix D, I list all the tables and provide detailed information for
each table.
3.4.2 Dynamic Data Storage
In this sub-section I provide a detailed description of data storage in our dynamic
analysis. As I mentioned in Section 3.3.3, we ran each executable file in the VM
environment, traced that execution and wrote down the intercepted windows API
calls in a log file. Figure 3.13 gives an example of such log files. In the log file, each
line records a windows API call, including Timestamps, the name of API call and
corresponding parameters.
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select * from strings window where module id =2.
Output of Execution Result
SID ID SECNAME ADDR STRLEN STRTYPE STR ...
137 2 .newIID 4223096 13 0 ADVAPI32.dll ...
138 2 .newIID 4223112 14 0 egSetValueExA ...
139 2 .newIID 4223128 12 0 RegCloseKey ...
140 2 .newIID 4223144 15 0 enProcessToken ...
141 2 .newIID 4223161 22 0 LookupPrivilegeValueA ...
142 2 .newIID 4223185 22 0 AdjustTokenPrivileges ...
143 2 .newIID 4223209 16 0 RegCreateKeyExA ...
144 2 .newIID 4223225 13 0 kernel32.dll ...
145 2 .newIID 4223240 13 0 GetLastError ...
146 2 .newIID 4223256 17 0 etCurrentProcess ...
147 2 .newIID 4223276 7 0 inExec ...
148 2 .newIID 4223285 8 0 lstrlen ...
149 2 .newIID 4223296 20 0 etWindowsDirectoryA ...
150 2 .newIID 4223320 18 0 tSystemDirectoryA ...
151 2 .newIID 4223340 17 0 GetModuleHandleA ...
152 2 .newIID 4223360 15 0 etStartupInfoA ...
153 2 .newIID 4223377 25 0 CreateToolhelp32Snapshot ...
154 2 .newIID 4223404 15 0 Process32First ...
155 2 .newIID 4223421 12 0 CloseHandle ...
156 2 .newIID 4223436 16 0 erminateProcess ...
157 2 .newIID 4223456 17 0 tExitCodeProcess ...
158 2 .newIID 4223476 18 0 etModuleFileNameA ...
159 2 .newIID 4223496 14 0 Process32Next ...
160 2 .newIID 4223512 12 0 OpenProcess ...
161 2 .newIID 4223524 10 0 MFC42.DLL ...
162 2 .newIID 4223534 11 0 MSVCRT.dll ...
. . . . . . . ...
. . . . . . . ...
. . . . . . . ...
Table 3.6. Fetch All the Printable String Information from a File
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Figure 3.13. An Example of a Log File of API Calls
After we obtained our ida2DBMS schema and log files of dynamic analysis, we
no longer needed the original executable files. Next I will present the Extraction and
Representation Layer of our system.
3.5 Extraction and Representation
As I mentioned above, once we finished the data preprocessing, the exporting of
static disassembling information and recording of dynamic execution information, we
no longer needed the original executable files. We did however extract static features
from DBMS and extract dynamic features from log files. In this section, I will explain
them individually.
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3.5.1 Static Features Extraction and Representation
Static features are extracted from DBMS. In Section 3.4.1, I introduce our
ida2DBMS schema, which holds lots of information we can extract from it.
As I mentioned in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, the feature sets in our system would
be simple, effective and easily extracted, expanded and combined. At the same time,
these feature sets would present malware from different points of view and would
be robust enough against the evolution of malware. Keeping these in mind, we set
up our system by extracting function distance, function length and printable string
information.
3.5.1.1 Functions
In the context of IDA Pro, function refers to an independent piece of code identified
as such by IDA. In IDA and other disassembling software, segment code analyzed into
smaller functional units are generally called “functions”. A function is essentially a
basic unit of code which reflects the intention of the code. I use two aspects of
function; one is the distance between functions and the another is function length
related information.
The first experiment was called Function Distance Experiment. In this experi-
ment, I extracted all the binary code of each function from an executable file, and
then use three distance algorithms to calculate the similarity between any two func-
tions from different executables. Please refer to Appendix A for further detailed
information on this experiment.
Function length is defined by IDA and equates to be the number of bytes in the
function. We define the function length pattern vector of an executable as a vector
representing the length of all the functions in this executable. Each component in
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the vector represents the length of a function and all the components are arranged
in ascending order. The raw function length pattern vectors are of different sizes
and scale, therefore are not directly comparable. In order to apply function length
pattern vectors into our system, we used two different approaches to creating vectors
of a standardized size:
1) Function Length Frequency. In this experiment, we counted the frequency of
functions of different lengths.
2) Function Length Pattern. In this experiment, we standardized the function
length vectors to be of the same size and scale so patterns could be compared.
In Chapter 4, I provide a detailed description of these two experiments.
3.5.1.2 Printable String Information
Another feature that we investigated was printable string information. A string is
a consecutive sequence of printable characters, with this definition often augmented to
specify a minimum length and a special character set. The strings utility is designed
especially to extract string content from files. IDA Pro has a built-in equivalent of the
strings utility, which we used to extract the strings from executables. In Appendix D,
I provide detailed information of printable strings in our table named strings windows,
and I present this experiment in Chapter 5.
Following this, we did another experiment based on combined static feature ex-
traction. This experiment is described in Chapter 6.
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3.5.2 Dynamic Features Extraction and Representation
After we achieved the dynamic execution log files for executables, we used the
dynamic analysis approach to extract and represent features. The purpose of our
feature extraction approach is to separate out all the API call strings along with
their parameters which occurred in the log files. We treated the API calls and their
parameters as separate strings. In Chapter 7, I provide a detailed description of our
dynamic analysis experiment.
3.6 Classification Process
As I mentioned in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, another core problem of the malware
detection and classification system is the Classification Decision Making Mechanisms,
which is the generalization of the classification process. As discussed in Section 2.2.5 of
Chapter 2, the core idea of Machine Learning is generalization, and Machine Learn-
ing is capable of generalizing unknown data, and therefore can be a potential and
promising approach for detecting malware. We adopted Machine Learning and Data
Mining techniques in our system.
The Machine Learning method is divided into two stages: one is to construct
the classifier, which is called the training or learning phase, with the data used in
this phase called training or learning data. The second stage is to evaluate, which
is called validation. The data on which we evaluate the classifier is called test data.
By applying Machine Learning techniques into our classification system, we need to
answer the following questions:
1) Feature Extraction: In the context of Machine Learning, feature extraction
refers to what we select as input to the computer. This issue was discussed in
the Feature Extraction and Representation Layer of our system in Section 3.5.
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2) Setup Training Set: The machine learning process is a process of learning. We
adopt a supervised learning algorithm, which means there is labeled data in
their training set.
3) Setup classifier models by using Classification Algorithms: The selection of
classification algorithms.
4) Evaluation: Evaluation of classifier models on the test set.
3.6.1 K-fold Cross Validation
We adopt the K-fold cross validation method in our training and testing phases.
K-fold cross validation [Koh95a] is a class of model evaluation methods in statistical
analysis. Its purpose is to indicate how well the learner will perform when it is
asked to make new predications for data it has not already seen. The idea is not to
use the entire data set when training a learner as some of the data is taken away
before training begins. When training is finished, this data can be used to test
the performance of the learned model in a way that estimates how accurately a
predictive model will perform in practice. It involves partitioning a sample of data
into complementary subsets, performing the analysis on one subset (called the training
set), and validating the analysis on the other subset (called the validation set or testing
set). To reduce variability, multiple rounds of cross validation are performed using
different partitions, and the validation results are averaged over the rounds.
K-fold cross validation is the most popular type of cross validation. In K-fold
cross validation, each K sub-samples is used exactly once as the validation data. The
K results from the folds can then be averaged or otherwise combined to produce a
single estimation. The advantage of this method over repeated random sub-sampling
74
is that all observations are used for both training and validation, and each observation
is used exactly once for validation.
We adopted the supervised Machine Learning approach in our automatic mal-
ware detection and classification system. The learning procedure includes training
procedure and validation procedure. In order to evaluate the classification model
generated during the training procedure, we chose K-fold cross validation to do the
validation test. When we used the K-fold cross validation method, we needed to
decide how many folds to employ. When K is small, this means the model has a
small amount of data to learn from. When K is large this means the model has a
much better chance of learning all the relevant information in the training set. While
no theoretical result supports any particular choice of the value of K , in practice,
people always chose K = 2,5,10 [ARR05]. We used 5-fold cross validation in the
experiments in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. In order to increase the chance of learning all the
relevant information in the training set, we adjusted to 10-fold cross validation in
our later dynamic experiment in Chapters 7 and 8. That is to say in our experiments,
we randomly partitioned the test data into 5 or 10 subsets of approximately equal
size, with one subset then used as the test set, and the other 4 or 9 subsets combined
as the training set. We then used the training set to calibrate the test and validate
the effectiveness against the test set. This procedure is normally repeated 5 or 10
times.
3.6.2 Selection of Classification Algorithms
WEKA (Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis) is a popular machine
learning workbench with a development life of nearly two decades and widely ac-
cepted in both academia and business [BFH+10, HFH+09]. WEKA contains more
than 100 classification methods which are divided into five main categories. These are
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the Bayesian methods, lazy methods, rule-based methods, tree learners and function-
based learners. In our system, we chose five kinds of Machine Learning classifica-
tion algorithms, one from each of the above five categories. There were NB (Na¨ıve
Bayesian classifiers), IB1 (Instance-Based Learning), DT (Decision Tree), RF (Ran-
dom Forest), and SVM (Support Vector Machine ). All of these classifiers are basically
learning methods that adopt sets of rules. In addition we use AdaBoost, which is an
ensemble of classifiers in conjunction with these learning algorithms to improve their
performance. I elaborate on these algorithms in the next section.
3.6.2.1 Na¨ıve Bayesian (NB)
Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers are derived from Bayesian Decision Theory [DHS00].
This is a widely used classification method due to its manipulation capabilities and
associated probabilities according to the user’s classification decisions and empirical
performance. In Bayesian classifiers, each class is represented with a single probabilis-
tic summary. The assumption is that all the attributes of the class are conditionally
independent and so the presence (or absence) of a particular attribute of a class is
unrelated to the presence (or absence) of any other attribute. That is to say that the
Na¨ıve Bayesian considers that all of the attributes independently contribute to the
probability summary of classification. Because of the precise nature of the probability
model, Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers can be efficiently trained in a supervised learning
setting.
In [LIT92], the authors presented an average-case analysis of the Bayesian classifier
and gave experimental evidence for the utility of Bayesian classifiers. They concluded
that in spite of their naive design and apparently over-simplified assumptions with
a comparative lack of sophistication, Bayesian classifiers deserve increased attention
in both theoretical and experimental studies. Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers have worked
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quite well in many complex applications, such as Bayesian spam filtering which makes
use of a Na¨ıve Bayesian classifier to identify spam e-mails [SDHH98].
In [SEZS01], the authors designed a data-mining framework to train multiple
classifiers on a set of malware and cleanware to detect new malware. They adopted
a static analysis method and extract three kinds of static features, including system
resource information obtained from the program header, printable string information
extracted by the GNU strings program [PO93] and byte sequences. Then they applied
RIPPER [Coh96], Na¨ıve Bayesian and Multi-Na¨ıve Bayesian to train on a set of
malware of 3265 malware and 1001 cleanware to set up the classifiers and evaluate
using the 5-fold cross validation. They showed that the Na¨ıve Bayes algorithm using
strings as features performed the best out of the learning algorithms and better than
the signature method in terms of false positive rate and overall accuracy. Since the
Na¨ıve Bayes and Multi-Na¨ıve Bayes methods are probabilistic, they mentioned that
these algorithms could tell if an executable had similar probabilities to be classified
as malware or cleanware. In this case, they could set up an option in the network
filter to send a copy of the executable for further analysis by anti-virus analysts.
In [WDF+03], the authors proposed an automatic heuristic method to detect
unknown computer viruses based on data mining techniques including Decision Tree
and Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers. Their results showed that both perform well in terms
of detection rate and accuracy.
The authors in [CGT07] compared four data mining classification algorithms over
seven feature selection methods based on the byte sequence frequencies extracted
from executables. Although the results from their experiments showed that SVM is
superior in terms of prediction accuracy, training time, and aversion to overfitting,
the Na¨ıve Bayesian classifier still performed well.
In [MER08], the authors examined whether a machine learning classifier trained
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on behavioral data collected from a certain computer system was capable of correctly
classifying the behaviors of a computer with other configurations. They chose four
machine learning algorithms, including Na¨ıve Bayes, Decision Trees, Na¨ıve Bayes,
Bayesian Networks and Artificial Neural Networks. From the results of their eight
experiments, they demonstrated that current machine learning techniques are capable
of detecting and classifying worms solely by monitoring host activity.
We chose Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers as one of our classification algorithms in the
static analysis methods presented in Chapters 5 and 6. They consider all of the
attributes to independently contribute to the probability summary of classification
which may not be the case for our data. This limitation may affect the accuracy
of classification and results in Chapters 5 and 6 prove this hypothesis. In those
experiments, Na¨ıve Bayes gave the weakest results which led us to exclude Na¨ıve
Bayes in later experiments.
3.6.2.2 Instance-Based Learning IB1
IB1 is the simplest IBL (Instance-Based Learning) algorithm which is commonly
known as KNN (k-nearest neighbours algorithm) and is proposed by Aha et al.
[AKA91]. Instance-based learning or memory-based learning generates classification
predictions using only specific instances instead of performing explicit generalizations,
and compares new problem instances with instances seen in training which have been
stored in memory. It extends the nearest neighbour algorithm by significantly reduc-
ing the storage requirement. Because it constructs a hypotheses directly from the
training instances in memory, the IBL algorithm is very simple and effective. It is
popularly used in many applications.
IBL algorithms have several advantages. One of them is simplicity, which al-
lowed us to use a detailed analysis to guide our research motivation and aims. IBL
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algorithms have a relatively relaxed concept bias and low updating costs [AKA91].
Another advantage is that IBL supports relatively robust learning algorithms. It
can tolerate noise and irrelevant attributes and can represent both probabilistic and
overlapping concepts. [AK89].
In [LM06], the authors proposed a behavior-based automated classification
method based on distance measure and machine learning. They used the string edit
distance as the distance measure, and then performed the nearest neighbor classifi-
cation. They tested this in two separate experiments, using 461 samples of 3 families
and 760 samples of 11 families and ran 10-fold cross validation on the above two
datasets. They found that even though the string edit distance measure was costly,
IBL classification performed quite well and they emphasized the importance of devel-
oping an automated classification process that applies classifiers with innate learning
ability on near lossless knowledge representation.
The authors in [Ghe05] evaluated IBL with three different distance measures from
the perspective of run time, storage space, and classification accuracy. Their tests
demonstrated that it is possible to build an automated real-time system that can
answer malware evolutionary relationship queries and run on an average desktop
machine.
In [Weh07], the authors adopt IBL in classifying worms by using a normalized
compression distance (NCD) measure. To assign the family of an unknown worm,
they compute the NCD between the worm and all available binary worms. The family
best matched is the family of worms which is closest to the unknown worm in terms
of NCD. The authors in [See08] propose using machine learning approaches to learn
malware intention and specific functionality properties. Their method is based on
recorded execution traces in a sandbox in virtual environments, with focus on the
research of spam and botnets. In their preliminary experiments, they tested many
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different learning algorithms, including Na¨ıve Bayes, Logistic Regression, IBL, and
the rule learner JRip, however they discussed that IB1 offered the best performance.
In [AACKS04], the authors applied the CNG (Common N-Gram) method
[KPCT03] based on byte n-gram analysis in the detection of malware. They chose the
most frequent n-gram with their normalized frequencies to represent a class profile
and used the KNN classification algorithm. Their results tested 65 distinct windows
executable files (25 malware and 40 cleanware) and achieved 100% accuracy on train-
ing data and 98% accuracy in 3-fold cross validation.
Based on the analysis from works of other researchers, along with the advantages
of the IBL algorithms mentioned above, we choose IB1, which is the simplest IBL
algorithm as one of our malware classification algorithms.
3.6.2.3 Decision Table (DT)
A decision table (also known as a logic table) or a decision tree (also known as
a decision diagram) describes the conditions associated with particular actions or
decisions, along with constraints on the associated behavior. A decision table shows
rules as rows and conditions as columns, with an entry in each cell for each action
that should be taken by the person performing the behavior. A decision tree shows
decision points as diamonds (as on a flowchart) and actions as boxes [Got02]. Decision
tables have been advocated as a programming tool for displaying logical relationships
and programmers frequently use decision tables because they translate directly into
programmable logic [BD72, Lan78].
The Decision Table classification algorithm builds a simple decision table majority
classifier, and summarizes the dataset or sample space with a decision table which
contains the same number of attributes as the original dataset or sample space. Fol-
lowing this a new data item is assigned a class by finding the line in the decision
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table that matches the non-class values of the data item. This was proposed by Ron
Kohavi [Koh95b].
The Decision Table classifier is a spreadsheet-like classifier which is easy for hu-
mans to understand. In [KS98], the authors improved this algorithm by using entropy-
based attribute selection to replace their previous methods based on a forward selec-
tion of attributes using the wrapper model. In their experiment they showed that
prediction accuracy of a decision table majority classifier is comparable to that of
widely used induction algorithms, such as C4.5.
In our system, we chose Decision Table as our rule-based classification algorithm.
3.6.2.4 Random Forest (RF)
Random Forest is a classifier consisting of a collection of tree-structured classifiers
[Bre01]. It is an ensemble classifier that consists of many decision trees and outputs
the class that is the mode of the class’s output by individual trees. In this instance,
“mode” is a statistical term and is the value that occurs most frequently in a data
set or a probability distribution. Random Forest actually grows many classification
trees and in order to classify a new object from an input vector, the input vector
puts down each of the trees in the forest, and each tree gives a classification. That
is, the tree “votes” for that class, and then the forest chooses the classification with
the most votes over all the trees in the forest.
Each decision tree in the Random Forest is a classifier in the form of a tree
structure, where each node is either a leaf node or a decision node. A leaf node
indicates the value of the classification and a decision node specifies the test to be
carried out on a single attribute-value, with one branch and sub-tree for each possible
outcome of the test. In general terms, the purpose of the analysis via tree-building
algorithms is to determine a set of if-then logical conditions that permit accurate
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prediction or classification of cases. A decision tree can be used to classify a sample
by starting at the root of the tree and moving through until reaching a leaf node
which provides the classification value. A random classifier uses a number of such
decision trees in order to improve the classification rate.
In the decision tree algorithm, the main topics are selection of attributes on a
decision node and method for splitting the tree. There are several popular algorithms
used to generate a decision tree, such as ID3 [Qui86],C4.5 [Qui93], CART [BFSO84]
and CHAID [Kas80]. ID3 and C4.5 are based on information theory, which C4.5 is
an extension of Quinlan’s earlier ID3 algorithm and C4.5 builds decision trees from
a set of training data in the same way as ID3 by using the concept of information
entropy. It chooses attributes for which entropy is minimum or information gain is
maximum in order to most effectively split its set of samples into subsets. CART
(Classification and regression trees) was first introduced by Breiman et al. in 1984.
Decision trees are formed by a collection of rules based on values of certain attributes
in the modeling data set and these rules are selected based on how well splits based
on attribute values can differentiate observations based on the dependent attribute.
CART’s methodology is technically known as binary recursive partitioning. Binary
refers to the fact that all decisions involve a parent node that is broken into 2 child
nodes. Recursive refers to the fact that once a rule is selected and splits a node
into two, the same logic is applied to each “child” node and in so doing, a decision
tree with expanding branches is created. CHAID (Chi-squared Automatic Interaction
Detector) is one of the oldest tree classification methods originally proposed by Kass
(1980). According to Ripley (1996), the CHAID algorithm is a descendant of THAID,
developed by Morgan and Messenger. CHAID builds non-binary trees on a relatively
simple algorithm that is particularly well suited for the analysis of larger datasets
and is a recursive partitioning method.
The author of the dissertation [Sid08] presented a data mining framework to detect
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malicious programs. The author applied an array of classification models also used
in our experiments, including Logistic Regression, Neural Network, Decision Tree,
Support Vector Machines and Random Forest. Random forest outperforms all the
classifiers and dimension reduction methods in their experiments in terms of overall
accuracy, false positive rate and area under the ROC curve.
In [TKH+08], the authors introduced two classification models, one based on
Support Vector Machine (SVM) and the other on Random Forest (RF) to detect
malicious email servers. Their experimental results showed that both classifiers are
effective, with RF slightly more accurate at the cost of time and space.
The authors in [HGN+10] proposed an Intelligent Hybrid Spam-Filtering Frame
work (IHSFF) to detect spam by analyzing only email headers. They applied various
machine learning algorithms over five features extracted from the email header to set
up the framework. Their experimental results showed that RF algorithm performed
well in terms of accuracy, recall and precision.
Due to its excellent performance in classification tasks and in wider applications
in information security, we chose RF as one of our classification algorithms.
3.6.2.5 Support Vector Machine (SVM)
SVM (Support Vector Machine) is a powerful, state-of-the-art algorithm with
strong theoretical foundations based on Vapnik’s theory [Vap99]. It has a strong data
regularization property and can easily handle high dimensional feature spaces. SVM is
based on the Structural Risk Minimization (SRM) principle in order to find an optimal
hyperplane by maximizing the margins that can guarantee the lowest true error due
to increasing the generalization capabilities [DHS00]. The high classification accuracy
of SVM is due to the fact that the learning algorithm in SVM not only minimizes
the training error but also maximizes the generalization [Bur98]. The SVM method
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we used in our system is Sequential Minimal Optimization which is a fast method
to solve huge quadratic programming problems and is widely used to speed up the
training of the Support Vector Machines.
SVM was firstly applied to detect malicious code in [ZYH+06] where they tested
a total number of 632 samples, including 423 cleanware and 209 malware. Their
experimental results show that the SVM based method can be effectively used to
discriminate normal and abnormal API function call traces.
The authors in [SKF08a, SKF08b] used traffic patterns collected from real and
simulated worm traffic. They compared six different classifiers based on these fea-
tures including three bio-inspired classifiers, two statistical malware detectors and
SVM. Their results showed that the best classification results are obtained with the
SVM classifier. The authors also point out that SVM is an ideal candidate to act
as a benchmark in their comparative study because of its high classification accu-
racy even thought the SVM has high algorithmic complexity and extensive memory
requirements.
In [YCW+09], the authors developed an interpretable string based malware detec-
tion system (SBMDS) using a SVM ensemble with bagging or Bootstrap aggregating
[Bre96]. In their experiments, the SVM method also works well in classification.
In [ZZL+09], the authors proposed a system calls tracing system based on the full
virtualization via Intel-VT technology and SVM. They use SVM to process system
call sequences extracted from 1226 malicious and 587 benign executables to detect
unknown executables. Their SVM based experiment shows that the proposed method
can detect malware with strong resilience and high accuracy.
The authors in [WWE09] also applied SVM in their malware analysis based on
both process-related information and the executed system calls.
In [ALVW10], the authors applied SVM to train the classifier and derived an
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optimum n-gram model for efficiently detecting both known and unknown malware.
They provided a preliminary analysis by using SVM and n-gram. They tested that
on a dataset of 242 malware and 72 cleanware, and with their experiments providing
a promising accuracy of 96.5%.
The authors in [SKR+10] also mentioned that data mining has been a recent focus
of malware detection research. They present a data mining approach by appling
SVM classification model based on the analysis of the frequency of occurrence of each
Windows API.
We introduce SVM as one of our selected classification algorithms based on the
above survey.
3.6.2.6 AdaBoost
An ensemble of classifiers is a set of classifiers whose individual decisions are
combined in some way, typically by weighted or unweighted voting, to classify new
examples [Dit97]. Because uncorrelated errors made by the individual classifiers can
be removed by voting, ensembles can improve classification accuracy in supervised
learning [Dit97].
The Boosting method is a well established ensemble method for improving the
performance of any particular classification algorithm. Boosting is a general and
provably effective framework for constructing a highly accurate classification rule by
combining many rough and moderately accurate hypotheses (called weak classifiers)
into a strong one. The weak classifiers are trained sequentially and, conceptually,
each is trained mostly on the examples which were more difficult to classify by the
preceding weak classifiers.
The concept of boosting an algorithm was initially presented in [Sch90] by
Schapire, who provided the first provably polynomial-time boosting algorithm. On-
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going research introduced a new generation of Boosting methods called AdaBoost
(Adaptive Boosting) [Fre95, FS95, FS97]. This method was a much more efficient
boosting algorithm and solved many of the practical difficulties of earlier boosting
algorithms.
We also introduced the AdaBoost method into our system in order to improve the
classification performance.
In sum, the above analysis of the literature on classification algorithms has in-
fluenced our choice of five algorithms. There are NB (Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers),
IB1 (Instance-Based Learning), DT (Decision Tree), RF (Random Forest), and SVM
(Support Vector Machine ). In addition, we also applied AdaBoost to each of these
to determine if indeed it would improve our results.
3.7 Performance Assessment
The upper layer of our system is Performance Assessment. In this layer, I discuss
the methods to assess the system performance based on the classification results. As I
mentioned above, our classification process system is based on Machine Learning and
Data Mining techniques. During the classification process, we can always arbitrarily
label one class as a positive and the other one as a negative class. The experimental
set is composed of P positive and N negative samples for each family.
As I discussed in Section 3.6, Machine Learning method is divided into two stages:
the training or learning phase, and the evaluation phase. The classifier built during
the training phase assigns a class to each sample from the test set, with some assign-
ments possibly correct but some of the assignments possibly wrong. To assess the
classification results, we count the number of true positive (TP), true negative (TN),
false positive (FP) (actually negative, but classified as positive) and false negative
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Figure 3.14. Performance of Classification
(FN) (actually positive, but classified as negative) samples [Vuk]. Figure 3.14 shows
the relationship between them. In this figure, a dot represents a positive class and
the star represents a negative class. The test set is composed of two sets P and N .
P has P positive samples and N has N negative samples. All the data within the
ellipse are the samples being labelled as class one and all the data outside the eclipse
are the samples being labelled as another class. We can see that samples in P are
composed of TP samples from the original positive set and FP samples from the
original negative set. Samples in N are composed of FN samples from the original
positive set and TN samples from the original negative set. Some measures are in-
troduced by the following formulas to assess the performance of the classifier. These
are TPrate, FPrate, FNrate, Precision and Accuracy:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
TPrate = TP/P
FPrate = FP/N
FNrate = FN /P
Precision = TP/(TP + FP)
Accuracy = (TP + TN )/(P + N)
(3.7.1)
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The aim of our system was to achieve a high classification accuracy. If accuracy equals
100%, this meant we classified samples completely and correctly. As I discussed in
Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, our target was 97% classification accurarcy for our malware
detection and classification system.
3.8 Robustness of System
Robustness is one of the key factors of an automated malware detection and
classification system. Malware trouble makers use obfuscation technologies to evade
detection, but they always focus on some specific features of malware. For example,
they could confuse the disassembler at the instruction level by junk instruction inser-
tion, transform of unconditional jumps and call instructions to the respective branch
functions [LDS03], however these tricks cannot conceal some other features, such as
string information extracted from the executables. Thus, we expect our system to be
robust because we combined not only static features, FLF (Function Length Feature)
and PSI (Printable String Information), but also dynamic API call sequence features.
These features complement each other.
In practice, anti-virus detection faces a big challenge with huge amounts of mal-
ware released daily. Anti-virus detection systems need to provide a timely response
before the malware can cause any damage to the system. Under such circumstances,
knowing whether a file is malicious or clean is more urgent than knowing the specific
family from which the malware emanates. A robust malware detection and clas-
sification system should provide a timely response by differentiating malware from
cleanware. In our system, we not only classified malware into different families, but
also differentiate malware from cleanware.
In the research literature on malware detection and classification, it is suggested
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that malware becomes immune to older anti-virus detection methods over time. To
test the integrated system to see if it was robust to changes in malware evolution, we
introduced more recent malware into our test dataset and divided the dataset into two
groups according to their age (measured when the executable file was first collected)
and then tested these two groups in our integrated experiments. We expected our
integrated system to be robust through the inclusion both old and new malware
families.
3.9 Summary
In this chapter, I described our automatic malware detection and classification
system from the point view of the hierarchical architecture of a system. Our sys-
tem was divided into five layers, which are the Data Collection and Data Preprocess
Layer, Data Storage Layer, Extraction and Representation Layer, Classification Pro-
cess Layer and the Performance Assessment Layer. I explained the problem and
corresponding solution for each layer.
Firstly I described our experimental dataset and due to our system using a combi-
nation of static and dynamic methodologies, I then presented both static and dynamic
methods in the Data Collection and data Preprocess Layer, Data Storage Layer and
Extraction and Representation Layer. In the Classification Process Layer and Per-
formance Assessment Layer, I described the application of machine learning and data
mining methods in our system. Finally, I gave a brief description of the expected
robustness of our system.
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Chapter 4
Function Length Features based
Methodology
As I explained in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3, there were two methods of features
extraction and representation in our system; one was static and another was dynamic.
This chapter focuses on the function based static features extraction and representa-
tion.
4.1 Introduction
Malware is essentially a piece of program code. Making malware should follow
the principle of computer programming techniques. A computer program actually is
a list of instructions that tell a computer how to accomplish a set of calculations or
operations [VRH04]. A program is often composed of self-contained software routines
which perform a certain task as defined by a programmer. Such self-contained soft-
ware routines or functional units have many different names, such as procedure,
method or function. In order to get an overall acknowledge of a piece of program code,
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first we need to understand each functional unit. Functional unit is the foundation
of analyzing a program.
An IDA function is simply an independenft piece of code identified as such by
IDA and is not necessarily software which performs a certain task as defined by a
programmer, while IDA function is essentially the functional unit of disassembling
code, corresponding to the functional unit of high level program code. Therefore IDA
function is the foundation when we analyze disassembling code of the malware. We
then start our research work from IDA functions.
In this chapter, I present my method of classifying malware based only on the
lengths of their functions. Two aspects of function length are investigated : one is
the length of the function as measured by the number of bytes of code in it; the other
is the frequency with which function lengths occur within any particular executable
file of malware. These values are easy to obtain as output from IDA for any unpacked
input. Our results indicate that both function features are significant in identifying
the family to which a piece of malware belongs; the frequency values are slightly more
significant than the function lengths with respect to accuracy while the reverse is true
with respect to the rate of true positives.
In Section 4.2, I summarize the relevant literature in this area. In Section 4.3, I
detail our analytical approach and data preparation and in Section 4.4 I describe the
experimental set-up for our two function length based. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 present
the two tests individually. In Section 4.8 I analyse and compare the results of the two
tests and extended one and summarize in Section 4.9.
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4.2 Related Work
As I described in Chapter 2, to set up an automatic malware detection and classi-
fication system, many researchers used static features drawn from unpacked executa-
bles without executing them [Ghe05, KS06, SBN+10, PBKM07, XSCM04, XSML07,
TBIV09, TBV08, WPZL09, YLCJ10, DB10, HYJ09].
Gheorghescu [Ghe05] used basic blocks of code in the malware to form a control
flow graph. Kapoor and Spurlock [KS06] compared vectors converted from a function
tree which is constructed based on the control flow graph of the system to determine
similarity of malware. Peisert et al.[PBKM07] used sequences of function calls to
represent program behaviour. Sathyanarayan et al.[SKB08] used static analysis to
extract API calls from known malware in order to construct a signature for an en-
tire class. API Calls were also used by [XSCM04, XSML07, WPZL09, YLJW10] to
compare polymorphic malware. Kai Huang et al. [HYJ09] developed an instruction
sequence-based malware categorization system. Igor Santos et al. [SBN+10], used
weighted opcode sequence frequencies to calculate the cosine similarity between two
PE executable files.
In the following section, I present our approach to the classification problem based
on the static features extracted from function length. On the positive side, our
methods are based on simple features extracted from binaries, including function
length frequency and function length pattern. On the negative side, using function
size and frequency appears to give a correct classification in only about 80% of cases
and so these features must be used with others for a better determination.
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4.3 Data Preparation
This approach is based on the prototype system proposed in Chapter 3. In the
Data Collection and Data Preprocess Layer of our system I first unpack the malware
executables using the free software program named VMUnpacker v1.3 and in a few
cases I unpack the packed executables using manual processes. Then disassemble
them using IDA, export the disassembling analysis to our database schema ida2DBMS
in the Data Storage Layer. Our architecture allows us to effectively extract large
amounts of disassembling information and obtain a wide range of features of a malware
in a swift and simple way in the Extraction and Representation Layer of our system.
Our aim is to use features that are simple and inexpensive to extract, so we start from
IDA function length information. To easily understand this process, I first explain
the disassembling process of IDA Pro and IDA function.
4.3.1 IDA Disassembling Process
Figure 4.1 is a brief description of IDA disassembling process.
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Figure 4.1. IDA Disassembling Process
Three main components of IDA Pro, including loader module, disassembling en-
gine and processor module, play the important role in the disassembling process. IDA
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loader modules behave much as operating system loaders behave 1. There are three
types of loader modules in IDA Pro:
• Window PE loader. Used to load Window PE files.
• MS DOS EXE loader . Used to load MS DOS EXE files.
• Binary File . Default for loading files that are not recognized by reading header
structure in the disk image of the analyzed file.
Once you have chosen a file to analyze, the selected loader module starts to load
the file from disk, parse any file-header information that it may recognize, create
various program sections containing either code or data as specified in the file header,
identify specific entry points into the code. In such a way that the selected loader
module determines a virtual memory layout for the disk image of the analyzed file
and then the selected loader module returns control to IDA.
Once the loading has finished, the disassembling engine takes over and begins
to pass address from the virtual memory layout to the selected processor module
one by one. In most cases, IDA chooses the proper processor module based on the
information that it reads from the executable file’s headers or you can assign a proper
processor type before IDA starts to analyze the file.
It takes processor module two passes to finish generating the assembly code for the
analyzed file. In the first pass, the process module determines the type and length of
instruction located at that address and the locations at which execution can continue
from that address. In such a way, IDA detects all the instructions in the file. In the
second pass, processor module generates assembly code for each instruction at each
address.
1For more information about operating system loader, please refer to [Pie94, Pie02]
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4.3.2 IDA function
Functions are identified by IDA through the analysis of addresses that are tar-
gets of call instructions. IDA performs a detailed analysis of the behaviour of the
stack pointer register to understand the construction of the function’s stack frame.
Stack frames are blocks of memory, allocated within a program’s runtime stack and
dedicated to a specific invocation of a function [Eag08]. Based on the analysis of the
layout of function’s stack frame, IDA identifies each function.
We know that in high-level programming, programmers typically group executa-
bles statements into function units, including procedures, subroutines or methods,
which perform a certain task as defined by the programmers. So function units are
always the basis when people do high-level program analysis.
An IDA function is simply an independent piece of code identified as such by
IDA and it is not necessarily a function unit. However IDA is a well-defined mech-
anism that maps high-level programming constructs into their messy, assembly code
equivalents. So we assume that IDA functions have quite similar characteristics as
functional unit, then we choose IDA functions as the basis of our static analysis and
extraction.
4.3.3 Extract Function Length Information
The first step that we need to do is to fetch data information of each function
for an executable file from our ida2DBMS schema.Figure 4.2 describes five tables
involved in the formation of the function data information. These five tables are
Instructions, BasicBlocks, Functions, Modules and FunctionLength. From this figure
we can see that an IDA function is composed of many basic blocks; and each basic
block is composed of instructions. All the instructions and all the basic blocks that
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belong to a function are traversed and put them together to form the data of the
function.
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Figure 4.2. IDA Function Data
To get function length information, I program the following four database func-
tions or stored procedures to fetch function length information from the database:
• GetBasicblockData. A database function used to fetch all the instruction infor-
mation to form data information for a specific basic block.
• GetFunData. A database function used to fetch all the basic block data infor-
mation to form data information for a specific function.
• GetFileData. A database storage procedure used to extract function length
information for all the functions of an executable file and store this information
in database.
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Figure 4.3. Related Database Programs
• GetFamilyData. A database storage procedure used to extract function length
information for all the executable files of an assigned family.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the calling relationship between these four database pro-
grams.
The core program of these four programs is “GetFunData”. To extract function
length information, we need to generate data information for each function by execute
“GetFunData”. Figure 4.4 describes the process of generating of data information for
each function.
For each function in the disassembling module of a specific executable file, first
we need to get all the basic blocks belonging to that function; and then identify and
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fetch all the instructions of each basic block by using the value of basic block id.
Then combine these instructions to form a hex format string for each basic block, in
the same way,combine all the basic blocks belonging to the function to form a hex
format string representing the function.
In Appendix D I provide the detailed description of our Ida2DB schema and these
four database programs mentioned above.
4.4 Experimental Set-up
4.4.1 Motivation
In the initial stages we extracted function length information from our ida2DBMS
database schema. For each malware executable file we constructed a list containing
the length (in bytes) for all the functions. We then sorted the list from the shortest
length function to the longest, and graphed it. We call this the function length pattern.
Figure 4.5 illustrates three samples from the Robzips family and Figure 4.6 illustrates
three samples from the Robknot family.
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Figure 4.5. Function Length Pattern Samples from Robzips Family
With malware executables from within the same malware family, we noticed that
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Figure 4.6. Function Length Pattern Samples from Robknot Family
although the number of functions and their lengths varied, the shape of the function
length pattern looked similar. The executables from different families have different
patterns. This motivated us to investigate whether function length contains statisti-
cally significant information for classifying malware.
The unpacking preprocess mentioned in Section 3.3.2.1 of Chapter 3 may not pro-
duce the original binary. In addition, when IDA disassembles unpacked malware, it
identifies functions according to its own auto-analysis procedure. The functions finally
extracted may be different from those returned by the malware programmer.Although
it is difficult to be precise in regard to exactly what is meant by a function in the
context of our experiments, we are nevertheless using a reliable and repeatable pro-
cess.
In our experiments, function length is defined to be the number of bytes in the
function as defined by IDA. The function length pattern vectors are the raw input
given to our experiments. An example function length vector, taken from the Beovens
family, is (24, 38, 46, 52, 118, 122, 124, 140, 204, 650,694, 1380). (All vectors and sets
referred to in this paper are ordered.) Each component in this vector represents the
length of a function in the example. There are 12 functions in the sample, and the
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function lengths are 24, 38, 46, . . . , 1380 respectively; the maximum function length is
1380.
4.4.2 Test Dataset
When we first do function length based experiment, we use 721 files from 7 families
of Trojans. Table 4.1 lists the families in this experiment. In this experiment our aim
is to investigate whether function length contain statistically important information
for classifying malware. So we start with a relatively small test dataset collected over
a 4-year span which is from 2003 to 2007.
Family Detection Date: No. of Samples
starting ⇒ ending (YYYY-MM)
Bambo 2003-07⇒2006-01 41
Boxed 2004-06⇒2007-09 263
Alureon 2005-05⇒2007-11 43
Beovens 2005-03⇒2007-06 144
Robknot 2005-10⇒2007-08 101
Clagger 2005-11⇒2007-01 47
Robzips 2006-03⇒2007-08 82
Total 2003-07⇒2007-11 721
Table 4.1. Experimental Set of 721 Malware Files
4.4.3 Overview of Experimental Process
Figure 4.7 provides an overview of our function length based experiments.
The raw function length vectors are of different sizes so are not directly compa-
rable. We try two different approaches to creating vectors of standardized size. The
first is to count the frequency of functions of different lengths (described in Section 4.5
), the other is to standardize the function length vectors to be of the same size and
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Figure 4.7. Overview of Our Experimental Process
scale so that the patterns could be compared (described in Section 4.6). Figure 4.7
is the overview of these two experiments.
In order to determine whether function length information can be used in classi-
fication, we choose, in each test and for each family, a target vector, which we call a
‘centroid’ and determine how close each sample is to this centroid. For a good choice
of the centroid, we expect samples in the family to be close in a carefully defined
statistical way, and we expect samples not in the family to be far.
We use K-fold cross validation in each test. For each family we randomly parti-
tion the vectors into 5 subsets of approximately equal size. We use one subset as the
test set, and combine the other 4 subsets as the training set. We use the training set
to calibrate the test and validate the effectiveness of the centroids against the test
set. This is repeated 5 times, so that each vector is used as a test sample.
Our classification uses an adaptation of the technique described by [SKB08].For
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each training set we calculate a centroid vector. We use statistical methods to deter-
mine whether a test vector is sufficiently close to the centroid vector to be classified
as belonging to that family.
4.5 Function Length Frequency Test
We first introduce some standard notation which is referred to throughout this sec-
tion and the next. Let P = {P1, P2, . . . , PN} represent a general population of N func-
tion length vectors. P∗ = {P ∗1 , P ∗2 , . . . , P ∗N} represents the set of all the standardized
vectors. We use F for a set of n vectors from a specific family having n samples. For
any particular function vector Pk with mk elements, we write Pk = (pk1, pk2, ..., pkmk)
and refer to mk as the size of the function length vector.
In both the tests of Sections 4.5 and 4.6, we use the 5-fold cross validation
method discussed in Section 3.6.1 of Chapter 3, applying it five times. In both cases,
T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tr} ⊂ F represents a training set chosen from the family F. Then
Q = F−T = {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn−r} is used as a test set. Each entry Ti in the training
set is represented by the vector Ti = (ti1, ti2, . . . , tim¯), and each entry Qi in the test
set is represented by a vector Qi = (qi1, qi2, . . . , qim¯).
4.5.1 Data Processing
From Figure 4.5 and 4.6, we can see that the shapes of the function length
pattern are similar within the same malware family and different across families.
This is the motivation of using function length features in our experiments. While
as I mentioned above the raw function length vectors are of different sizes so are not
directly comparable. We need to standardize the original vectors so that the patterns
could be compared. Two standardization approaches are adopted in our experiments,
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which leads to two tests: the function length frequency test and the function length
pattern test. The latter will be described in Section 4.6.
The function length frequency test is based on counting the number of functions
in different length ranges. We divided the function length scale into intervals, which
we call bins, and for each sample counted the frequency of functions occurring in
each bin. Due to the order of magnitude of differences between function lengths, we
increased the range covered by our bins exponentially. For example, we might count
the number of functions of lengths between 1 and e bytes, the number between e
and e2 bytes, etc. In our experiment, we chose m¯ = 50 as the number of bins. This
now allows us to associate a new vector of size 50 with each function length vector
in the population as described below. In introducing a factor to include the height
variations, we map an exponential function over the entire spectrum of the dataset,
from heights 1 to M , the maximum function length across the complete dataset.
Assuming that this exponential function is given by y = aekx where y(0) = 1 and
y(50) = M , it follows that a = 1, k = lnM/50, and so y = e
lnM
50
x.
Thus, for any Pk from the population, the jth entry in the standardized form P
∗
k
of Pk of size 50 is:
p∗kj = |{pki|e
ln(M)
50
(j−1) ≤ pki ≤ e
ln(M)
50
j ,
i = 1 . . .mk}| (4.5.1)
for j = 1 . . . 50.
4.5.2 Statistical Test
We assume that the vectors of the entire population have been standardized as de-
scribed in Section 4.5.1. For each family F we choose 80% as a training set from which
we compute a single ‘centroid’ vector to use in comparing against the entire dataset
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as a means of classification. We obtain this centroid vector A = (a1, a2, . . . , a50) by
computing each term as follows:
aj =
1
r
r∑
i=1
tij , j = 1 . . . 50. (4.5.2)
r is the number of malware files in the training set, its value varies from family to
family due to we choose 80% malware files from that family as a training set. For
each family, this process was repeated five times, each time using a different 80% of
the family and in such a way that each vector appears in exactly one test set.
For each training set, the complement within the family is used as the test set.
The Chi-square test is applied as a test for Goodness of Fit of the centroid vector
and vectors in the training set [Spa05]. For each Ti = (ti1, ti2, . . . , ti50) in the training
set, a Chi-square vector χ2 = (χ21, χ
2
2, . . . , χ
2
50) is computed as
χ2j =
(tij − aj)2
aj
, j = 1 . . . 50. (4.5.3)
Finally, χ2 is compared against a threshold value  from a standard Chi-square
distribution table [Spa05]. A significance level of 0.05 was selected, which means that
95% of the time we expect χ2 to be less than or equal to . For each Ti, let
Ui = {tij |χ2j ≤  , j = 1 . . . 50}. (4.5.4)
For each Ti, the value λi defined by:
λi =
|Ui|
50
(4.5.5)
represents the proportion of components of Ti which fall within the threshold . Thus
λA =
1
r
r∑
i=1
λi (4.5.6)
represents the proportion of elements of the training set which fall within the thresh-
old.
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We now apply this test to the set of standardized vectors from the entire dataset,
excluding those used in the training set. Let T∗ be the set of adjusted vectors from
T as in Equation (1). Let X now be any vector from the set P∗ −T∗. We compare
X with A by applying Equations (4.5.3) and (4.5.4) to produce λX as in Equation
(4.5.5).
Let P (F,A) represent the set of vectors which were classified by our test as be-
longing to the family. It is constructed as follows :
X ∈ P (F,A) iff λX ≥ λA. (4.5.7)
We repeat this process for all five training sets of each family. Every time a centroid
vector A is obtained for a specific training set of the family.
Table 4.2 in the next subsection summarizes the classification accuracy of our
tests.
4.5.3 Test Results
FAMILY P N Accuracy TPRATE FPRATE FNRATE
CLAGGER 47 3370 0.9699 0.8085 0.0279 0.1915
ROBKNOT 101 3100 0.9884 0.6337 0 0.3663
ROBZIPS 82 3195 0.9774 0.7683 0.0172 0.2317
ALUREON 43 3390 0.6685 0.7209 0.3322 0.2791
BAMBO 41 3400 0.6493 0.6098 0.3503 0.3902
BEOVENS 144 2885 0.9243 0.5417 0.0565 0.4583
BOXED 263 2290 0.9651 0.6653 0.0004 0.3347
Average 0.8776 0.6783 0.1121 0.3217
W.Average 0.9263 0.6574 0.05494 0.34260
Table 4.2. Function Length Frequency Results
For each family F in Table 4.1, TP represents the true positives, that is the number
of samples belonging to the family which our test correctly classified. Formally,
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TP = |Q ∩ P (F,A)|, represents the number of samples in Q which were placed in
P (F,A) for any of the five centroid vectors A from five tests. TN represents the true
negatives, that is the number of samples not in F which were not placed in P (F,A) for
all five centroid vectors A. Similarly, FP represents the false positives, the number
of samples not in F which were placed in P (F,A) by any centroid A, while FN
represents the false negatives, the number of samples in Q which were not placed in
P (F,A) by some centroid A. The total number of positives, P = TP +FN , is the set
of elements of Q repeated five times, one for each centroid, while the total negatives,
N = TN + FP , is the set of elements not in F, again, repeated five times. Finally,
the True Positive and False Positive rates are generated over the whole population
and all five tests (per family) as in Equation (4.5.8).
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
TPrate = TP/P
FPrate = FP/N
FNrate = FN /P
Accuracy = (TP + TN )/(P + N)
(4.5.8)
Equation (4.5.8) is the same as the Equation ( 3.7.1) mentioned in Section 3.7 of Chap-
ter 3. The Accuracy in Equation (4.5.8) measures how closely the test determines
true containment, or not, in the family. We thus expect it to be close to 1. While
this is the case in Table 4.2, the average True Positive rate is a little disappointing.
This motivated us to continue to the test described in Section 4.6.
4.6 Function Length Pattern Test
The graphs of function lengths of malware samples described in Section 4 appear
to have some similarities within families and differences across families. In order to
compare these graph patterns, we need to standardize the original function length
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vectors of different sizes. In function length frequency test in Section 4.5, we stan-
dardized the original vectors by counting the number of functions in different length
ranges. In this section, we again use function length as a distinguisher, but using a
different approach to standardize the original vectors.
In this test we directly use the pattern made by the function length. We use two
steps in order to prepare the data. First, we standardize the vector size across the
entire dataset by resizing the function length vector along the x-axis by a rational fac-
tor. Each term in the new vector is a weighted average of corresponding terms in the
old vector. In the second step, we retain the shape of the pattern of function lengths
by standardizing along the y-axis family by family. We do this by multiplying each
component of the old vector by a formula derived by averaging the first component
(the shortest function length) and last component (the longest function length). The
standardization of vector size must be made across the whole database as we need to
compare all vectors pairwise; the standardization of height is done family by family
as this appears to be a significant identifier.
4.6.1 Data Processing
Step 1: standardize vectors in the complete dataset
We first obtain the average size over all vectors in the dataset m¯ = m1+m2+...+mN
N
.
Then for each arbitrary PK we standardize it by using the continuous function f
defined over the domain [0, mk) given by:
f(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pk1, 0 ≤ x < 1
pk2, 1 ≤ x < 2
...
pkmk , mk − 1 ≤ x < mk
(4.6.1)
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We create the new vector P¯k of length m¯, by dividing the domain of f into m¯
equal sections and calculating the mean value of f(x) over each section of the domain.
That is,
p¯kj =
1
C
∫ jC
(j−1)C
f(x)dx (4.6.2)
where C = mk
m¯
and j ∈ {1, 2, ..., m¯}.
Each point in the function length vector Pk is given equal representation in the
resized vector P¯k = (p¯k1, p¯k2, ..., p¯kmk).
Step 2: standardize pattern height family by family
We choose a training set T from a family F (refer to Section 4.5 for the notation).
Let P¯k ∈ T ⊂ F. We average over the first component and then over the last
component in each vector Pk ∈ T. Let v1 = 1n(p¯11 + p¯21 + . . . + p¯n1), and vm¯ =
1
n
(p¯1m¯ + p¯2m¯ + . . . + p¯nm¯). We obtain the jth entry in the standardized vector P
∗
k =
(p∗k1, p
∗
k2, . . . , p
∗
km¯) from P¯k by:
p∗kj =
(vm¯−v1)
(p¯km¯−p¯k1)(p¯kj − p¯k1) + v1, j = 1 . . . m¯. (4.6.3)
At this point, all vectors in the population have been standardized for size and
each family has been standardized for pattern.
4.6.2 Statistical Test
Using the similar method described in Section 4.5.2, for each family we choose an
80% subset as a training set from which we compute a single centroid vector to use
in comparing against the entire dataset as a means of classification. We assume that
109
all vectors have been standardized as in Section 4.6.1. We again run this test five
times, each time using a different 80% portion of the family. For each test and each
family, we calculate v1 and vm¯ using the method above. Using Equation (4.5.2) of
Section 4.5.2, we compute the centroid vector A = (a1, a2, . . . , am¯).
In [Wei02] the author states that for large samples, the assumption of the parent
population being normally distributed is not needed for the Student t-test. Assum-
ing the whole dataset has a t-distribution, we therefore use the Student t-test to
compare the centroid vector with a sample vector. The standard deviation vector
S = (s1, s1, . . . , sm¯) is calculated by:
sj =
√∑k
i=1(tij − aj)2
k
(4.6.4)
For each Ti in the training set and for each component tij we calculate the t-value
to test whether the component’s value is consistent with belonging to the family. For
each Ti, we get τi = (τi1, τi2, . . . , τim¯) using the following formula:
τij =
∣∣∣∣ tij − ajsj
∣∣∣∣ . (4.6.5)
.
We chose a confidence level α = 0.05 which means we expect that 95% of the
values are within  standard deviation of the centroid vector. Thus if τij ≤ , this
component is consistent with belonging to the family. In our experiment, the number
of samples in each family is different, so we adjust  according to the size of each
family. For each Ti, let
Ui = {tij |τij ≤  , j = 1 . . . m¯}. (4.6.6)
Then we get the degree of membership λi from Equation (4.5.5) and the threshold
λ for the family from Equation (4.5.6). We thus acquire both the centroid vector A
and a threshold λ for each family. Based on these, we calculate the true positive and
false positive rates as in Equation (4.5.8).
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4.6.3 Test Results
Table 4.3 presents the statistical analysis results of the function length pattern
test.
FAMILY P N Accuracy TPRATE FPRATE FNRATE
CLAGGER 47 3370 0.6128 0.9361 0.3917 0.0639
ROBKNOT 101 3100 0.8688 0.8416 0.1303 0.1584
ROBZIPS 82 3195 0.8276 0.8537 0.1731 0.1463
ALUREON 43 3390 0.9849 0.6977 0.0115 0.3023
BAMBO 41 3400 0.8718 0.7805 0.1271 0.2195
BEOVENS 144 2885 0.7821 0.8542 0.2215 0.1458
BOXED 263 2290 0.6722 0.9126 0.3555 0.0874
Average 0.8029 0.8395 0.2015 0.160514
W.Average 0.7655 0.8655 0.24530 0.13450
Table 4.3. Function Length Pattern Results
The True Positive rate achieved in this test is much higher than that in the
previous test while the level of Accuracy was retained.
4.7 Running Times
Family No.Sample ExportingTime(secs) FLV GenerationTime(secs)
Bambo 41 726 144
Boxed 263 14526 13618
Alureon 43 1956 603
Beovens 144 499 139
Robknot 101 2602 110
Clagger 47 490 24
Robzips 82 2683 501
Total 721 23482 15139
Table 4.4. Running Times in the Function Length Experiments
In table 4.4, running times, including ExportingTime and FLV GenerationTime,
are listed for each family. All the times in this table are in seconds. In the preprocess
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phrase, all the samples are exported to ida2DBMS schema. The time spent on export-
ing executables to the ida2DBMS is the ExportingTime. FLV GenerationTime is used
to generate function length vectors by database programs described in Section 4.3.3.
Other running times are the execution times of algorithms in the experiments. Com-
pared with ExportingTime and FLV GenerationTime, execution times are relatively
negligible due to the the simplicity of the algorithms. So the total running time for
the 721 samples is the sum of ExportingTime and FLV GenerationTime, which is
38621 seconds.
4.8 Discussion
In the FLF test, the average true average positive rate is 67.83%. For “Clagger”
family, we get the maxmim value of true positive rate, which is 80.85%. And the
average false positive rate is 11.21% and we get zero value of false positive rate for
“Robknot” family which means that we can correctly classify samples which are not
from “Robknot” family.
In the FLP test, the average true average positive rate is 83.95%. For “Clagger”
family, we got the maxmim value of true positive rate, which is 93.61%. And the
average false positive rate is 20.15% and we got the minmum value of false positive
rate for “Alureon” family, which is 1.15%.
The results of both FLF and FLP tests show the true positive rate to be much
higher than the false positive rate. If function length contained no information we
would expect the true positive rate and the false positive rate to be relatively equal.
We can therefore conclude that function length contains statistically significant in-
formation in distinguishing between families of malware, and is therefore a useful
component for consideration in a classification of malware [TBV08].
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The function length pattern method correctly identified a higher proportion of the
true positives compared with the frequency method. However, the frequency method
had a lower false positive rate, giving it a higher overall accuracy. We believe that
this is because in our FLP method we vary how close a test vector needs to be to
the centroid vector depending on the Student t-distribution of the training set. This
will broaden the accepted range for a family with a degree of variability. However
the broader acceptable range is likely to also accept more false positives. From the
point of view of classification accuracy, FLF test outperforms FLP test. So in our
later experiments, we choose FLF as one of our static methods.
Our technique relies on unpacking. As I mentioned in Section 3.3.2.1 of Chapter 3,
there are many methods and tools that we can use to unpack a packed executable.
We choose VMUnpacker 1.3(For more information , please see Section 3.3.2.1 of
Chapter 3) as our unpacking tool.
Our approach is efficient to execute and scalable. Our training and classification
processes both execute in O(n) time, where n is the number of malware files. The
feature extraction is leveraged by DBMS technology. Once we finish exporting the
disassembling information from IDA Pro into the SQL Schema, we do not need access
the executable files. And we can easily fetch function length information from our
ida2DBMS schema by executing the four database functions or stored procedures
described in Section 4.3.3.
The average classification accuracy of FLF test is 87.76% and the average classi-
fication accuracy of FLP test is 80.29%. In FLF test, we get the maximum value of
classification accurary for “Robknot” family, which is 98.84%, and in FLP test, we get
the maximum value 98.49% of classificatin accurary for “Alureon” family These re-
sults verify Hypothesis 1 proposed in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2: It is possible to find
static features which are effective in malware detection and classification. Function
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length based features are simple and effective in malware detection and classification.
While the target of our classification system is 97% classification accuracy, therefore
function length alone is not sufficient. While taking the advantage of our DBMS
technology, we can expolit more information stored in our ida2DBMS schema. In
next Chapter 5 I present another feature PSI(Printable String Information) by using
the same techniques.
4.9 Summary
In this Chapter, I presented our Function Length based static method. First I
described IDA function and function length information, then explained the function
length information extraction process. And finally I described two experiments: FLF
test and FLP test in detail. And based on the experimental results I discussed the
classification performance of these two methods.
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Chapter 5
String Features based Methodology
In this Chapter, I present another static feature extraction and presentation
method, which focuses on Printable String Information.
5.1 Introduction
As I mentioned in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, malware analysis and extraction
should be based on simple and effective feature sets and these feature sets would
be easily extracted. In Chapter 4, I presented our function length based extraction
and presentation method. PSI (Printable String Information) contains interpretable
strings which carrying semantic interpretation of malicious behaviors and is easily
extractable from unpacked malware, so we choose PSI as our next static feature. In
this Chapter, I provide detailed description of PSI based static feature extraction and
presentation.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the relevant literature reviews
are summarized in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, I detail our analytical approach and
data preparation and in Section 5.4 I describe the experimental set-up . Sections 5.5
115
present the test. In Section 5.7 I analyse and compare the results of PSI test and
extended one and summarize in Section 5.8.
5.2 Related Work
In the research area of static analysis methodologies, many researchers used dif-
ferent information of binary code to extract different static features from unpacked
executables without executing them to do the classification [Ghe05, KS06, SBN+10,
PBKM07, XSCM04, XSML07, TBIV09, TBV08, WPZL09, YLCJ10, DB10, HYJ09].
These static information included the basic blocks of code in the malware, a function
tree which is constructed from the control flow graph and sequences of API function
calls.
In Chapter 4 I presented the function length features based static methodologies,
in the following sections, I present our approach to the classification problem based
on the static features extracted from printable string information.
5.3 Data Preparation
5.3.1 PSI
Printable String Information is a list of strings extracted from a binary along with
the address at which each string resides [Eag08]. IDA recognizes a large number of
string formats. If the bytes beginning at the currently selected address form a string
of the defined style, IDA groups those bytes together into a string variable. Strings
window is the built-in IDA equivalent of the strings utility which is used to display
a list of strings extracted from a binary and the Setup Strings window is used to
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configure the defined style of string. Table Strings window in our ida2DBMS schema
table is used to store these information.
5.3.2 Extract Printable String Information
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Figure 5.1. Exporting of PSI
Figure 5.1 illustrates the exporting of PSI in our system. Once IDA finishes
disassembling of an executable file, it generate a .idb file for the executable. This .idb
file reflects all the disassembling information and IDA no longer requires access to
that executable. Every time the Strings window is opened, IDA String Scanner scans
the .idb file in accordance with the settings configured by Setup Strings window.
By default IDA searches for and formats C-style null-terminated strings, you can
reconfigure the Setup Strings window to search for anything other than C-style strings.
In our system, we use the default settings. Strings window is used to display these
formatted strings. Figure 5.2 is a snapshot of Strings window in IDA. Then using our
customized ida2sql mentioned in Section 3.3.2.2 of Chapter 3, these string information
is exported to table Strings window in our ida2DBMS schema.
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Figure 5.2. Strings Window in IDA
5.4 Experimental Set-up
5.4.1 Motivation
From the experiences of anti-virus analysts from CA company, we know that
there are similar printable strings in specific malicious executables that distinguish
them from others. Furthermore, these printable strings contain interpretable strings,
including API calls from Import Table and strings carrying semantic interpretation,
are the high-level specifications of malicious behaviors and contain the important
semantic information which can reflect the attacker’s intent and goal [YCW+09]. In
addition, as I show in Chapter 4, function length contains statistically significant
information in distinguishing between families of malware,however, function length
alone is not sufficient. And our ida2DBMS contain all the disassembling information
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extracted from executables. There three factors motive us to extract PSI to do
malware detection and classification.
5.4.2 Test Dataset
Table 5.1 lists our test dataset. In this experiment, we expand the test dataset
to 1367 samples by introducing viruses, cleanware and more recent malware samples
with an extended detection date to November of 2008. In this table the first 7 families
have been pre-classified as Trojans; the next 3 families as Viruses.
Due to the huge amount of malware released in the wild every day, fast response is
extremely important for the anti-virus detection engine. Therefore, knowing whether
a file is malicious or clean is more urgent than knowing the specific family from
which the malware is from. In order to verify the that our methods keep effective in
differentiating malware from cleanware, we introduce cleanware into our experiments.
In our experiments cleanware is a group of clean executables collected from win32
platforms spanning from Windows 98 to Windows XP. In this experiment, we treat
the cleanware as a single family.
5.5 Printable String Information Test
Figure 5.3 outlines our PSI experiment. The methodology used in this experiment
can be summarised in the following steps:
• Step 1: Extract the features based on string information.
• Step 2: Generate string list based on the whole dataset.
• Step 3: For each sample, check the occurrence of each string from the string
list, mapping each sample into a vector.
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Type Family Detection Date: No. of Samples
starting ⇒ ending (YYYY-MM)
Malware
Trojan
Bambo 2003-07⇒2006-01 41
Boxed 2004-06⇒2007-09 263
Alureon 2005-05⇒2007-11 43
Beovens 2005-03⇒2007-06 144
Robknot 2005-10⇒2007-08 101
Clagger 2005-11⇒2007-01 47
Robzips 2006-03⇒2007-08 82
Subtotal of Trojan 721
Virus
Agobot 2003-01⇒2006-04 340
Looked 2003-07⇒2006-09 67
Emerleox 2006-11⇒2008-11 78
Subtotal of Virus 485
Total of Malware 2003-07⇒2008-11 1206
Cleanware 161
Total 1367
Table 5.1. Experimental Set of 1367 Files
• Step 4: Build family Fi, i = 1 . . . 11, one of these families is cleanware.
• Step 5: Select a family Fi and split it into 5 parts.
• Step 6: Build 5 sets T and Q using an 80% to 20% split.
• Step 7: Reduce the features by retaining only the strings which occur in more
than 10% of the samples in the training set T .
• Step 8: For each set T and Q, take a random sample of executable files from
the other families to create supplementary vectors which represent negative
samples (i.e. not from family Fi). Add the negative sample vectors to sets T
and Q.
• Step 9: Select the classifier.
• Step 10: Call WEKA libraries to train the classifier using the training data
T .
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• Step 11: Evaluate the test data using set Q.
• Step 12: Repeat steps 9 to 11 for each classifier.
• Step 13: Repeat steps 5 to 12 for each family.
And this experiment can be divided into the following three phases including:
1 ) Data Preprocessing and Feature extraction.
2 ) Feature selection and data preparation.
3 ) Classification and Performance evaluation.
In the following sections, I provide the detailed description of each phrase.
5.5.1 Data Preprocessing and Feature Extraction
The first phase “Data Preprocessing and Feature extraction” uses the same tech-
niques described in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4.1 of Chapter 3. We first unpack the malware
using VMUnpacker, disassemble both unpacked malware and cleanware and export
disassembling information into our ida2DBMS schema.
In this experiment,printable string information extracted from executable files is
used as static features. For each file, we create a vector to represent which strings are
present in that file. We first generate a global list of all the strings that occur in our
malware database. (We ignored strings of less than three bytes as these tend to be
extremely common non-malicious strings and they unnecessarily add complexity to
our computations.). In our ida2DBMS schema , I create a database view to generate
this global string list.Figure 5.4 shows how to fetch the global string list by executing
a sql script. In the output window of the sql script , we can see that there are two
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Figure 5.3. Overview of PSI Experiment
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columns in the list, one is the string , another column “Frequency” indicates the global
frequency of the string in our database. Each string is given an ordering according
to its frequency in the list. For each malware , we then test which of the strings in
our global list it contains. This is computed efficiently by using a hash table to store
the global list and by doing hash lookups on the strings contained in a given sample.
The results are recorded in a binary vector, where for each string in the global list, a
1 denotes that it is present and a 0 that it is not.
Figure 5.4. Global String List
Let G = {s1, s2, s3, . . . s|G|} be the global ordered set of all strings; thus si might
be the string “kernal32”. |G| is the total number of distinct string, which is 31217 in
the experiment.
Let F represent the ordered set of malware families along with a single family of
clean files. In our experiment, we take cleanware as a separate family. So there are
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total n = 11 families in the experiment.
F = {F1, F2 . . . , F11}. (5.5.1)
Each malware family Fi is a set of executable files. We represent an executable
file in the database by its module id M ij . Thus, for any particular family Fi, we can
write
fi = {M i1,M i2, . . .M ik} (5.5.2)
where k is the number of executables in a particular family. We can also view M ij as
a binary vector capturing which of the strings in the global set G are present in the
sample; that is:
M ij = (s
i
j1, s
i
j2, . . . , s
i
j|G|) (5.5.3)
where
sijl =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if the lthstring of G is not inmodule vectorM ij
1 otherwise
|G| represents the total
number of distinct strings in this experiments, which is 31217 in this experiment.
To be simplify, let us assume that the global set G contained only 5 strings:
G = {“kernel32”, “advapi32”, “GetModuleHandleA”, “OpenProcess”, “LoadLibrary”}
then M ij = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1) means the strings “kernel32”, ”GetModuleHandleA’ and
”LoadLibrary” are all present in the sample M ij , whereas “advapi32” and “OpenPro-
cess” are not.
5.5.2 Feature Selection and Data Preparation
The second phase “Feature selection and data preparation” is a process that selects
a subset of the original features removing irrelevant, redundant or noisy data. It also
improves the performance of data classification as well as speeding up the processing
algorithm. We considered only the data in the training sets when we selected the
features.
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For any particular family Fi containing k malware files, T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tr} ⊆ Fi
represents a training set chosen from the family Fi. Then Q = Fi – T =
{Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk−r} is used as a test set. Each entry Tj in the training set is rep-
resented by the vector Tj = (tj1, tj2, ..., tj|G|), and each entry Qj in the test set is
represented by a vector Qj = (qj1, qj2, . . . , qj|G|).
To select features for the family Fi based on string information, we then selected
a restricted ordered subset Gir based on the global set G. That is -
Gir = {gir1, gir2, . . . , gir|Gir|} (5.5.4)
where girj are the strings from the training set Tr for the family Fi ordered as in G
when this string occurred with a frequency of at least 10% in Tr.
The training sets can also be represented by binary vectors of string information
in the same way as the M ij shown in equation (3); for a specific family Fi,
T ij = (t
i
j1, t
i
j2, . . . , t
i
r|Gir |
) (5.5.5)
where
tijl =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if the lthstring of Gir is not inmodule vectorT
i
j
1 otherwise
A frequency threshold of 10% was chosen. It reduced the number of strings
in set G from over 100,000 to a number in the 100s (depending on the family).
Preliminary work showed that higher thresholds gave slightly better results for some
of the classfication algorithms. Determining the optimal frequency threshold is a
potential topic for future investigation.
After reducing the set of strings to Gir we added some negative samples to our
sets T and Q, i.e. samples that do not belong to family Fi. Negative samples were
needed to train the classifier and for testing against false positives. We randomly
125
selected samples from the other families and created standardised vectors for each
sample using our reduced set Gir.
5.5.3 Classification and Performance Evaluation
The third phrase “Classification and Performance evaluation” is to do classifica-
tion using machine learning machine based method and to evaluate the performance
of the system.
We built a program interface to WEKA to do classification. The program reads
from the idb2DBMS database to collect the data for preprocess, feature extraction
and feature selection. Then generates the training set T and test set Q and converts
both sets into WEKA data format. We pass training set T to the WEKA library to
train the classifiers and then test the effectiveness with test set Q. Our program is
designed in such a way that the system can select the families and the corresponding
classifiers according to our requirements rather than the default in WEKA. And in
this experiement we apply 5-fold cross validation in all cases.
We then use the same Equations ( 3.7.1) mentioned in Section 3.7 of Chapter 3
to evaluate the performance of our system. Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 give the results.
And Figure 5.5 compares the classification accuracy with and without boosting for
these five classification algorithms.
Classification Base Classifier Meta Classifier
Algorithm FP FN Acc FP FN Acc
NB 0.015 0.1846 0.904 0.011 0.141 0.927
SVM 0.023 0.065 0.955 0.0341 0.065 0.951
IB1 0.0266 0.072 0.954 0.022 0.075 0.9551
RF 0.02 0.072 0.959 0.021 0.071 0.9595
DT 0.041 0.162 0.9487 0.0241 0.0591 0.9625
Table 5.2. Average Family Classification Results in PSI Experiment
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Classification Base Classifier Meta Classifier
Algorithm FP FN Acc FP FN Acc
NB 0.0084 0.173 0.913 0.0075 0.128 0.936
SVM 0.016 0.056 0.965 0.0215 0.0565 0.964
IB1 0.0175 0.0529 0.967 0.0128 0.0582 0.9701
RF 0.011 0.051 0.972 0.011 0.0483 0.975
DT 0.0291 0.167 0.954 0.021 0.0421 0.9642
Table 5.3. Weighted Average Family Classification Results in PSI Experiment
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
SVM IB1 DT RF NB
Accuracy
Base 
Classifier
Meta 
classifier
Figure 5.5. Comparison of Classification Accuracy (with and without Boosting)
5.5.4 Experimental Results
Table 5.2 presents the average of the experimental results according to classifier.
Na¨ıve Bayes gives the weakest results, while the other algorithms compare very well
with each other. The meta-classifier AdaBoostM1 improves on all classifiers, with the
exception of SVM, but the difference is insignificant. Based on these results, the best
accuracy rate is above 96% (AdaBoostM1 with DT).
Since not all families were of the same size, we also calculated a weighted aver-
age,where each family was weighted according to the formula
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nfi
nT
where nfi is the number of modueles in family Fi, and nT is the total number of
executable files (across all families). The weighted average results are shown in Ta-
ble 5.3. For all parameters, the weighted results are better than the non-weighted
results. The Random Forest and IB1 classifiers both achiever accuracies above 97%.
Random Forest has the best results overall.
Again, AdaBoostM1 improves on all classifiers with the exception of SVM, but
the difference is insignificant. The best accuracy rate after calculating the weighted
average is 97.5%(AdaBoostM1 with RF)
As I mentioned in Section 5.4.2, we introduce cleanware in this experiment. Ta-
ble 5.4 lists the classification results of malware versus cleanware by taking cleanware
as a separate family.
Classification Base Classifier Meta Classifier
Algorithm FP FN Acc FP FN Acc
NB 0.04 0.2 0.882 0.05 0.18 0.884
SVM 0.06 0.05 0.942 0.06 0.06 0.94
IB1 0.15 0.068 0.896 0.05 0.05 0.947
RF 0.075 0.062 0.938 0.05 0.062 0.948
DT 0.16 0.1 0.87 0.09 0.05 0.93
Table 5.4. Malware Versus Cleanware Results in PSI Experiment
5.6 Running Times
In the preprocess phrase of static analysis, all the samples are exported to
ida2DBMS schema. The time spent on exporting executables to the ida2DBMS is the
ExportingTime. In Table 5.5, ExportingTimes are listed for the families and these
times are in seconds. In ida2DBMS schema, I create a database view to update the
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Family No.Samples ExportingTime(secs)
Bambo 41 726
Boxed 263 14526
Alureon 43 1956
Beovens 144 499
Robknot 101 2602
Clagger 47 490
Robzips 82 2683
Subtotal of Trojan 721 23483
Agobot 340 48300
Looked 67 4062
Emerleox 78 7313
Subtotal of Virus 485 45469
Cleanware 161 7811
Total 1367 76763
Table 5.5. Running Times in the Printable String Information Experiments
Global String List mentioned in Section 5.5.1, so the ExportingTimes already include
the preprocess times. And the running times for the classification component of the
experiments are 10269 seconds(estimated value based on the classification component
of the experiment for static PSI features described in Section 8.6 of Chapter 8, the
only difference between that experiment and this experiment is the number of samples.
In that experiment, we test on 2939 samples and the running time of classification
component is 368 mins)
5.7 Discussion
From these results in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 , we can see that the values of clas-
sification accuracy are all over 9% including Na¨ıve Bayes which performs the worst.
And for the weighted average classification results, all the values are over 95% with the
exeception of Na¨ıve Bayes. Our PSI test results show that string information can be
used to achieve high classification accuracy for the range of methods we tested. This
is evidence that strings are a powerful feature for malware classification. Therefore
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this experiment verifies again Hypothesis 1 proposed in Section 2.4 in Chapter 2:
It is possible to find static features which are effective in malware detection and clas-
sification. In addition, perhaps surprisingly, many of the strings used for classifying
came from library code (rather than the malicious code itself). This suggests that
string information can be used to identify which libraries the programs used.
We think the reason of bad performance of Na¨ıve Bayes in our experiments is the
limitation of the classification algorithm. As I mentioned in Section 3.6.2.1 of Chap-
ter 3, Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers are based on the assumption that all the attributes
of the class are conditionally independent so the presence (or absence) of a particular
attribute of a class is unrelated to the presence (or absence) of any other attribute.
They consider all of the attributes to independently contribute to the probability
summary of classification which may not be the case for our data. Results in Ta-
ble 5.2 and Table 5.3 verify this hypothesis. In those experiments, Na¨ıve Bayes gives
the weakest results.
We introduced 161 clean executables collected from win32 platform in this ex-
periment and Table 5.4 lists the classification results of malware versus cleanware by
taking cleanware as a separate family. In that table, we can see that the best classi-
fication accuracy is 94.8% (RF with boosting). These results show that our methods
keep similar performance in differentiating malware from cleanware.
In Table 5.6, we compare PSI results with some other recent work classifying large
sets of malware and achieving at least 85% accuracy. Bailey et al. [BOA+07] describe
malware behaviour in terms of system state changes (taken from event logs). They
compare over 3000 pre-classified samples with over 3000 unclassified samples using a
clustering technique to measure closeness. They achieve over 91% accuracy.
Rieck et al. [RHW+08] used behavioural pattern analysis to classify differences
between 14 families of Trojans (3) and worms (11) based on a total of over 10,000
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Families Size Accuracy Features
K. Rieck et. al (2008) 14 10,000 88% Behavioural
[RHW+08] patterns
M. Bailey et. al (2007) unknown 8,000 91.6% Behaviour
[BOA+07]
Z. Shafiq et.al (2009) unknown 1,200 95% This paper compares only
[STF09] only clean with
malicious files
Tian, R et.al. (2008) 7 721 87% Function length
[TBV08] frequency
Our method 11 1,367 97% Printable string information
information
Table 5.6. Comparison of Our Method with Existing Work
samples. They used training, test and validation sets and applied SVM classifiers
choosing the best such classifier family by family. Overall performance is determined
by using a combined classifier on the testing partition. Approximately 88% true
positive allocation is achieved. We also compare PSI test with our FLF test [TBV08].
5.8 Summary
In this Chapter, I presented our PSI (Printable String Information) based static
method. First I explained the PSI and describe the extraction of PSI. Then I described
the PSI test in its three phrases. And finally based on the experimental results I
discussed the performance of our system.
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Chapter 6
Combined Static Features based
Methodology
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an automated malware classification system based on static
feature selection. In previous Chapters 4 and 5, I presented two static classification
methodologies FLF method and PSI method, where feature vectors are extracted in-
dividually based on function length frequency and printable string information. From
the FLF experimental results of Chapter 4, we saw that some aspects of the global
program structure remain consistent across malware families despite the evolution of
the code. Thus function features of the unpacked malware are useful in identification.
And from PSI experimental results of Chapter 5, we found that string information
can be used to achieve high classification accuracy for the range of methods we tested.
As Hypothesis 2 that I presented in Chapter 2, our expectation is that function
length and printable strings are complementary features for classifying malware, we
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expect each to reinforce the other, thus together giving better results than either
separately. The purpose in this chapter is to test this hypothesis.
Thus, in this chapter I present a combined approach drawing on both the FLF
and PSI methodologies. The combined results show that the malware classification
accuracy achieves a weighted average of over 98% (with DT), which indeed improves
on both methodologies separately and confirming our hypothesis. These results also
strengthen the argument against the existence of a unique feature usable for malware
identification.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the relevant literature reviews
are summarized in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3, I detail our analytical approach and
data preparation and in Section 6.4 I describe the experimental set-up . Section 6.5
presents the test. In Section 6.6 I analyse and compare the results of the PSI test
and combined one and summarize in Section 6.7.
6.2 Related Work
At the side of static features, many works have been done [Ghe05, KS06, SBN+10,
PBKM07, XSCM04, XSML07, WPZL09, YLCJ10, DB10, HYJ09]. different re-
searchers used different aspects of binary code to do the classification, including basic
blocks of code in the malware, a function tree which is constructed based on the con-
trol flow graph and sequences of API function calls. To the time of writing this thesis
there was a lack of research work combining more than two kinds of static features
together to improve the classification performance.
Based on our previous work [TBIV09, TBV08], in the following sections, I present
our approach to the classification problem based on the Combined Static Features
extracted from executables.
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Figure 6.1. Combined Feature Vector Example
6.3 Data Preparation
In this experiment, we extend FLF method presented in Chapter 4 to the test
dataset of 1367 samples listed in Chapter 5 and merge the extracted static features
using both the FLF and PSI methods, then pass the generated vectors into the
classification engine. Figure 6.1 gives an example of the combined feature vector.
In Chapter 4 we presented two function length related tests: FLF (Function
Length Frequency) test and FLP (Function Length Pattern) test. From results of
two tests, we saw that FLF method outperforms FLP method according to the clas-
sification accuracy. FLP method identified a higher proportion of the true positives
compared with FLF method. However, FLF method had a lower false positive rate,
giving it a higher overall accuracy. As I discussed in Section 4.8 of Chapter 4, this
is because in our FLP method we vary how close a test vector needs to be to the
centroid vector depending on the Student t-distribution of the training set. This will
broaden the accepted range for a family with a degree of variability. However the
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broader acceptable range is likely to also accept more false positives. Furthermore
the target of our system is to achieve a higher classification accuracy, so we choose
FLF method and combine it with PSI method in this experiment.
6.4 Experimental Set-up
6.4.1 Motivation
As I proposed in Chapter 2, our Hypothesis 2 is that function length and
printable strings are complementary features for classifying malware, we expect each
to reinforce the other, thus giving better results than either separately.
In Chapter 2, I talk about signature-based malware detection system which relies
on the determined signature. The implication is that there is some unique factor
which defines a piece of code. While this may be the case for a specific sample,
given the many obfuscation techniques available, it is unlikely to be true for a general
family; there may be several features of a piece of code which together indicate its
purpose, but which separately do not definitively reveal this information.
Our results in Chapter 4 and 5 verify our Hypothesis 1 proposed in Chapter 2.
FLF (function length frequency) and PSI (printable string information), these simple
static features extracted from binary code are effective in malware detection and
classification. In this experiment, we expect to verify Hypothesis 2 by combining
these two static methods in our malware detection and classification system.
6.4.2 Test Dataset
In this experiment, we use the same test dataset as our PSI experiment, see
Table 5.1 in Chapter 5. There are 1367 executables ,including trojans, viruses and
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cleanware. The first 7 families in Table 5.1 have been pre-classified as trojans; the
next 3 families as Viruses.
6.5 Combined Test
6.5.1 Overview of Experimental Process
Figure 6.2 illustrates the process of our Combined Static Features Based Classifi-
cation experiment. In this experiment, we use the K-fold cross validation technique
with K = 5. The methodology used can be described by the following steps:
• Step 1 Extract the features based on both FLF and PSI methods.
• Step 2 Combine the features vectors and make a WEKA (arff) file.
• Step 3 Build families Fi for i = 1 . . . 11.
• Step 4 Select a family Fi and split it into 5 parts.
• Step 5 Select the same instances of Fj from other families Fj(j 	= i) and split
into 5 parts in the same manner as for Fi.
• Step 6 Build 5 sets of Training Set Data and Test Set Data in respective
portions of 80% and 20%.
• Step 7 Select features from the Training Data.
• Step 8 Select the classifier C to be used.
• Step 9 Call WEKA libraries to train the C using the Training Data.
• Step 10 Evaluate the Test Set Data.
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• Step 11 Repeat four more times.
• Step 12 Repeat for other classifiers.
• Step 13 Repeat for other classifiers.
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Figure 6.2. Combined Static Features Based Classification Process
6.5.2 Experimental Results
In this experiment, we take the cleanware as a family and list the classification ac-
curacy for cleanware family separately. It is shown that we achieve over 96% accuracy
(meta classifier with DT) in our testing, as indicated in Table 6.1 and 6.2.
Base Classifier
NB SVM IB1 DT RF
W. Avg 94.31 97.77 97.63 98.15 96.69
Cleanfiles 84.51 92.4 85.64 91.04 94.4
Table 6.1. Classification Results for Base Classifier
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Meta classifier - AdaBoost
NB SVM IB1 DT RF
W. Avg 96.51 98.16 98.2 98.86 97.73
Cleanfiles 95.2 92.81 92.74 96.13 95.8
Table 6.2. Classification Results for Meta classifier
6.6 Discussion
Combined Static Features Experiment results show that combined features, using
both FLF and PSI methodologies, can be used to achieve higher classification accuracy
for the range of methods we tested compared to the previous results in Chapters 4 and
5, which were 87% and 97% respectively . This evidence supports our Hypothesis 2
that Combining several static features can produce better detection and classification
performance than any individual feature can produce.
Figure 6.3 graphically represents the comparisons of classification accuracy with
and without boosting. AdaBoostM1 improves on all classifiers although the difference
is insignificant. Like the results in Section 5.5.4 of Chapter 5, Na¨ıve Bayes gives the
weakest results, while the other algorithms compare very well with each other. We
think the reason of bad performance of Na¨ıve Bayes in this combined experiment
and previous PSI experiment is the limitation of the classification algorithm which I
discussed in Section 3.6.2.1 of Chapter 3. Based on the weakest performance given
by Na¨ıve Bayes in both PSI and Combined methods, we then decide to exclude Na¨ıve
Bayes algorithm from our selected classification algorithms in the later experiments.
Based on these results, the best accuracy rate of the combined method is above
98.86% (AdaBoostM1 with DT).
Figure 6.4, I compare this combined classification method with the previous in-
dividual PSI classification method in Chapter 5 (which had better results than FLF
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method in Chapter 4). It is obvious from the figure that our present accuracy is
better in all parameters compared to existing one.
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Figure 6.3. Comparison of Classification (with and without boosting)
In Table 6.3, I compare our results with some other recent work classifying large
sets of malware and achieving at least 80% accuracy. As different authors use different
datasets, therefore a direct comparison is not possible, as there is no publicly available
standardized malware test set.
Zhao, H., et al. [ZXZ+10] used string information to classify malware based on
a total of over 13330 samples. They used training, test and validation sets and
applied SVM classifiers choosing the best such classifier family by family. Overall
performance is determined to be approximately 83.3%. Ye, Y. et.al [YLJW10], used
a post-processing technique based on analysis of API execution calls. They adapt
several post-processing techniques of associative classification in malware detection on
approximately 35000 malicious and 15000 benign samples. Using various data mining
techniques they achieved approximately 88% accuracy. I also compare our publised
results from Chapter 4 and 5, Ahmed et al. [AHSF09] whose aim is a composite
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scheme for malware classification that extracts statistical features from both spatial
and temporal information available in run-time API calls. Using 237 core API calls
from six different functional categories, their system provides an accuracy of 98% on
the average. They also carried out a scalability analysis with an accuracy of 97 %.
Their result is as good as our method in classification accuracy, while they test on
a relatively small dataset with 416 samples, our dataset is more than three times of
their size.
6.7 Summary
In this Chapter, the Combined Static Features experiment was presentd. First
I proposed our hypotheses that FLF and PSI can be combined to complement each
other ,making our system flexible, scalable and robust. Then I explained the Com-
bined Static Features experiment and analyse the results. We did not set up an
extended experiment for our expanded test dataset mentioned in the table 3.1 in
Section 3.3.1 of Chapter 3. We established that the best classification accuracy rate
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Families Size Accuracy Features
Ahmed F, Et.al (2009) unknown 416 98% Behavioral
[AHSF09]
Ye, Y. et.al., (2010) unknown 35000 88% Behavioral
[YLJW10] Behavioral
Hengli Zhao, et.al., (2010) unknown 13332 83.30% String information
[ZZL+09] String information
Tian, R et.al. (2008) 7 721 87% Function length
[TBV08] frequency
Tian, R et. Al (2009) 11 1367 97% Printable string
[TBIV09] information
Our method 11 1367 98.86% Function length frequency
& printable string
Table 6.3. Comparison of Our method with Similar Existing Work
98.86% was high enough for static methods compared with our target of 97% classifi-
cation accuracy and we will move to dynamic method and do the extended experiment
by combining static and dynamic methods.
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Chapter 7
Dynamic Methodology
This chapter proposes an approach for detecting and classifying malware by in-
vestigating the behavioral features using dynamic analysis of malware binaries. Our
framework includes statistical methods for classifying malware into families using
behavioral analysis of information collected at run-time.
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we proposed our integrated method which aims to build a robust
malware detection and classification system by merging static and dynamic methods
together to complement each other. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 I elaborated the static
methods. In this Chapter I present our approach for detecting and classifying malware
by investigating the behavioral features using dynamic analysis of malware binaries.
We have developed a fully automated tool called “HookMe” mentioned in Chapter 3 in
a virtual environment to extract API call features effectively from executables. Our
experimental results with a dataset of nearly 3000 malware executables stretching
cross a 8-year span, including trojans, worms and viruses, have shown an accuracy
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of over 90% for classifying the malware families and an accuracy of over 95% in
differentiating malware from cleanware.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the relevant literature reviews are
summarized in Section 7.2. In Section 7.3, I detail our analytical approach and data
preparation and in Section 7.4 I describe the experimental set-up . Sections 7.5 present
both Family Classification Test and Malware versus Cleanware Test. In Section 7.6
I analyse and compare the results of the Dynamic method and some other similar
methods. And summarize in Section 7.7.
7.2 Related work
In Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, I pointed out that all malware analysis and ex-
traction approaches can basically be categorized into two types: (i) based on fea-
tures drawn from an unpacked static version of the executable file without executing
the analyzed executable files [Ghe05, KS06, SBN+10, PBKM07, XSCM04, XSML07,
TBIV09, TBV08, WPZL09, YLCJ10, DB10, HYJ09] and (ii) based on dynamic fea-
tures or behavioral features obtained during the execution of the executable files
[CJK07, WSD08, AHSF09, KChK+09, ZXZ+10].
Due to the limitations of Static Method discussed in Section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2,
more and more researchers turned to working on dynamic analysis techniques to
improve the effectiveness and accuracy of malware detection and classification.
Viewing the malware as a black box, Christodorescu et al In [CJK07] focused
on the interaction between malware and the operating system, therefore using sys-
tem calls as the building blocks of their technique. The authors in [WSD08] used
dynamic analysis technologies to classify malware by using a controller to manage ex-
ecution, stopping the execution after 10 seconds. In [AHSF09] the authors opened a
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new possibility in malware analysis and extraction by proposing a composite method
which extracts statistical features from both spatial and temporal information avail-
able in run-time API calls. A novel malware detection approach was also proposed
in [KChK+09]; the authors focused on Host-based malware detectors because these
detectors had the advantage that they could observe the complete set of actions that
a malware program performed and it was even possible to identify malicious code
before it was executed. In[ZXZ+10], the authors also proposed an automated clas-
sification method based on the behavioral analysis. They tested on 3996 malware
samples and achieved an average classification accuracy of 83.3%.
7.3 Data Preparation
In the dynamic analysis, each file is executed under a controlled environment
which is based on Virtual Machine Technology. Our trace tool name ”‘HookMe”’ is
used to monitor and trace the real execution of each file.
As I mentioned in Section 3.3.3 of Chapter 3, we set up a virtual machine envi-
ronment by installing and configuring VMware Server 2.0.2. Then we create a new
virtual machine installing Window XP Professional as guest operation system and
disable networking. Before the start of dynamic analysis, a snapshot of the virtual
machine is taken and we need to revert to this snapshot for every execution. In such
a way, we assure that the virtual machine is rehabilitated every time.
Figure 3.9 of Chapter 3 illustrates this process. To automatically run the exe-
cutables, we code our vmrun-based Dynamic Analysis Script which carries out the
executions in the VMware environment.
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7.3.1 Dynamic Analysis Script
For each malware execution, the following steps are taken automatically in the
Dynamic Analysis Script:
1) Revert the virtual machine to its original snapshot. It actually overwrites the
current virtual machine state with the original virtual machine state, so that
all the changes made by the malware during its execution are lost.
2) Start the virtual machine to set up the virtual runtime environment.
3) Copy the executable file from Host to VM.
4) Run our HookMe trace tool to monitor and trace the execution of malware.
HookMe monitors the state changes in the system and generates a log file.
5) In our experiments, we run each executable file for 30 seconds.
6) Stop the virtual machine.
7) Restart the virtual machine and then copy the generated log file from virtual
machine to Host.
After the execution, for each executable we get a log file which reflects the behav-
iors of the malware in terms of API function calls. In Section 3.4.2 of Chapter 3 I
give an example of such log files.
7.4 Experimental Set-up
7.4.1 Motivation
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 focused on the static features methodologies. As I analyse
in Section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2, Static Feature Extraction has its advantages and dis-
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advantages. On the positive side, Static Feature Extraction is low level time and
resource consuming[Li04] and has a easily accessible form[Oos08]; while on the nega-
tive side, Static Feature Extraction is susceptible to inaccuracies due to obfuscation
and polymorphic techniques[MKK07].
The aim in this chapter is to build a dynamic analysis system which achieves
accuracy similar to that of the static analysis approach. The purpose in this chapter
is to test our Hypothesis 3 presented in Chapter 2: It is possible to find dynamic
features which are effective in malware detection and classification.
7.4.2 Test Dataset
In this experiment, we introduce more recent malware families and more cleanware
to expand our test dataset listed in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. In the dynamic experiment,
we terminate the execution of each malware file after 30 seconds then collect the log
files from the virtual machine environment. For some of malware files, there are no
log files generated during the execution. In this case, we exclude those malware files
from our test dataset.
See Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 for detailed information of all the families in this
experiment. There are 2939 executables, including trojans, viruses, worms and clean-
ware. The first 12 families have been pre-classified as trojans; the next 2 families
as worms; another 3 families as viruses. Now our test dataset includes malware files
stretch cross a 8-year span which is from 2003 to 2010.
We know that knowing whether a file is malicious or clean is more urgent than
knowing the specific family from which the malware is from. In order to verify the
that our methods keep effective in differentiating malware from cleanware, we firstly
introduce cleanware into our test dataset in Chapter 5. But in that experiment and
later experiment presented in Chapter 6 we treat the cleanware as a separate family
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when we do classification. In order to differentiate malware from cleanware, we add
malware versus cleanware tests in this chapter.
7.5 Dynamic Feature Based Tests
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Figure 7.1. Overview of Dynamic Feature Based Experiment.
Figure 7.1 gives an overview of our Dynamic Feature Based experiment.
After we generate log files for all the files in our test dataset, we collect all the
log files and regroup them according to their families. For each log file, We generate
string list and string frequency, next we create a hash table to store all the unique
strings along with frequency and generate the feature vectors using frequency. Then
we pass these vectors to our WEKA-Integrated Classification Engine.
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As I mentioned above, we actually do two experiments by using dynamic features.
one is Malware VS Cleanware Classification and the other one is Malware Family
Classification.
7.5.1 Malware VS Cleanware Classification
In this section I introduce our method for comparing the behaviour of malicious
executables versus clean files using log files.
7.5.1.1 Feature Extraction
In the malware versus cleanware experiment we follow recommendations of
[MSF+08] in using an equal portion of malware and of cleanware in the training
as this gives the best classification results. Since we have almost five times as many
malware files as cleanware files, we needed to run (at least) five tests in order to
incorporate all the files at least once into our testing. We create subsets with equal
numbers of malware and cleanware files.
We then generate string lists for each group. Our feature extraction method is
to separate out all the API call strings and their parameters which occur in the log
files. We treat the API calls and their parameters as separate strings. First we read
the strings from our log files and record each string into our global list. We use a
hash table to store all strings along with their global frequency and file frequency;
we call it as fs and fm respectively. The fs is the total number of occurrences of the
string in all files and the fm is the number of occurrences of the string within a file.
We then compare the strings in each file against the global list. Figure 7.2 shows
a sample of extracted features from our log file for a sample of malware along with
their corresponding fm and S.
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Extracted fm          S 
features            
P6          26        MSVCRT.dll 
P7          41        DontUseDNSLoadBalancing 
P8          27        WSAJoinLeaf 
P16         25        AutoConfigURL 
P17         25        RtlConvertSidToUnicodeString 
P18         27        CreateTimerQueue 
P19          1        0x1ae3 
P150        41        UpdateSecurityLevel 
P151         1        Domains\gotudoronline.com 
P460        27        WSAEnumNameSpaceProvidersW 
P461         5        Kernel32.dll 
P833        27        Ws2_32NumHandleBuckets 
P834         9        \\.\MountPointManager 
 
Figure 7.2. Sample Feature Sets of A Malware File
For each file we calculate fm for all the strings in the global list. We also keep
track of the global frequencies. Table 7.1 gives an example of the global frequencies
and file frequencies for a small set of strings. In our classification experiments we find
that only information about the presence of a string is important, however including
the number of occurrences of the string, fm, do not improve the classification results.
Therefore our final feature vectors for each file only recorded which of the strings in
the global list is present in each file. In our feature vectors we used “1” to denote
that a string is present and “0” to denote that a string is not present.
The following example clarifies our feature extraction process. Let us assume that
we consider three files, with the strings extracted from the execution logs of these
files listed as follows:
• File 1 = { GetProcAddress, RegQueryValueExW, CreateFileW, GetProcAddress, ......}.
• File 2 = { GetProcAddress, OpenFile, FindFirstFileA,FindNextFileA,CopyMemory, ......}.
• File 3 = { GetProcAddress, CreateFileW, CopyMemory, RegQueryValueExW,......}.
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String list Global frequency File frequency
GetProcAddress 4 3
RegQueryValueExW 2 2
CreateFileW 2 2
OpenFile 1 1
FindFirstFileA 1 1
FindNextFileA 1 1
CopyMemory 2 2
Table 7.1. Example Global Frequencies and File Frequencies
Table 7.1 lists the global frequencies and the file frequencies which would be
generated for the strings in this example.
The feature vectors for the example files would be :
• File 1 = {1,1,1,0,0,0,0}.
• File 2 = {1,0,0,1,1,1,1}.
• File 3 = {1,0,1,0,0,0,1}.
7.5.1.2 Classification Process
In our classification we integrated the WEKA library with our system. We use
K-fold cross validation for classifying between malware and cleanware as this is a
standard, well understood and well accepted method of classification in a number of
domains including malware analysis. In our previous experiments, we chose 5-fold
cross validation. As I discussed in Section 3.6.1 of Chapter 3, we adjust to 10-fold
cross validation in this experiment in order to increase the chance of learning all the
relevant information in the training set.
We test four base classifiers from WEKA: Support Vector Machine, Random For-
est, Decision Table and the Instance-based classifier, IB1. In addition, the meta-
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classifier(booster AdaboostM1) is tested added to each of the base classifiers. As I
discussed in Chapter 3, 5 and 6 that we decided to exclude Na¨ıve Bayesian classifiers
from our experiment due to their assumption limitation and poor performance in
experiments in Chapter 5 and 6
Figure 7.1 shows our classification methodology. Each malware file is tested with
cross validation once whereas each cleanware file has cross validation performed on
it five times in correspondence with each malware group. The methodology used in
this experiment is given below:
• Step 1 : Extract string information from the collected log files.
• Step 2 : Divide the malware files into 5 subsets with size equal to that of the
cleanware set.
• Step 3 : Build a hash table to record the global and file string frequencies (fs
and fm).
• Step 4 : Create feature vectors and construct the WEKA (arff) file.
• Step 5 : Select cleanware files and split them 10 groups.
• Step 6 : Select a malware group and split it 10 groups.
• Step 7 : Build Training Data and Test Data sets.
• Step 8 : Select the classifier Ci, [i = 1 . . . n], n = 4 represents four selected
classifiers.
• Step 9 : Call WEKA libraries to train the Ci using Training Data.
• Step 10 : Evaluate the Test Data set.
• Step 11 : Repeat until finish all 10 groups.
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• Step 12 : Repeat for other classifiers.
• Step 13 : Repeat for other malware subsets.
7.5.1.3 Experimental Results
Table 7.2 shows the average of the experimental results for each classifier in our
malware versus cleanware test.
The performance of our experiment, malware versus cleanware, shows RF (Ran-
dom Forest) gives the best average performance which is 94.80% compared to other
classifiers while IB1 shows lower performance, which is 81.89%.
Table 7.3 also shows the average classification results using meta-classifier Ad-
aBoostM1 on top of base classifiers. The results show that the meta-classifier im-
proves the accuracy for all classifiers tested except SVM. Based on these results,
the best accuracy rate is 95.15% (AdaBoostM1 with RF) and the lowest accuracy is
84.93% (AdaBoostM1 with IB1). Figure 7.3 graphically depicts the comparison of
classification accuracy of base classifiers with metaclassifiers. Our results show that
classification of cleanware versus malware using behavioural features can be used to
achieve high classification accuracy.
7.5.2 Malware Family Classification
In our second experiment we achieve further refinement of our classification by
comparing malware across and within families. By comparing individual malware files
based on their behavior, we determine similarities which indicate a commonality. As
we shall show, the results of this work, to a large extent, validate the pre-classification
within the CA zoo.
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Figure 7.3. Comparison of Average Classification Accuracy Between Base and Meta
Classifier.
This work can also be used in quickly identifying an unknown file by testing it
against the known families. If the classification test identifies it as being a member
of a family already considered malicious, then the file can be classified as malicious
without further analysis.
7.5.2.1 Feature Extraction and Classification Process
The Feature Extraction process is similar to that described in Section 7.5.1.1.
The only difference is that first we generate the string list family by family and then
create a hash table for every family and store all string information along with the
module frequency, into our hash table. For example, Let Gi = {si1, si2, si3, ...sin}
be the set of distinct strings of the family Fi, where si1, si2..sin represents the string,
for instance : si1 = “kernel32
′′, si2 = “advapi32′′, si3 = “GetModuleHandleA′′, sin =
“openProcess′′.
Each malware family F contains a number of files. In particular, we can write:
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F = {M1,M2, . . .Mq} (7.5.1)
where each Mi is a file, q is the number of files in the family. We can also represent
each file M as an array of 3-tuples of the form:
M ij =< s, f(F,s), f(M,s) > (7.5.2)
Where s is a string, f(F,s) is the total number of occurrences of string s within the
family and f(M,s) is the number of occurrence of string within the file M .
For each malware file, we then test which strings in our family list that it contains.
After inserting all the strings along with corresponding values into the hash table, we
follow the same process as described in Section 7.5.1.2. The process of malware family
classification is similar to that described in Section 7.5.1.2. The only difference is in
how we construct the training and test data. In this testing, we select a particular
family and split them into K = 10 different groups (as in Figure 7.2). For training
the classifiers, we choose an equal number of positive (from the family) and negative
(non-family) files. We construct the negative set by randomly selecting files from the
other families. We invoke WEKA libraries to train the classifier and evaluate the test
data. The same rotating process applies for all other families.
7.5.2.2 Experimental Results
The experimental setup and the methodology of our family classification system
is similar to that presented in Section 7.5.1.2. We tested four base classifiers: SVM,
Random Forest, Decision Table and IB1, in our experiments. We used the same
data set as listed in Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. Table 7.4 shows the accuracy of our
family classification for the tested classifiers. This table indicates that RF has best
performance and IB1 the worst.
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Classification Base Classifier Meta Classifier
Algorithm FP FN Acc FP FN Acc
SVM 0.0792 0.0942 0.9093 0.0934 0.0903 0.9082
IB1 0.1092 0.0893 0.8952 0.1263 0.0907 0.8915
DT 0.1144 0.1463 0.8639 0.1048 0.1063 0.8945
RF 0.0926 0.0926 0.9028 0.1023 0.0971 0.9002
Table 7.4. Average Family-wise Malware Classification Results
Classification Base Classifier Meta Classifier
Algorithm FP FN Acc FP FN Acc
SVM 0.0891 0.1062 0.8979 0.097886 0.105076 0.8985
IB1 0.1138 0.0907 0.892 0.12714 0.09359 0.8897
DT 0.1232 0.1408 0.8618 0.10923 0.1212 0.8848
RF 0.08943 0.0906 0.9056 0.09709 0.09491 0.9040
Table 7.5. Weighted Average Family-wise Malware Classification Results
As the families are not all of the same file size, we therefore calculated a weighted
average, where each family was weighted according to the formula:
nfi/nT , where nfi is the number of files in family fi and nT is the total number of
files (across all families).
According to the weighted average, the RF classifier achieved the best overall results
in our family classification with 90.4% accuracy, as shown in Table 7.5.
Table 7.4 and Table 7.5also shows the malware family classification results using
the meta-classifier AdaBoostM1 on top of the base classifiers. The results show that
the meta-classifier achieves quite similar results compared with base classifier. Based
on these results, the best accuracy rate is 90.4% (AdaBoostM1 with RF).
Figure 7.4 compares the classification accuracy of base classifiers with meta-
classifiers.
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Figure 7.4. Comparison of Family Classification Results
7.6 Discussion
In dynamic test, the behavioral information from both malware and cleanware
binary files are extracted to classify software in two different ways:
1) Malware versus Cleanware Classification.
2) Family Classification.
The extracted API calls form the basis for modelling the behavioural patterns of
software in order to distinguish between classes. The first and foremost contribution of
this method is the outlining of a methodology to extract relevant behavioral features
of API calls; such features include hooking of the system services and creation or
modification of files. The second contribution is the provision of a statistical analysis
of the API calls from log files generated by executing the files in a virtual environment.
The third contribution is a method of distinguishing malware from cleanware using
a 2-class classification model; this model achieves over 90% performance in terms of
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Experimental Data Method Accuracy
Santos et.al (2010) 6(F 1 )/13189(m 2 )/13000(c 3 ) Static No accuracy
[SBN+10] provided.
Ye et.al(2010) 35000(m)/15000(c) Static 88%
[YLJW10]
Wang et.al(2009) 353(m)/361 (c) Static 93.71%
[WPZL09]
Moskovitch et al.(2008) 7688(m)/22735(c) Static 95%
[MSF+08]
Our method 2398(m)/541(c) Dynamic 95.15%
Table 7.6. Comparison of Our method with Existing Work
accuracy. The fourth contribution is malware family classification, a similar process
to that of testing cleanware versus malware, and this model achieves a classification
accuracy of over 95%.
7.6.1 Cleanware versus Malware Classification
Distinguishing malware from cleanware is more critical for malware detection than
malware family classification, and can offer a first line of defence against malware.
Recent research trends are moving toward the classification of clean files from mali-
cious file [MSF+08, SBN+10, WPZL09, YLJW10]. We have investigated some recent
work classifying malware versus cleanware and compare it with ours. Table 7.6 sum-
marizes this comparison across results achieving at least 80% accuracy, and compares
their outcomes with those of our method.
Santos et.al in [SBN+10] used opcode sequence frequencies as features to calculate
the cosine similarity between two PE executable files. There are 13189 malware files
from 6 malware families and 13000 benign files in their dataset. They show that if
1the number of malware families;
2the number of malware files;
3the number of clean files;
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they select an appropriate similarity ratio threshold, their method would be a very
useful tool to identify malware variants from benign files; they do not mention the
classification accuracy. Ye et al. in [YLJW10] used static API call sequences as a
feature of associative rule learning. They test 35000 malware and 15000 cleanware
files and their classification accuracy is 88%. Wang et al.in [WPZL09] used static
API call sequences from 714 files which are pre-identified as either normal (361) or
virus programs (353); they obtain 93.71% classification accuracy. Moskovitch et al. in
[MSF+08] used the text categorization process and examined the relationship between
the MFP (malicious file percentage) in the test set, which represents real-life scenario,
and in the training-set, which being used for training the classifier. They found that
the best mean performance is associated with a 50% MFP in the training. Their result
is as good as our method in classification accuracy by using static method, while we
use dynamic method. As I discussed in Section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2, Both static
methods and dynamic methods have their merits and limitations. Dynamic analysis
is a necessary complement to static techniques as it is significantly less vulnerable to
code obfuscating transformations. Further discussion is provided in Section 8.4.1 of
Chapter 8.
7.6.2 Family Classifications
In our previous published work [TIBV10], we achieved an accuracy of over 97%
by using this dynamic method with a test dataset of over 1500 malware stretching
across 5-year span which is from 2003 to 2008, including trojans and viruses. In
this experiment, we introduce worms and more recent malware families which are
collected in 2009 and 2010. Table 7.7 lists the detailed family classication results in
this experiments.
From Table7.7 we can see that most of the families perform quite well and Rob-
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knot achieves 100% accuracy. Old families collected between 2003 and 2008 perfor-
mance better than the new families collected between 2009 and 2010. New families
“Banker”,“Bancos” and “Adclicker” families give poor performance according to ac-
curacy, which achieve 68.75% ,88% and 76.67% accuracy respectively.
As I discussed in Chapter 2, the disadvantages of dynamic analysis include limited
view of malware,trace dependence and execution time period and lack of interactive
behavior information. The “Banker” and “Bancos” families are trojans which at-
tempt to steal sensitive information that can be used to gain unauthorized access to
bank accounts via Internet Banking. They only perform malicious actions when they
receive specific commands or Internet users perform certain actions, such as logging
into specific banking websites. Since we run malware automatically with no human
interaction, such behaviors will not be recorded in the log files, which is the likely
cause of low accuracy for “Banker” and “Bancos” families.
“AdClicker” is a group of trojans that designed to artificially inflate the num-
bers of visitors to a given website by creating fake page views, to share the primary
functionality of artificially generating traffic to pay-per-click Web advertising cam-
paigns in order to create or boost revenue. “AdClickers” typically copy themselves
to a system folder in an attempt to remain inconspicuous, and create a load point
so that they run every time Windows starts. In our dynamic experiment, we disable
the Internet connection and run each malware executable by reverting the VM to the
original snapshot without restart the Windows. In this case, the malicious behaviors
will not be recorded in the log files, which is the likely cause of low accuracy for
“Adclicker” family.
The disadvantages of dynamic analysis mentioned above can perhaps be supple-
mented by integrate with static analysis methods. In Chapter 8, I will give a detailed
description of the integrated experiment.
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We also compare our empirical performance of malware family classification with
similar existing methods and summarised it in Table 7.8. We have considered only
the recent results in Table 7.8 which achieved classification accuracy of 80% or above.
Sathyanarayan et al. in [SKB08] used static extraction to extract API calls from
known malware in order to construct a signature for an entire class. The API calls of
an unclassified file of malware can then be compared with the ’signature’ API calls for
a family to determine if the file belongs in the family or not. They tested eight families
with 126 files in total, but no specific classification accuracy was provided. Ahmed
et al. in [AHSF09] proposed a composite method which extracts statistical features
from both spatial and temporal information available in run-time API calls. There
are 516 malware files in their dataset and they obtained 96.3% classification accuracy.
Compared with this, our method of using dynamic API features got accuracy over 90%
with a relatively large collection of malware. And our method use string frequency
features which are simple and easy to be extracted from log files. Wagener et al.
in [WSD08] tested a small set of malware, 104 files, by using dynamic extraction
technologies; they did not provide classification accuracy. The authors in [ZXZ+10]
traced thebehaviour of malware in a virtual machine environment and used these
traces to extract string information. They then applied SVM classifiers and overall
performance was determined to be approximately 83.3%.
7.7 Summary
The Dynamic method was proposed in this chapter. First I described the data
preparation by narrating the Dynamic Analysis Script which is used to automatically
execute the executables and collect the log files. Following this I explained the moti-
4the number of malware families
5the total number of files;
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Paper Exp. Data Method Accuracy
Sathyanarayan et.al(2008) 8(F) 4 Static Did not mention
[SKB08] 126(S) 5 the quantitative accuracy
Tian, R et.al. (2008) 7(F)/ Static 87%
[TBV08] 721(S)
Tian, R et.al. (2009) 13(F)/ Static 97%
[TBIV09] 1367(S)
Ahmed et.al. (2009) 516(S) Dynamic 96.30%
[AHSF09]
Wagener et.al. (2008) 104(S) Dynamic Did not mention
[WSD08] the quantitative accuracy
Zhao et.al. (2010) 11(F)/ Dynamic 83.30%
[ZXZ+10] 3996(S)
Our method 2939(S) Dynamic 90.40%
Table 7.8. Comparison of Similar Existing techniques with Our method
vation of the dynamic tests and provided the dataset tested in the experiments. Next
I elaborated two dynamic tests: Malware versus Cleanware Classification and Family
Classification. I also compared our method with other similar works.
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Chapter 8
Integrated Static and Dynamic
Features
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, I explained our static features based methods , including
FLF method, PSI method and combined static features approach, and I also explained
dynamic features based method. In this Chapter, I provide the detailed description
of our integrated static and dynamic method. The experimental results prove our
Hypothesis 4 : Combining static and dynamic features can produce better detection
and classification performance than any individual feature can produce.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the relevant literature reviews
are summarized in Section 8.2. In Section 8.3, I detail our analytical approach and
data preparation and in Section 8.4 I describe the experimental set-up . Sections 8.5
present the integrated tests. In Section 8.7 I analyse and compare the results and
summarize in Section 8.8.
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8.2 Related Work
As I mentioned in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, on the side of static analysis, re-
searchers focused on static features, such as instructions, basic blocks,functions, con-
trol flow and data flow extracted from binary code. On the side of dynamic analysis,
researchers focused on dynamic information extracted from the real executions of
malware under a controlled environment.
In the following sections, I provide a detailed description of our integrated exper-
iments.
8.3 Data Preparation
In the integrated experiments, we extract both static and dynamic features using
the same methods mentioned in Chapter 4, 5 and 7. We use the same test dataset,
Table 3.1 in Chapter 3, in this experiment. I recall how the vectors were generated
in the next subsections.
8.3.1 FLF Vector
For extracting the frequency of function length we normalize the function length
vector using the same procedure described in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4. As an example,
considers an executable file with only 23 functions, with the functions having the
following lengths (in bytes): 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 50, 50, 50, 140, 340, 420, 448, 506,
548, 828, 848, 1342, 1344, 1538, 3138, 3580, 4072, 4632. For illustration purposes, let
us create just 10 function length ranges, exponentially spaced. The distribution of
lengths across the bins would be as shown in Figure 8.1. We then capture a vector
of length 10 from the last column of this figure: (0, 0, 5, 3, 1, 3, 4, 5, 2, 0).
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Length 1-2 functions 0
Length 3-7 functions 0
Length 8-21 functions 5
Length 22-59 functions 3
Length 60-166 functions 1
Length 167-464 functions 3
Length 465-1291 functions 4
Length 1292-3593 functions 5
Length 3594-9999 functions 2
Length>=10000 functions 0
Figure 8.1. Example of an FLF Bin Distribution
8.3.2 PSI Vector
Another static feature is PSI. As described in Chapter 5, we again use a vector
representation, by first constructing a global list of all strings extracted from our
ida2DBMS. The method is as described in Chapter 5 and is explained by means of
the following example: Let us assume that the example global string list contains
just 7 strings: {“GetProcAddress”, “RegQueryValueExW”, “CreateFileW”, “Open-
File”, “FindFirstFileA”, “FindNextFileA”, “CopyMemory”}. Now consider that the
printable strings extracted from the executable file are as follows: “GetProcAddress”,
“RegQueryValueExW”, “CreateFileW”, “GetProcAddress”. The PSI vector records
the total number of distinct strings extracted and which of the strings in the global
list are present. Figure 8.2 presents the corresponding data for this executable. The
vector is then (3, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0).
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number of strings 3
"GetProceAddress" present TRUE
"RegQueryValueExW" present TRUE
"CreatFileW" present TRUE
"OpenFile" present FALSE
"FindFirstFileA" present FALSE
"FindNextFileA" present FALSE
"CopyMemory" present FALSE
Figure 8.2. Example of Data Used in a PSI Vector
8.3.3 Dynamic Vector
In the dynamic method, once again, a vector representation of the log data ex-
tracted after emulation is used in the classification. This process is described in detail
in Chapter 7 and explained here in the following illustration. After running all the
executable files in our sample set and logging the Windows API calls we extract the
strings from the log files and again construct a global string list. The strings extracted
include API function names and parameters passed to the functions. For the purpose
of example, consider this global string list: { “RegOpenKeyEx”, “RegQueryVal-
ueExW”, “Compositing”, “RegOpenKeyExW”, “0x54”, “Control Panel\Desktop”,
“LameButtonText”, “LoadLibraryW”, “.\UxTheme.dll”, “LoadLibraryExW”, “Mes-
sageBoxW” }. Then for our example executable, we obtain the following abridged
log file:
2010/09/02 11:24:50.217, 180, RegQueryValueExW, Compositing
2010/09/02 11:24:50.217, 180, RegOpenKeyExW, 0x54, Control Panel\Desktop
2010/09/02 11:24:50.217, 180, RegQueryValueExW, LameButtonText
2010/09/02 11:24:50.217, 180, LoadLibraryW, .\UxTheme.dll
2010/09/02 11:24:50.217, 180, LoadLibraryExW, .\UxTheme.dll
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The strings extracted are highlighted. We then count the number of occurrences
of each string in the global list. For this example, Figure 8.3 gives this data. The
corresponding vector is then (0, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 0).
"RegOpenKeyEx" count 0
"RegQueryValueExW" count 2
"Compositing" count 1
"RegOpenkeyExW" count 1
"ox54" count 1
"Control Panle\Desktop" count 1
"LameButtonText" count 1
"LoadLibraryW" count 1
".\UxTheme.dll"  count  2
"LoadLibraryExW" count 1
"MessageBoxW" count 0
Figure 8.3. Example of Data Used in a Dynamic Feature Vector
8.3.4 Integrated Vector
Now I describe how we combine the feature vectors separately established in each
of the above three methods into one vector. Figure 8.4 represents this process.
Our integrated vector contains features from all of the previous feature extraction
methods, including FLF, PSI and Dynamic logs. The integrated vectors are con-
structed by concatenating the FLF, PSI and dynamic log vectors. Therefore for the
above mentioned example executable, the integrated feature vector would be (0, 0, 5,
3, 1, 3, 4, 5, 2, 0, 3, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 0) and this data can
also be seen in Figure 8.5.
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Figure 8.4. Integrated Feature Extraction Model
8.4 Experimental Set-up
8.4.1 Motivation
In Chapter 2 I discuss advantages and disadvantages of both static and dynamic
analysis. We know that both of them have their merits and limitations.
Static analysis and extraction of executable files are the foundation of malware de-
tection and classification, static analysis methods provide information about content
and structure of a program and are well explored and widely adopted. They present a
global view sight of analyzed executables, they have easily accessible forms, low level
time and resource consuming. While at the same time, static analysis methods are
susceptible to inaccuracies due to obfuscation and polymorphic techniques and fail to
detect inter-component/system interaction information.
As with static analysis, dynamic analysis also has its merits and limitations. Dy-
namic analysis methods determine whether a program is malicious by observing the
actual execution of it malicious behaviors , which is far more straightforward than
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Length 1-2 functions 0
Length 3-7 functions 0
Length 8-21 functions 5
              .
              .
              .
number of strings 3
"GetProceAddress" present TRUE
"RegQueryValueExW" present TRUE
"CreatFileW" present TRUE
"OpenFile" present FALSE
              .
              .
              .
"RegOpenKeyEx" count 0
"RegQueryValueExW" count 2
"LoadLibraryW" count 1
              .
              .
              .
Figure 8.5. Data Used in Generating an Integrated Feature Vector
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just examining its binary code. The dynamic runtime information can also be directly
used in assessing the potential damage malware can cause which enables detection
and classification of new threats. While dynamic methods are trace dependence and
have limited view of analyzed executables.
Static analysis alone is not enough to either detect or classify malicious code,
likewise dynamic analysis is inadequate either. As I discussed in Chapter 7, due
to the limitation of dynamic methodology, the overall performance of detection and
classification dropped after we applied the dynamic method to the expanded dataset
with more recent malware families, such as ‘Banker” and “Bancos”. This motivate
us to combine static and dynamic method to complement each other to keep good
level of performance.
In this chapter, I present our integrated experiments.
8.4.2 Test Dataset
In this experiment, we use the same test dataset in our dynamic experiment.
See Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. There are 2939 executables ,including Trojans, Worms,
Viruses and Cleanware. The first 12 families have been pre-classified as Trojans; the
next 2 families are Worms; and the last 3 families as Viruses.
8.5 Integrated Tests
After we generate the integrated feature vectors, we use the similar classification
process described in Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7. We input the integrated feature vectors
into the WEKA classification system for which we have written an interface. As
shown in Figure 8.6, 10-fold cross validation is used for classifying malware in the
experiments.
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Figure 8.6. The General Classification Process
In the previous chapters, I have already described this general classification pro-
cess. To be clear, I restate this general classification process separately. In the cross
validation procedure, we first select one family Fi and divide it into groups Ck of
approximately equal size where k varies from 1 to 10. Then we divide all the other
executable files into subsets which have the same number of executable files as the
selected one as far as possible. We then choose one subset and divide it into groups
Otherk of approximately equal size where k varies from 1 to 10.
Next the classifier takes 9 groups from Ck and Otherk to set up the training set
and the remaining one group from Ck and Otherk is used for the testing set. In
our WEKA classification engine, we use a training set to build up the classification
model and validate it by using the test set in order to obtain the statistical results.
This process is performed once or repeated until all the subsets are traversed. The
whole process is repeated for each family and we then calculate weighted average
classification results.
Because of the significance to the anti-malware vendor of being able to satisfy cus-
tomers that the anti-virus software will allow legitimate cleanware with executable
characteristics to pass, testing to verify that malware can be distinguished from clean-
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ware has become an important part of classification research [TIBV10]. Thus in this
section I present two different tests: (i) malware families classification, and (ii) mal-
ware versus cleanware classification.
8.5.1 Family Classification
In this experiment, we test our classification system by comparing executable
files across and within families. In order to do this family classification, we follow
the process explained in Figure 8.6. To train the classifiers, we choose an equal
number of positive (from a particular family) and negative (from other families) files.
We construct the negative set by randomly selecting files from the other families.
Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 show the family classification results.
8.5.2 Malware Versus Cleanware Classification
We now turn to the problem of distinguishing between cleanware files and mal-
ware files. In this experiment, we follow the recommendations of [MSF+08] in using
an equal portion of malware and of cleanware in the testing and ensured that each file
is incorporated into at least one test. We use 541 cleanware executable files and ran-
domly selecting the same number of executable files from the malware set. Using this
process, we generate 5 separate malware executable file groups, MG1,MG2, . . . ,MG5,
and test each group against a cleanware group. Referring to Figure 8.6, we use the
cleanware group (particular family) as a positive set and select one group of malware
(from MGi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 5) (other families) as a negative set. We then split the clean-
ware and malware group separately, as shown in Figure 8.6 , for making training and
test data. Table 8.3 and Table 8.4 show the weighted average of the experimental
results.
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8.5.3 Using the Integrated Method on Old and New Families
From Table 3.1 of Chapter 3, we can see that our experimental data set includes
Trojans, Viruses and Worms spanning from 2003 to 2010. We divide them into two
groups, the first collected between 2003 and 2008 including “Clagger”, “Robknot”,
“Robzips”, “alureon”, “Bambo”, “Boxed”, “Emerleox”, “Looked”, “Agobot”, and
the second collected between 2009 and 2010,including “Addclicker”, “Gamepass”,
“Banker”, “Frethog”, “SillyAutorun”, “SillyDI”, “Vundo”, “Bancos”. To demon-
strate that our method is robust to changes in malware development, we test and
compare results on these two sets of malware in the this experiments. Table 8.5 and
Table 8.6 show the experimental results on old families and Table 8.7 and Table 8.8
show the experimental results on new families.
8.6 Running Times
In Table 8.9, running times, including ExportingTime and FLV GenerationTime,
are listed for each family. All the times in this table are in seconds. As I mentioned
in Section 4.7 of Chapter 4 and Section 5.6 of Chapter 5, time spent on exporting
executables to ida2DBMS is the ExportingTime. And FLV GenerationTime is used
to generate function length vectors by database programs described in Section 4.3.3
of Chapter 4.
Besides these preprocess times, the running times for the classification component
of the experiments based on base classifiers are 110 mins for static FLF features, 368
mins for static PSI features, 348 mins for dynamic API call based features and 440
mins for the integrated test.
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Family No.Samples ExportingTime(secs) FLV GenerationTime(secs)
Bambo 44 779 140
Boxed 178 9832 9269
Alureon 41 1865 607
Robknot 78 2010 100
Clagger 44 459 22
Robzips 72 2356 533
SillyDl 439 11049 12754
Vundo 80 1728 2324
Gamepass 179 4345 5201
Bancos 446 12573 12958
adclicker 65 2039 1888
Banker 47 3318 1366
Frethog 174 1044 5055
SillyAutorun 87 1635 2528
Agobot 283 40203 33401
Looked 66 4001 1577
Emerleox 75 7031 519
Cleanware 541 70165 15718
Total 2939 176432 105960
Table 8.9. Running Times in the Integrated Experiments
8.7 Discussion
8.7.1 Family Classification
Table 8.10 compares the results of old and integrated methods based on meta
classifiers. Figures 8.7, 8.8, 8.9 illustrate that integrated method outperforms both
static and dynamic methods. From these figures we see that integrated method
always presents lowest false positive rate, lowest false negative rate and highest clas-
sification accuracy. Figure 8.9 shows that our four methods are clearly separated in
classification accuracy, with the FLF method showing poorest performance among
the presented methods, followed by PSI, then dynamic and finally the integrated
method achieving the best results. Once again, the Meta-RF classifier achieved the
best overall results in family classification.
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Figure 8.7. Compare FP Rate of Old and Integrated Methods (Meta-classifier)
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8.7.2 Malware Versus Cleanware Classification
In Table 8.11, we compare our results with similar work classifying malware versus
cleanware. Unless stated otherwise, the results given are the best accuracy obtained.
In Santos et al., [SNB11], the authors used static byte n-gram features for their clas-
sification using semi-supervised learning algorithms. They used 2,000 executable files
in their experiment and obtained 88.3% accuracy. In Ye et al, [YLCJ10], the authors
used static API call sequences as the characterizing feature with 30,601 executable
files and obtained 93.69% accuracy. Wang et al., [WPZL09], used static API call
sequences distilled from 714 PE files and pre-identified as normal (361) and virus
programs (353); they achieved 93.71% classification accuracy. In Moskovitch et al.,
[MSF+08], the authors used the text categorization process and examined the rela-
tionship between the malicious file percentage (MFP) in the test set. They found
that the best mean performance is associated with a 50% MFP in the training set,
which is 95%. Z. Shafiq [STF09] compares the performance of evolutionary and non-
evolutionary rule learning algorithms for classifying between malware and cleanware.
Their reported best average accuracy is 99.75% (SLIPPER, a non-evolutionary rule
based algorithm). In our earlier work, [TIBV10], we used dynamic API calls and
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their parameters as features and obtained 97.3% accuracy based on the classification
method used there, while our current integrated method achieved 97.46% accuracy
which is best among the other works.
According to the Table 8.11, the best accuracy reported in [STF09]. However,
in their paper they have statically extracted 189 attributes from executable files and
used this as the basis for classification. Our method uses both static and dynamically
extracted features. Our results show that combining static and dynamic features
greatly improves classification accuracy. Shafiq [STF09] considers a broader range of
static features than described in this paper. The evidence in this paper predicts that
combining this with a similarly rich set of dynamic features would further improve
classification accuracy and robustness.
8.7.3 Using the Integrated Method on Old and New Families
As I mentioned above, to test if our method is robust to changes in malware
development,we also do experiments on two separated sets: old families and new
families. Table 8.12 compares the weighted average of old family data, new family
data and combined data using integrated method. And Figures 8.10, 8.11, 8.12
illustrate these comparison.
The results shows that the age (as measured by when the executable file was first
collected) of the malware used has an impact on the test results. It is clear from the
figures that the classifiers perform better on the old families. Since our classification
method is less effective on the latest malware executables as compared to the older
files, this demonstrates that malware continues to evolve and to deploy advanced
anti-detection techniques.
From Table 8.6 we can see that the best weighted average accuracy of inte-
188
C
it
at
io
ns
E
xp
er
im
en
ta
l
da
ta
si
ze
Fe
at
ur
e
ex
tr
ac
ti
on
m
et
ho
d
A
cc
ur
ac
y
Sa
nt
os
et
al
.
(2
01
1)
20
00
O
pC
od
e
se
qu
en
ce
s
ab
ou
t
88
.3
%
[S
N
B
11
]
Y
e
et
al
.(
20
10
)
50
00
0
P
E
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
93
.6
9%
[Y
L
C
J1
0]
W
an
g
et
al
.(
20
09
)
71
4
A
P
I
ca
ll
se
qu
en
ce
93
.7
1%
[W
P
Z
L
09
]
M
os
ko
vi
tc
h
et
al
.
(2
00
8)
30
60
1
by
te
n-
gr
am
s
95
%
[M
SF
+
08
]
Z
.S
ha
fiq
et
.a
l
(2
00
9)
11
78
6
cl
ea
n
w
it
h
99
.7
5%
[S
T
F
09
]
m
al
ic
io
us
fil
es
Sa
th
ya
na
ra
ya
n
et
al
.(
20
08
)
12
6
A
P
I
ca
lls
D
id
no
t
m
en
ti
on
[S
K
B
08
]
th
e
qu
an
ti
ta
ti
ve
ac
cu
ra
cy
R
.T
ia
n
et
al
.
(2
01
0)
18
23
A
P
I
ca
lls
an
d
97
.3
0%
[T
IB
V
10
]
A
P
I
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
O
ur
m
et
ho
d
29
39
In
te
gr
at
ed
(F
L
F
,
97
.4
6%
P
SI
,A
P
I
ca
lls
an
d
A
P
I
pa
ra
m
et
er
s)
T
ab
le
8.
11
.
C
om
p
ar
is
on
of
O
u
r
In
te
gr
at
ed
M
et
h
o
d
w
it
h
S
im
il
ar
M
et
h
o
d
s
B
as
ed
on
M
al
w
ar
e
V
er
su
s
C
le
an
w
ar
e
T
es
ti
n
g.
189
grated method tested on old families is 99.8%, and three family, including “Emer-
leox”,“Robknot” and “Robzips” come to 100%.
The weighted average results on new families are not as good as old fami-
lies. From Table 8.8 we can see that Banker family gives the poorest performance.
As I discussed in Section 7.6 of Chapter 7, due to the disadvantages of dynamic
method, “Banker”,“Bancos” and “Adclicker” families give poor performance in dy-
namic method according to accuracy. From Table 7.7 of Chapter 7, we can see that
in the dynamic test the best classification accuracy of “Banker”,“Bancos” and “Ad-
clicker” families are 68.75%, 88% and 76.67% accuracy respectively.
We can see that when a mix of old and new malware is used, the overall perfor-
mance is improved. The improvement is almost 9% with meta-SVM. This indicates
the importance of including both old and new malware when developing new tech-
niques: the integrated test performed better on the combined data set than on the
new malware alone, so classification of new malware should be done with old malware
also present in the data set.
Although the weighted average results on new families are not as good as old
families, they still achieve best classification accuracy of 94.4%. Furthermore in Ta-
ble 8.12, we achieve best weighted average accuracy of 97.1% using the integarated
method tested on the combined data set, which proves again that our method is
robust to changes in malware evolution.
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Meta Classifier
Old Family Data New Family Data Combined Data
FP FN Acc FP FN Acc FP FN Acc
SVM 0.003 0.017 98.924 0.179 0.193 83.913 0.083 0.092 92.66
IB1 0.005 0.015 99.168 0.116 0.131 90.688 0.076 0.072 94.67
DT 0.004 0.017 99.155 0.098 0.132 92.393 0.060 0.101 95.69
RF 0.002 0.007 99.82 0.088 0.093 94.407 0.051 0.056 97.055
Table 8.12. Comparison of Weighted Average of Old and New Malware Using Inte-
grated Method.
0
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Figure 8.10. Compare FPRate of Old and New Malware Families Using Integrated
Method.
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Figure 8.11. Compare FNRate of Old and New Malware Families Using Integrated
Method.
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8.7.4 Performance Analysis of Integrated Method
8.7.4.1 Effectiveness and Efficiency
In Table 8.10, I compare the results of our static, dynamic and integrated methods.
Integrated method outperforms both static and dynamic methods. In addition, the
integrated method is more efficient than using the other three methods combined. As
I presented above, the running time for the classification component of the integrated
test with base classifiers is 440 minutes. This compares favourably with a combined
time of 826 minutes for running the three tests separately. However, the three tests
could be run in parallel with a time just slightly higher than that of the slowest test
which is 368 minutes. As long as the accuracy of the integrated test is at least as
good as any of the accuracies in the other three tests, we have a strong argument for
the integrated approach.
8.7.4.2 Robustness of Integrated System
Table 8.13 gives an analysis of robustness of our integrated system. From this
table, we can conclude that:
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• FLF(Function Length Frequency) based static method is effective when we ap-
plied it to a relatively small set of malware which only contains trojans. In
that experiment, we achieved 92.63% weighted average malware detection and
classification accuracy.
• PSI(Printable String Information) based static method is also effective when
we applied it to a set of malware by introducing viruses into our original test
dataset. In that experiment, we achieved 97.5% weighted average malware
detection and classification accuracy.
• Next when we combined these two static methods and applied to the same test
dataset as PSI method, we achieved an improved 98.89% malware detection
and classification accuracy. This verified ourHypothesis 2 : Combining several
static features can produce better detection and classification performance than
any individual feature can produce.
• We furthermore extended our test dataset by introducing more recent new mal-
ware families which are collected between 2009 and 2010. In addition, we intro-
duced worms collected between 2009 and 2010 into our test dataset. Then we
applied our dynamic method to this extended test dataset. Although the classifi-
cation accuracy dropped to 90.4% due to the limitaion of dynamic methodology,
the experimental results showed that our dynamic method is still effective when
tested on on malware collected over an extended period of time.
• To make it comparable, we did FLF and PSI tests on the extended test dataset
and achieved 87.82% and 87.81% accuracy respectively. Finally we integrated
static and dynamic methods into a single test which gave us an significantly im-
proved performance with 97.06% malware detection and classification accuracy.
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8.8 Summary
In this Chapter, I gave a detailed account of our integrated method. First I
presented the data preparation, following this I described our Experimental Set-up
by explaining the motivation of our experiment and the dataset used in the tests.
Then I elaborated our three integrated experiments, including Family Classification,
Malware Versus Cleanware Classification and Using the Integrated Method on Old
and New Families. Finally I analysed and discussed the performance of our system
based on the results from these experiments. From these results and analysis , we
can see that our integrated system is a scalable and robust malware detection and
classification system.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
9.1 Accomplishments
In this thesis, the following hypotheses have been proposed and verified:
• Hypothesis 1 : It is possible to find static features which are effective in mal-
ware detection and classification. From the experimental results in Chapter 4
and 5, we can see that both function length based features and printable string
based features extracted by our static methods are effective in malware de-
tection and classification. We achieved an average detection and classification
accuracy of 87.7% and 97.5% respectively.
• Hypothesis 2 : Combining several static features can produce better detection
and classification performance than any individual feature can produce. Exper-
imental results in Chapter 6 showed that combining the FLF and PSI features
improved the performance by achieving the best weighted average accuracy of
98.9%.
• Hypothesis 3 : It is possible to find dynamic features which are effective in
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malware detection and classification. This hypothesis was verified by the exper-
imental results in Chapter 7. In that experiment, we achieved the best weighted
accuracy of 90.4% for family classification, and the best weighted average accu-
racy of 95.15% for malware versus cleanware tests.
• Hypothesis 4 : Combining static and dynamic features can produce better de-
tection and classification performance than any individual feature can produce.
Experimental results from our integrated experiments in Chapter 8 indicated
that combining the static and dynamic features method outperformed any in-
dividual method for all four classifiers. When we applied all the methods to an
expanded test dataset by adding more recent malware in the integrated experi-
ment, FLF, PSI and the Dynamic method achieved the best accuracy of 87.8%,
87.8% and 80.4% respectively, while the integrated method achieved the best
accuracy of 97.1%.
• Hypothesis 5 : Good levels of malware detection and classification accuracy
can be retained on malware collected over an extended period of time. Our
integrated experiments also indicated that the detection and classification ac-
curacy is still maintained when applied to an extended test dataset with more
recent malware samples.
Antivirus research is a relatively new research field with some work are still per-
formed manually, there is a lack of structural analysis of a malware detection and
classification system. In developing this thesis, some research questions and corre-
sponding solutions were formed gradually. Based on these questions and solutions,
I have proposed the architecture for a malware detection and classification system
and presented its implementation. We have provided the antivirus community with
answers for the following questions, which have been identified as also being valuable
for their work.
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1 Data Collection and Data Preprocess : Where do we collect test samples?
How do we preprocess these samples to make them well-formed and fitting for
the research?
2 Data Storage : How do we store and maintain this data in a reliable and safe
way?
3 Extraction and Representation : What information should we extract from
the executable files and how should we abstractly represent it based on the
extraction.
4 Classification Process : Selection of suitable classification algorithms which
need to be generalized based on the extracted feature sets.
5 Performance Assessment : How to do statistical detection of classification
results and how to evaluate the performance of a system.
Regarding question 1 In Section 3.3.1 of Chapter 3, We have investigated re-
ports from several antivirus companies regarding recent security threats. Based on
the analysis of these reports, we focused our experiments on Trojans, Worms and
Viruses. In addition, our project was supported by CA Technologies which has a long
history of research and development in anti-virus products. To make the best use of
this advantage, we collected three types of malware, including Trojans, Worms and
Viruses from CA’s VET zoo, which have been pre-classified using generally accept-
able mechanical means. We also collected clean executables from Window platforms
spanning Windows 98 to Windows XP.
The original executable files that we collected were stored in the file system in the
form of binary code. We needed to preprocess these files to make them suitable for
our research. We used two methods of data preprocessing in our system as discussed
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in Section 3.3.2 and Section 3.3.3 of Chapter 3. These methods included static and
dynamic methods. In the static method, we first unpacked malware then performed
a reverse engineering analysis of the executable files by IDA Pro and exported disas-
sembling information into our ida2DBMS schema by using the customized software
Ida2sql. In the dynamic method, the executable files were executed under a a con-
trolled environment which was based on Virtual Machine Technology. A trace tool
was developed to monitor and trace the execution of malware. After execution, a log
file was generated for each executable file, which became the base of our dynamic
analysis.
Regarding question 2 Considering accessibility, manoeuvrability and security of
data, we stored and maintained our data in two effective and safe ways, including a
database schema in Section 3.4.1 and log files in Section 3.4.2 of Chapter 3. In the
static method, we chose DBMS as our data storage system because DBMS has many
benefits which can facilitate our work, such as an integrated management interface,
with data fetched in a simple and effective way plus data that is independent and
safe. In the dynamic method, we stored dynamic information in the log files which
wrote down the intercepted windows APIs.
Regarding question 3 Two kinds of features were extracted from the executables,
including the static features and dynamic features. Our aim was to analyze and
extract simple and effective features from executable files. In the static method,
we chose FLF in Chapter 4, and PSI in Chapter 5 as our static features. In the
dynamic method, we chose intercepted windows APIs as our dynamic features in
Chapter 7. Because our proposed system aimed to build a robust system which
integrated the dynamic analysis and static analysis approaches, we combined two
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kinds of static features mentioned above in Chapter 6 and integrated both static and
dynamic features in Chapter 8.
Regarding question 4 In Section 3.6.2 of Chapter 3, we looked into five kinds
of Machine Learning classification algorithms. There were NB (Na¨ıve Bayesian clas-
sifiers), IB1 (Instance-Based Learning), DT (Decision Tree), RF (Random Forest),
and SVM (Support Vector Machine). Based on the understanding of their principles,
analysis of work from other researchers, the advantages of these algorithms and their
excellent performance in classification tasks, we applied these five algorithms along
with AdaBoost in our experiments.
Regarding question 5 We adopted the k-fold Cross Validation method in the
training and testing phases of classification processes. To assess the classifica-
tion results, some measures were introduced, including TPrate, FPrate, FNrate,
Precision and Accuracy in Section 3.7 of Chapter 3.
9.2 Weaknesses of methodologies
The work presented in this thesis still in its research phase, the following aspects
need to be improved when it is put into industry practice:
Respond in a timely manner In anti-virus industry, timely response is critical.
Detection of malware and malware family classification should be completed instanta-
neously. My current research work focus is on improving the classification accuracy. I
integrated both static and dynamic features into a broader feature vector to improve
the classification accuracy. Due to the fact that the feature set expands, the response
time will increase. In addition, compared with huge number of malware released ev-
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ery day, the test dataset in this thesis is small. I need to introduce more malware
into the system. That means the size of features set may increase correspondingly,
which would further affect the response time of the method. In the future work, I
will introduce feature reduction or selection technology to minimize this influence.
Static Methodologies FLF(function length frequency) and PSI(printalbe string
information) are the main features in static methodologies. FLF features depend
on function length information extracted from executables by IDA Pro. And PSI
features are extracted from Strings window of IDA Pro. These static methodolgies are
vulnerable to obfuscation and polymorphic techniques. Although these two features
can complement each other, if malware writers obfuscate both of them, the detection
and classification accuracy will be affected. To deal with this, in the future work,
some other significant static features would be investigated and introduced into our
system.
Dynamic methodology In dynamic methodology, we create virtual machine with
networking disabled and run each executable for 30 seconds, in this case, analysis
results are only based on malware behavior during one specific execution run and some
of malware’s behavior can not be monitored due to the lack of execution conditions. In
addition, in the dynamic method described in this thesis, trace tool name ”‘HookMe”’
is used to monitor and trace the real execution of each file. Some popular and critical
API call are monitored during the execution, malware writers can evade this detection
by changing API calls invoked in the malware. To deal with this, in the future work,
an unpdated API calls list should be introduced into the system.
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9.3 Further Research Directions
Malware Data Set In Section 1.1.3 of Chapter 1, I described the general types of
malware, including Worms, Viruses, Trojans, Rootkits, Backdoors, Botnets, Hacker
Utilities and other malicious programs. At this point in time, our research has focused
on Trojans, Worms and Viruses. With the development and evolution of malware, we
simply can not group them into the categories mentioned above, with malicious code
combining two or more categories that can lead to powerful attacks. For instance, a
worm containing a payload can install a backdoor to allow remote access.
In future work, we will introduce more types of malware and more recent malware
into our system.
Features Extraction As we know from the ida2DBMS schema, besides function
length, and printable strings, we also store many other disassembled information,
including basic blocks, instructions, control flow graph, call graph and some statistical
information. In our future work, we can investigate this information to excavate
more significant static features. Using the current dynamic method, we generated
the feature vectors using frequency of intercepted windows APIs. While we think the
sequences or subsequences of intercepted windows APIs contain scheduled actions
taken by malware during its execution, these scheduled actions actually imply the
significant behavioral information of malware. In future work, these sequences can
be taken into consideration when we generate dynamic features by examining the log
files.
Feature Reduction In future work, we will introduce feature reduction or selec-
tion technology into our system. Feature reduction is the technology which reduces
features to improve the effectiveness of the classification system by selecting a subset
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of important relevant features upon which to focus its attention, while ignoring the
rest. During feature reduction, the system probes the analysed data to acquire a bet-
ter overall understanding about the data, ascertaining inter-relationships of features
and data, and determining the key or important features.
Feature selection techniques can be categorized according to a number of crite-
ria. One popular categorization are the terms “filter” and “wrapper” to describe the
nature of the metric used to evaluate the worth of features [KJ97, HH03]. Wrappers
evaluate each potential subset of features by using the classification accuracy pro-
vided by the actual target learning algorithm. Filter methods rely on tracing general
properties of features to evaluate them and operate independently of any learning
algorithm. We have already started to apply some filter selection methods into our
system by implementing the experiments. In this thesis, I have not presented these
due to time and space limitations.
Classification Algorithms The next aim is to optimize our system. The basic
purpose of genetic algorithms is optimization [BMB93, KCS06]. So in future work,
we will study genetic algorithms and integrate them into our classification system.
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Appendix A
Function Distance Experiment
A.1 Motivation For Experiment
Malware is essentially a piece of program code which without exception should
follows the principle of computer programming techniques. Whatever a program is
complicated , it is always composed of all kinds of self-contained software routines,
functional units, which perform a certain task as defined by a programmer and may
be considered logically as subject investigated when people analyze a program.As I
mentioned in Chapter 4.1, in Chapter 4.1, I discussed about the reason that we
started our research work from IDA functions.
In this part, I present another function distance based experiment. In this ex-
periment, I apply three kinds of distance algorithms to the binary code of different
functions to get the similarity between them, and based on the distance values, the
similarity between two files is calculated.
In Section A.2, I recite function fetch process used in this experiment. In Section
A.3, I describe three kinds of distance algorithms applied in this experiment. Section
A.4 presents the experiment and Section A.5 gives the experimental results. In
Section A.6 analyzes the performance of this experiment based on experimental
results.
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A.2 Function Fetch
From figure A.1,We can see that an IDA function is composed of many basic
blocks; and each basic block is composed of instructions. So in my methodology, all
the instructions and all the basic blocks that belong to a function are traversed and
put them together to form the data of that function. For more detail information of
functions, basic blocks and instructions, please refer to appendix D.
BASIC_BLOCKS
PK BASIC_BLOCK_ID
FK1,U1 MODULE_ID
U1 ID
U1 PARENT_FUNCTION
ADDRESS
FUNCTIONS
PK FUNCTION_ID
FK1,U1 MODULE_ID
SECTION_NAME
U1 ADDRESS
END_ADDRESS
NAME
FUNCTION_TYPE
NAME_MD5
CYCLOMATIC_COMPLEXITY
INSTRUCTIONS
PK INSTRUCTION_ID
FK1,U1 MODULE_ID
U1 ADDRESS
U1 BASIC_BLOCK_ID
MNEMONIC
SEQUENCE
DATA
MODULES
PK MODULE_ID
NAME
MD5
SHA1
COMMENT
ENTRY_POINT
IMPORT_TIME
OPERATOR
FULLFILENAME
FILETYPE
PLATFORM
FAMILY
VARIANT
Figure A.1. Related Tables
For each function in the disassembling module of a specific executable file, I first
get all the basic blocks belonging to that function; and then identify and fetch all the
instructions of each basic block by using the value of basic block id. Then combine
these instructions to form a hex format string for each basic block, in the same
way,combine all the basic blocks belonging to the function to form a hex format
string representing the function. Please refer to Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4 for the
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detailed flow of this process. When I calculate the similarity between two functions,
these hex format strings are used as the parameters of each distance algorithms. Now
I would like to introduce three distance algorithms that I used in this experiment.
A.3 Distance Algorithms
I use three distance algorithms , they are Levenshtein distance (LD),q-gram and
LLCS(length longest common subsequence).
A.3.1 LD Distance Algorithm
Levenshtein distance (LD) is a measure of the similarity between two strings, The
distance is the number of deletions, insertions, or substitutions required to transform
a string into another. The greater the Levenshtein distance, the more different the
strings are. For example:
• String1=”’this is an apple”’
• String2= ”‘this is an apple”’
• String3= ”‘this is an orange”
Then the distance between two strings are :
• LD(String1,String2) = 0, because no transformations are needed. The strings
are already identical.
• LD(String1,String3) =5, because the minimum number of operations needed to
transform String1 into String3 is 5, that is using ”‘oran”’ replace ”‘appl”’ and
then insert ”‘g”’.
The Levenshtein distance algorithm has been used in the following research areas:
• Spell checking
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• Speech recognition
• DNA analysis
• Plagiarism detection
A.3.2 q-gram Distance Algorithm
q-gram is used in approximate string matching by ”‘sliding”’ a window of length q
over the characters of a string to create a number of ”‘q”’ length grams for matching
a match is then rated as number of q-gram matches within the second string over
possible q-grams. Here I use q = 3. For example ,here are two string ”‘dabc”’ and
”‘abcde”’.The positional q-gram of the first string ”‘dabc”’ are
(1,##d),(2,#da),(3,dab),(4,abc),(5,bc#),(6,c##).
The positional q-gram of the second string ”‘abcde”’ are
(1,##a),(2,#ab),(3,abc),(4,bcd),(5,cde),(6,de#),(7,e##).
Here ”‘#”’ indicates the beginning and end of the string.
So getting the q-grams for two strings allows the count of identical q-grams over
the total q-grams available. As for the above example, the number of total q-grams
is 13, and the identical q-grams are (4,abc)in first string and (3,abc) in second string
, so the similarity based on q-gram distance of these two strings 2/13.
Q-gram is needed in many application areas, such as bio-computing ,recognition
of natural language and approximate string processing in DBMS.
A.3.3 LLCS Distance Algorithm
LLCS(length longest common subsequence). Given two sequences of characters,
LLCS distance is the length of the longest common subsequence of both sequences.
For example:
• String1=”’this is an apple”’
• String2= ”‘this is an apple”’
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The LLCS distance is 13 ,the longest subsequence is ”‘this is an ae”’. There are
several applications of LLCS. Such as Molecular biology,File comparison and Screen
redisplay etc.
A.4 Experimental Set-up
A.4.1 Experimental Data
The malware analysed in this experiemnt is from CA’s VET zoo (www.ca.com);
thus it has been pre-classified using generally acceptable mechanical means. I use the
similar method mentioned in Chapter 3.3.2.1 to unpack them and export them into
our ida2DBMS schema.This experiment is test on a small set of malware files , which
are 113 malware files from 11 families and they are all Trojans.
Family Number of Samples
Clagger 18
Cuebot 14
Ditul 4
Duiskbot 12
Robknot 18
Robzips 17
Abox 5
AdClicker 10
alemod 5
aliseru 5
allsum 5
Total 113
Table A.1. Number of Samples Used in FDE Experiment
A.4.2 Function Distance Experiment
The initial idea is to calculate similarity between two malware executable files. We
need to calculate the distance or similarity between any two functions from these two
files and based on these similarity, the similarity between two malware executable
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files is calculated. let A = {F1, F2, . . . , FM} represent malware file A which has
M functions. and let B = {f1, f2, . . . , fN} represent malware file B which has N
functions. We calculate all the similarity between any two funcitons from file A and
file B. Based on these similarities, a matrix is constructed between two files. To be
clarify, we assumed file A has 5 functioins and B has 4 functions. the following is an
example of this similarity matrix:
SIMA,B =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0.75 0.85 0.91 0.6
0.82 0.79 0.83 0.75
0.9 0.93 0.87 0.6
0.78 0.8 0.9 0.65
0.86 0.9 0.45 0.55
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
As for each row and column , we seek the element that has the maximum sim-
ilarity values, we define them as MaxR1,MaxR2, . . . ,MaxRM for each row and
MaxC1,Maxc2, . . . ,MaxCN fro each column.For example ,in the above example,
the value of MaxR2 is 0.83 and MaxC3 is 0.91. In each row and colum of that ma-
trix , the element that has the maximum value could be the most possible matched
function pair in that row or column. I use a threshold T to determine if it is the
case. In the experiment, I chose the value of T as 0.75, 0.8, 0.85. We then count the
number of most possible match function for row and column. Let Ri indicated if the
maximum value of ith row is greater than the threshold T and Cj indicates if the
maxmum value of jth column is greater than threshold T . If these maximum values
are greater than the threshold T, we count it,otherwise, we just ignore them. In such
a way , we calculate similarity between two files by the following formula:
SA,B = (
M∑
i=1
Ri/M +
N∑
j=1
Cj/N)/2 (A.4.1)
where
Ri =
{
1 if MaxRi ≥ T
0 otherwise
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and
Cj =
{
1 if MaxCj ≥ T
0 otherwise
In the above example, if we choose T = 0.85 the similarity between two file A
and B is 0.78. For each malware file, this procedure is repeated to get the similarity
between this malware and all the others.
A.5 Experiment Results
After we get the similarity between two malware files by using the above method,
I then visualize the result to show the similarity within the same family and across
different families. The following figure A.2 is comparison of similarity of one malware
file from clagger family with all the other malware files.
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Figure A.2. Experment Results
In the figure A.2, the similarity values of the first group are the similarity between
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a clagger malware file and all the other malware files from clagger family , and the
rest groups are from all the other 10 families and each group represents a family. We
can see that the similarity values among clagger family are relatively higher than the
similarity values between this clagger malware file and other files from other families.
And in some cases the similarity values within a family are very close, for instance,
the majority of similarity values within in Robknot and Robzips are quite close.
From the figure , we can see that malware files from same family are quite similar
compared to the similarity between two malware files from different famiies even we
do this test on a relatively small dataset.
A.6 Performance Analysis
This clustering method requires the computation of the distances between all
pairs of functions and furthermore between all pairs of malware files, which invariably
results in a computational complexity of O(n2). To evaluate the effectiveness of this
method, I do another test that assesses the application of three algorithms to our data.
I randomly create two hex format strings, that means every character of the string
is valued between ′0′ −′ 9′ and ′a′ −′ f ′, and feed them into the distance algorithms.
I record the time before every algorithm and after it , by this way , the execute
time which measured in millisecond is acquired. Then change the length of these two
strings to do the same test. Based on the test set in our ida2DBMS , the minimum
length of the function in the database is 2 and the maximum length is 23782. So in
this test the length of the two strings varies from the following values:50, 100, 500,
1000, 2000, 4000, 6000, 8000, 10000, 12000, 14000, 16000, 18000, 20000, 22000, 24000.
And this emulation is tested in a computer with Intel(R) Core(TM) CPU, 1.99GB
RAM and windows XP operating system and JVM 1.6.0.03.
The following table gives the result of this test:
In table A.2,I list the time consumed by computing the n-gram distance value
between two string , s1 and s2 and execution time is recorded in millisecond. here
the sign X means the current computing environment can not handle it, that is it
exceed the limit of JVM(Java Virtual Machine) heap space , the algorithm will halt
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s1
s2
50 100 500 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000 22000 24000
50 0 0 16 31 16 46 31 31 31 62 47 78 109 47 78 79
100 15 15 16 31 31 47 31 94 63 78 78 94 93 93 110 109
500 16 16 32 47 93 94 109 156 203 93 234 250 312 313 359 547
1000 16 31 31 63 93 157 203 312 327 187 438 547 609 641 718 782
2000 32 31 47 94 156 312 359 500 686 764 906 1047 1219 1359 1469 1625
4000 32 31 94 157 312 515 812 1219 1356 1746 1985 2188 2641 2703 3390 3469
6000 32 47 110 203 391 781 1297 1703 2229 2681 2953 3406 3751 4452 4829 4844
8000 47 31 141 250 484 1157 1735 2407 2946 3538 4141 4500 5372 5640 6188 6594
10000 63 47 188 297 672 1391 2188 2922 3631 4348 5094 5641 6357 7187 X X
12000 47 63 203 500 765 1672 2718 3516 4301 5205 5938 6922 X X X X
14000 47 63 266 469 922 1969 2984 3989 5143 6484 6985 X X X X X
16000 79 94 328 547 1062 2235 3391 4550 5673 6936 X X X X X X
18000 78 94 328 656 1172 2468 3766 5080 6827 X X X X X X X
20000 62 94 297 640 1329 2735 4125 5640 7123 X X X X X X X
22000 63 79 328 718 1453 3031 4563 6155 X X X X X X X X
24000 62 94 422 766 1547 3250 4797 6732 X X X X X X X X
Table A.2. Execution Results
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by throwing an exception. From this table, we can also extrapolate another figure A.3
which shows that the execution time ascends exponentially with the increase of string
length. In this figure, each line represents a different length of string s1 which ranges
from 50 bytes to 24000 bytes.X axis represents the length of string s2 which also
ranges from 50 bytes to 24000 bytes and Y axis represents the execution time used
to compute the distance between two strings s1 and s2.We can see with the increase
of length of string s1 the execution time changes from linear growth to exponential
growth. For example, when the length of string s1 is below 10000 bytes, the execution
time grows linearly with the increase of the length of string s2, but when the length
of string s1 reaches 16000 bytes, the execution time grows exponentially with the
increase of length of string s2. And under our current computing environment, it
takes average 1 minutes to compute three distance value between two executable
files, that means it will take about 2 days to compare 100 samples.
In addition, this method require the computation of the distances between all pairs
of functions, which invariably results in a computational complexity of O(n2).The
reality is the rapidly increasing number of malware programs each day, so it is clear
that one of the most important requirements for classification system is scalability,
it should classify a large amount of malware in a reasonable time. In this method,
I store all the information related to the function distance which is accompanied by
large memory and processing overheads vital for the real time deployment.
A.7 Summary
In this Appendix, I presented function distance based experiment. Hex format
string was extracted from the binary code of a IDA function in our ida2DBMS, three
distance algorithms were applied to these string information to acquire the similarity
between any two functions, and then based on these similarity, similarity between two
files was calculated. The experimental results and performance analysis showed that
this function distance based method has computational complexity of O(n2). This
method should be leveraged before being put into application.
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Appendix B
Experimental Dataset
All of your test samples are from CA’s VET zoo (www.ca.com); thus they have
been pre-classified using generally acceptable mechanical means.
Table 3.1 in Section 3.3.1 gives an overview of all the families in our experimental
data set. There are 17 malware families and cleanware, the total number is 2939,
including 12 Trojan families, 3 Virus families and 2 Worm families and 541 cleanware.
In this section, I give a detailed description of these families.
B.1 Adclicker
AdClicker is a detection name used by CA to identify of a family of malicious
programs that are designed to artificially inflate the numbers of visitors to a given
website by creating fake page views, to share the primary functionality of artificially
generating traffic to pay-per-click Web advertising campaigns in order to create or
boost revenue.
AdClickers typically copy themselves to a system folder in an attempt to remain
inconspicuous, and create a load point so that they run every time Windows starts.
The Trojans may also perform the following actions:
• Lower security settings.
• Attempt to download files, including other malware.
• Display messages and/or advertisements.
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The Trojans typically then begin their routines to generate fake clicks.In general,
Adclicker aim to execute without the knowledge of the user, but indicators of infection
may include slow or jittery Internet browsing. In some cases the Trojans may consume
significant bandwidth. Some variants of Trojans. Adclicker may additionally display
messages and/or advertisements on the compromised computer.The most immediate
risk to users is that the bandwidth being consumed by the threats,and user may be
vulnerable to the effects of other malware that may be downloaded by the threats.
B.2 Bancos
Bancos and Banker are two of the most prevalent banking Trojans that detected
by CA since 2008.Bancos malicous programs run silently in the background to monitor
web browser activities, sometime they imitate legitimate applications distributed by
banks and there is no way a user can tell the difference between the real and fake
graphical user interfaces. It can create fake login page for certain banking sites,after
they get the control over the keyboard they can intercept login credentials entered on
the website by the user,which is used for stealing user names and passwords which
can be sent to the attacker via e-mail.
B.3 Banker
Banker familyis used to describe trojans which attempt to steal sensitive infor-
mation that can be used to gain unauthorized access to bank accounts via Internet
Banking.
B.4 Gamepass
Gamepass is a family of Trojans that steals login credentials and in-game in-
formation related to various Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games
(MMORPG). Files belonging to this malware family are Win32 executables that
are packed/protected using various packers such as UPX, UPack, FSG and NSAnti.
227
Gamepass Trojan variants steal sensitive information related to various
MMORPGs and other online games, particularly those popular in China and East
Asia. Some game titles that this Trojan family targets include:
• AskTao
• Nexia the Kingdom of the Wind
• MapleStory
• Dungeon & Fighter
• Fantasy Journey Online
• The Warlords
• World of Warcraft
• Perfect World
• Yulgang (Scions of Fate)
• Legend of Mir II
• Lineage II
Gamepass generally monitors window titles and processes, searching for indica-
tions that the targeted game has been launched. For instance, it is common for the
Trojan to initialize its logging routines after it has found an active window with the
title of the game, which is commonly in Chinese for most of the titles targeted.
It is also common for some Gamepass variants to drop a DLL which allows it to
install either a keyboard or a mouse hook. The Trojan waits until the user has entered
a keystroke or clicked a mouse button before it begins logging sensitive information.
The Trojan logs the account name and password that the user enters into the game’s
login prompt window in order to access their account.
Gamepass variants may also steal details specific to the host machine, as well as
in-game information related to the game being played. In-game information is stolen
by the Trojan in various ways, such as:
• By reading information from sub-windows accessed by the user in-game
• By reading the process memory of the game’s main executable
• By reading information from the game’s setup files.
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Such information includes:
• IP and host name of machine
• Game server name
• Role information (character’s name, job/role, sex, level)
• Game information (amount of currency, map details)
Gamepass can store this information in a log file, and then send the log file to a
remote attacker, either via email or by posting the information to a remote website.
B.5 SillyDl
SillyDl variants may be installed via Internet Explorer exploits when users visit
malicious web pages; other Trojan downloaders or components; or they may be pack-
aged with software that the user has chosen to install. A downloader is a program that
automatically downloads and runs and/or installs other software without the user’s
knowledge or permission. In addition to downloading and installing other software,
it may download updated versions of itself.
SillyDl variants may download other Trojans, or non-malicious programs such as
adware. At any given moment in time, the program(s) it attempts to download may
be changed or updated, or may be unavailable altogether. This family of Trojans
usually downloads using HTTP.
B.6 Vundo
Vundo is a large family of Trojans that contain backdoor functionality that gives
an unauthorized user access to an affected machine. They have been associated
with adware. Vundo variants typically use random filenames, however reports indi-
cate that many variants of this increasingly large family are originally downloaded
as bkinst.exe. Current Vundo variants reported from the wild copy themselves and
drop an executable file in one or more of the following subdirectories of the %Win-
dows% directory: “addins”, “AppPatch”, “assembly”, “Config”, “Cursors”, “Driver
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Cache”, “Drivers”, “Fonts”, “Help”, “inf”, “java”, “Microsoft.NET”, “msagent”,
“Registration”, “repair”, “security”, “ServicePackFiles”, “Speech”, “system”, “sys-
tem32”, “Tasks”,“Web”, “Windows Update Setup Files”, “Microsoft”.
Vundo variants modify the following registry entries to ensure that their created
copies execute at each Windows start:
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
• HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
• HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Vundo also drops a DLL in the %Temp% directory using the filename of the
executable reversed with a .dat extension. For example, if the executable created is
wavedvd.exe, Vundo would drop dvdevaw.dat in the %Temp% directory.
This DLL is registered as a service process and is used to protect the main exe-
cutables. The DLL is injected randomly into any of the other running processes on
the system. Although the main process is visible, if the process is terminated, it will
be restarted from the system memory by the injected DLL process. Using the backup
copy of the executable stored in memory, the process is able to re-create any files
which are deleted.
The DLL also creates a BHO (Browser Helper Object) class in the registry that
may appear similar to the following (for example):
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects\{68132581-
10F2-416E-B188-4E648075325A}.
The executable also create a configuration file in its current directory, using its
own filename backwards, with the extension .ini. For example: if the executable was
dropper.exe it would create a configuration file named reppord.ini. Vundo creates
backup copies of the configuration file (should it exist) using the same filename, but
with extensions .bak1 and .bak2.
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B.7 Frethog
Frethog is a family of trojans that steals passwords for online games. When
executed, Frethog copies itself to either the %Windows % or %Temp% directories
using a variable filename that differs according to variant.
Frethog modifies the registry to ensure that this copy is executed at each Windows
start, for example:
• HKLM\SoftWare\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\upxdnd = “%Temp%\upxdnd.exe”.
Recent Frethog variants often also drop a DLL file into the %Windows% or %Temp%
directories.
B.8 SillyAutorun
SillyAutoRun is a worm that spreads via removable drives. The worm also targets
Trend Micro’s OfficeScan product files and registry keys. SillyAutorun executes when
a previously infected removable drive is enabled and “AutoPlay;; launches the worm.
The worm checks the path %SysDrive%:Program Files\Trend micro\Officescan\ in
an attempt to detect whether Trend Micro’s OfficeScan product is installed. This
would usually be C:\Program Files\Trend micro\Officescan\.
If the product directory is found, the worm copies itself to %SysDrive%:\Program
Files\Trend micro\Officescan\KOfcpfwSvcs.exe and creates the following registry key
to ensure it loads on the next user logon:
• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\KOfcpfwSvcs.exe = “%SysDrive%:\Program
Files\Trend micro\Officescan\KOfcpfwSvcs.exe”.
If the product directory is not detected, the worm copies itself to
%System%\KOfcpfwSvcs.exe and creates the following registry key to ensure it
loads on the next user logon:
• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\KOfcpfwSvcs.exe = “%System%\KOfcpfwSvcs.exe”.
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B.9 Alureon
Alureon is a family of Trojans with a variety of components that can download
and execute arbitrary files, hijack the browser to display fake web pages, and report
affected user’s queries performed with popular search engines.
B.10 Bambo
Win32.Bambo is a family of trojans that contain advanced backdoor functionality
that allows unauthorized access to and extended control of an affected machine. Vari-
ants of this trojan submitted to CA have been compressed with a number of different
tools (including UPX, AS-Pack and FSG), and have varied in length between 15,360
and 53,248 bytes. Although the filenames change according to the specific variant,
the trojans of the Bambo family usually install themselves in the following manner.
When executed, the trojan either copies itself to the %System% directory using one
of the following filenames:
• load32.exe
• vxdmgr32.exe
• dllreg.exe
• netda.exe
• netdc.exe
Bambo variants have been seen to perform a variety of actions. The most commonly
seen payloads may include the following:
1. Socks Proxy:The trojan opens up a Socks proxy on port 2283, or on a random port between 2710 and 53710
(in later variants). This allows for the forwarding of Internet traffic. In the later variants certain websites are
contacted, notifying them of the port on which the socks proxy is open.
2. FTP server:An FTP server is opened up by the trojan on ports 1000 or 10000, allowing for FTP access to the
files on an affected machine.
3. Steals Sensitive Information:The trojan gathers information from the infected computer, such as:Clipboard
data,Keylogs of sensitive information,IP address of the infected machine, Owner registration of the Win-
dows product,Internet banking and Webmoney details,ICQ numbers,E-mail server names, port numbers and
passwords from Protected Storage.
4. Backdoor Functionality:A backdoor is generally opened up on TCP port 1001, although in later variants the
port may be randomly selected. This backdoor accepts commands for several functions, including:Execute
local programs,Open the CD drive,Close the CD drive,Play a sound file,Display a message box,Capture an
image of the user’s screen,Change the e-mail address that keystroke captures, etc are sent to.
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5. Edits Hosts file:Some variants have been seen to edit the Windows hosts file.
Win32/Bambo are a family of trojans that being distributed via SMS text messages
sent to mobile phones, enticing people to visit a malicious website. The messages
may contain the following:
‘Thanks for subscribing to *****.com dating service. If you don’t unsubscribe you
will be charged $2 per day’.
The text message then directs the recipient to visit a website in order to unsubscribe
from the service and avoid being charged. This website contains a fake dating service
page, which entices users to enter their phone number, at which point it attempts to
load an executable file called ‘unregister.exe’. The web page instructs users to click
the ‘Run’ button on each warning page that Windows displays, to allow the program
to execute. If the program is run, it installs the Win32/Bambotrojan.
B.11 Boxed
Win32/Boxed is a varied family of trojans, some consisting of an IRC-based back-
door which can download and execute arbitrary files. Several of the components
downloaded by this backdoor are also included in the Boxed family. Earlier variants
of Boxed perform Denial of Service attacks against specific hosts Most Boxed variants
attempt to stop and/or delete the following services that belong to antivirus products,
the Windows Update client and the Windows Firewall:
• wscsvc
• SharedAccess
• kavsvc
• SAVScan
• Symantec Core LC
• navapsvc
• wuauserv
Some also delete the registry key and all subkeys and values at:
HKLM \ Software \ Microsoft \ Windows \ CurrentVersion \ Run \ KAVPersonal50.
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If the system is running Windows XP Service Pack 2 and the following registry entry
is present:
HKLM \ System \ CurrentControlSet \ Services \ SharedAccess \ Parameters \ FirewallPolicy \ StandardPro-
file \ AuthorizedApplications \ List.
the trojan may attempt to give itself access through the Windows Firewall by creat-
ing a registry entry at:
HKLM \ System \ CurrentControlSet \ Services \ SharedAccess \ Parameters \ FirewallPolicy
\ StandardProfile \ AuthorizedApplications \ List \ 〈pathandfilenameoftrojan〉 = ‘〈pathoftrojan〉 \
〈filenameoftrojan〉:*:enabled:Microsoft Update’.
B.12 Clagger
Win32/Clagger are a family of trojans that download files onto the affected sys-
tem as well as terminating security related processes. The trojan has been distributed
as an FSG-packed, Win32 executable that is between 5000 and 6000 bytes in length.
The trojan’s primary function is to download and execute files (including additional
malware) from a specific domain that is encrypted in the trojan’s code.Files are down-
loaded to the %Windows% 1directory using file names contained in the URL.After
downloading, Clagger runs a batch file that deletes its executable.The trojan termi-
nates the following processes if they are running on the affected system:
• firewall.exe
• MpfService.exe
• zonealarm.exe
• NPROTECT.exe
• kpf4gui.exe
• atguard.exe
• tpfw.exe
• kpf4ss.exe
• zapro.exe
1’%Windows%’ is a variable location. The malware determines the location of the current Win-
dows folder by querying the operating system. The default installation location for the Windows
directory for Windows 2000 and NT is C:\Winnt; for 95,98 and ME is C:\Windows; and for XP is
C:/Windows.
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• outpost.exe
The trojan adds its executable to the following reigstry entry so that it can be
added as an exception to the Windows Firewall.
HKLM \ system \ currentControlset \ services \ sharedaccess \ parameters \ firewallpolicy \ standardprofile \
authorizedapplications \ list
B.13 Robknot
Robknot spreads via e-mail and modify system settings. When executed, Robknot
copies itself a number of times to the ‘%Profiles% \ Local Settings \ Application Data’
directory. It copies itself using the following file names:
• CSRSS.EXE
• INETINFO.EXE
• LSASS.EXE
• SERVICES.EXE
• SMSS.EXE
• WINLOGON.EXE
It then executes all of these files, which in turn modify the registry so that they are
executed at each Windows start:
HKCU \ Software \ Microsoft \ Windows \ CurrentVersion \ Run \ Tok-Cirrhatus = ‘%Profiles% \ Local
Settings \ Application Data \ 〈filename.exe〉’
Robknot also copies itself to the ‘%Windows% \ ShellNew’ directory and sets the
following registry value so that this copied file is executed at each Windows Start:
HKLM \ software \ microsoft \ windows \ currentversion \ run \ Bron-Spizaetus = ‘%Windows% \ ShellNew
\ 〈filename.exe〉’.
Robknot also searches for folders to copy itself to. If it finds an executable in a
folder, it copies itself to the folder using the folder name. It replaces any executable
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in the folder which has the same name as the folder it is in.Robknot variants use the
folder icon which is trick.They also modify the following registry entry to hide all
file extensions in the Explorer view; hence, Robknot variants appear to be a folder
instead of an executable:
HKCU \ software \ microsoft \ windows \ currentversion \ explorer \ advanced \ HideFileExt = 1
Robknot sends itself as an e-mail attachement to e-mail addresses harvested from
the affected machine. It searches for e-mail addresses to send itself to in files that
have the following extensions on the local system :
• TXT
• EML
• WAB
• ASP
• PHP
• CFM
• CSV
• DOC
Robknot modifies the desktop theme as well as modifying the following registry
value to set Explorer to not show files with the ’Hidden’ attribute:
HKCU \ software \ microsoft \ windows \ currentversion \ explorer \ advanced \
Hidden = 0
Robknot modifies the following registry value to set Explorer to not show ”‘protected
operating system files”’ (i.e. - files with both the ”‘System”’ and ”‘Hidden’ attributes set):
HKCU \ software \ microsoft \ windows \ currentversion \ explorer \ advanced \ ShowSuperHidden = 0
Robknot also disables the Folder Options menu item in Explorer:
HKCU \ software \ microsoft \ windows \ currentversion \ Policies \ Explorer \ NoFolderOptions = 1
Robknot attempts to disable the command prompt by modifying the following value:
HKCU \ software \ microsoft \ windows \ currentversion \ Policies \ System \ DisableCMD = 0
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Robknot disables registry tools such as Regedit.exe by modifying the following registry
entry:
HKCU \ software \ microsoft \ windows \ currentversion \ Policies \ System \ DisableRegistryTools = 1
Robknot also modifies the file C:\autoexec.bat to include the line ‘pause’ so that the
system pauses at each Windows start.
B.14 Robzips
Robzips spreads via e-mail. They spread by sending a ZIP archive attached to an e-
mail message. The ZIP archive contains a downloader and a batch file. When executed,
Win32/Robzips creates a folder with a random name in the %System%2 directory and
copies itself to this folder using the following file names:
• smss.exe
• csrss.exe
• lsass.exe
• services.exe
• winlogon.exe
It then executes all of these files. Robzips then makes the following registry modifications
so that some of these copies are executed at each Windows start:
HKLM \ Software \ Microsoft \ Windows \ CurrentVersion \ Run \ 〈randomname〉 = ‘%Windows% \
〈randomname〉.exe’
HKCU \ Software \ Microsoft \ Windows \ CurrentVersion \ Run \ 〈randomname〉 = ‘%System% \
〈randomfoldername〉 \ 〈randomname〉.exe’
Some variants also make the following registry modifications:
HKCU \ Software \ Microsoft \ Windows \ CurrentVersion \ Run \ Tok-Cirrhatus-〈randomvaluesandcharacters〉
= ‘〈pathandnameofexecutable〉’
HKLM \ Software \ Microsoft \ Windows \ CurrentVersion \ Run \ Bron-Spizaetus- 〈randomvaluesandcharacters〉
= ‘ 〈pathandnameofexecutable〉 ’
Most Robzips variants create a text file ‘C: \ \Baca Bro !!!.txt’ reffig:robzips-textcontaining
the following text: When the user opens this file, Robzips closes it and then displays the
following messages (see Figure reffig:robzips-cmd1 and Figure ref) on a console window:
Robzips sends e-mail to e-mail addresses harvested from files located on the local hard
drive. It searches through files that have the following extensions:
2’%System%’ is variable location. The malware determines the location of these folders by query-
ing the operating system. The default installation location for the System directory for Windows
2000 and NT is C:\Winnt\System32; for 95,98 and ME is C:\Windows\System; and for XP is
C:\Windows\\System32.The default installation location for the Windows directory for Windows
2000 and NT is C:\Winnt; for 95,98 and ME is C:\Windows; and for XP is C:\Windows.
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Figure B.1. Text File Created by Robzips
Figure B.2. Messages Displayed on a Console Window by Robzips
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Figure B.3. Messages Displayed on a Console Window by Robzips
• asp
• cfm
• csv
• doc
• eml
• htm
• html
• php
• ppt
• txt
• wab
• xls
Robzips stops a number of applications from running at each Windows start by deleting
their registry values (listed below) from the keys:
HKCU \ Software \ Microsoft \ Windows \ CurrentVersion \ Run
HKLM \ Software \ Microsoft \ Windows \ CurrentVersion \ Run
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Robzips modifies the desktop theme, as well as modifying the following registry value
so that Explorer does not show files with the ‘Hidden’ attribute:
HKCU \ Software \ Microsoft \ Windows \ CurrentVersion \ Explorer \ Advanced \ Hidden = 0
Robzips modifies the following registry value so that Explorer does not show ”‘Protected
operating system files”’ - that is, files with both ”‘System”’ and ”‘Hidden”’ attributes set:
HKCU \ Software \ Microsoft \ Windows \ CurrentVersion \ Explorer \ Advanced \ ShowSuperHidden = 0
B.15 Looked
Looked is a family of file-infecting worms that spread via network shares. They also drop
a DLL which is used to periodically download and execute arbitrary files. A minority of
variants do not drop the DLL and behave slightly differently to the rest of this family. Recent
examples of these different variants (at the time of publication) include Win32/Looked.EK
and Win32/Looked.FU.
When executed, Win32/Looked copies itself to %Windows%\Logo1 .exe and
%Windows%\uninstall\rundl132.exe. It then executes the copy at %Windows%\Logo1 .exe.
When this is complete the worm uses a batch script to either delete the original file, or,
if the original file was an infected executable, to replace this file with a clean copy, and
then execute the clean file. Some variants copy themselves to %Windows%\rundl132.exe
instead of %Windows%\uninstall\rundl132.exe.
Looked generally creates the following registry entry to ensure that the worm runs on
system startup:
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\load = “%Windows%\uninstall\rundl132.exe”
One of the following registry entries may be used by some variants instead of the entry
above:
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\ load = “%Windows%\rundl132.exe”.
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\load = “%Windows%\rundl132.exe”
It drops a DLL to one of the following locations:
• %Windows%\RichDll.dll.
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• %Windows%\Dll.dll.
and injects code into the explorer.exe or Iexplore.exe processes so that the DLL’s code is
executed. This code is used to download and execute arbitrary files, as described in the
Payload section below. This action may result in an extra Windows Explorer window being
opened shortly after the infected file is first run. Some variants also drop a second DLL
with a random filename to the %Temp% directory. Many variants are packed using the
NSAnti packer. For some of these variants, a driver file is also dropped to %Temp%¡1 - 4
random alphanumeric characters¿.sys, which is later moved to %System%\wincab.sys. This
file appears to be a component of the unpacker, and is used to hide some of the worm’s
activities on the affected system.
B.16 Emerleox
Emerleox is a family of worms that spread via network shares and file infection. They
can also download and execute arbitrary files and terminate processes and services on the
affected system. Some Emerleox variants spread by infecting Win32 executables. Initially,
Emerleox parses the affected machine looking for executable and/or HTML files. When
an infected file is executed, the worm writes the original (uninfected file) to a file with
the same filename but with an additional .exe extension; creates a batch file that deletes
the infected file that was executed; renames the original to remove the additional .exe
extension.If successful, the worm drops a copy of itself to a shared directory using a variable
filename (for example: GameSetup.exe). It then tries to add a scheduled job to run this
copy on the newly compromised system.
When executed Emerleox usually copies itself to the %System% or %System%\drivers
directories. It often uses the filenames: “%System%\spoclsv.exe” or “%System%\drivers\svohost.exe”.
The worm then modifies the registry so that the main executable runs at each Windows
start, for example:
• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svcshare = “%System%\drivers\spoclsv.exe”.
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SoundMam = “%System%\svohost.exe”.
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B.17 Agobot
Agobot is an IRC controlled backdoor that can be used to gain unauthorized access to a
victim’s machine. It can also exhibit worm-like functionality by exploiting weak passwords
on administrative shares and by exploiting many different software vulnerabilities, as well as
backdoors created by other malware. There are hundreds of variants of Agobot, and others
are constantly being developed. The source code has been widely distributed, which has led
to different groups creating modifications of their own. However, their core functionality is
quite consistent. When first run, an Agobot will usually copy itself to the System directory.
The file name is variable. It will also add registry entries to run this copy at Windows start,
usually to these keys:
• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices.
For example, one variant observed ”in the wild”, copies itself to: %System%\aim.exe
and adds these values to the registry:
• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\AOL Instant Messenger = “aim.exe”.
• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices\AOL Instant Messenger = “aim.exe”.
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Appendix C
Function Length Extraction
Procedure
This section presents the opcode of stored procedures and functions used to extract
function length features from Ida2DB. As we see from Figure C.1 that the procedure
composed of four blocks and involved five tables in our Ida2Db, they are Instructions,
Basic blocks, functions, modules and Fun Len Table. In Appendix D we give the detailed
information of our Ida2DB schema.
In our ida2DB schema, each entry in the functions table is composed of many entries in
the basic blocks table, and each entry in the basic blocks table is composed of many entries
in the instruction table, so our function length information extraction process is based on
this structure. Database stored procedure ”‘Fun Len Family”’ fetches length information
of all the functions of all the modules from the specific family by invoking the Database
stored procedure ”‘Fun Len Module”’ which fetches length information of all the functions
of the specific module. Database stored procedure ”‘Fun Len Module”’ fetches each function
length information by invoking the Database Internal Function ”‘GetFun”’. Just as we
talked before, each function is composed of many basic blocks, so in ”‘GetFun”’, database
Internal Function ”‘GetBasicData”’ is invoked circularly to get all the data information of
all the basic blocks of the specific function. Similarly in ”‘ GetBasicData ”’ each instruction
is traversed to fetch all the instruction data information of the assigned basic block.
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Ida2DB
Fun_Len_Family
Fun_Len_Module
GetFun
GetBasicData
Function Features Extraction 
Figure C.1. Function Length Feature Extraction
C.1 Database Stored Procedure: Fun Len Family
Database stored procedure ”‘Fun Len Family”’ fetches
USE [ida2DB]
GO
SET ANSI_NULLS ON
GO
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON
GO
CREATE PROCEDURE [dbo].[Fun_Len_Family]
@family nvarchar(100)
AS
BEGIN
SET NOCOUNT ON;
declare @mid bigint
declare cc cursor for select module_id from
[dbo].[modules]
where family = @family
order by module_id
open cc
fetch next from cc into @mid
while (@@fetch_status=0)
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begin
Exec [dbo].[Fun_Len_Module] @mid
fetch next from cc into @mid
end
close cc
deallocate cc
END
C.2 Database Stored Procedure: Fun Len Module
USE [ida2DB]
GO
SET ANSI_NULLS ON
GO
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON
GO
CREATE PROCEDURE [dbo].[Fun_Len_Module]
@module_id bigint
AS
BEGIN
SET NOCOUNT ON;
declare @mid bigint, @function_id bigint, @fun_len bigint
declare @stemp nvarchar(max)
declare kk cursor for select module_id, function_id from
[dbo].[functions]
where module_id = @module_id
order by function_id
open kk
fetch next from kk into @mid,@function_id
while (@@fetch_status=0)
begin
set @stemp =’’
set @stemp = [dbo].[GetFun](@mid,@function_id)
set @fun_len = len(@stemp)
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If @fun_len >0
INSERT INTO fun_len (module_id, function_id,fun_len)
VALUES ( @mid, @function_id,@fun_len );
fetch next from kk into @mid,@function_id
end
close kk
deallocate kk
END
C.3 Database Internal Function: GetFun
USE [ida2DB]
GO
SET ANSI_NULLS ON
GO
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON
GO
CREATE function [dbo].[GetFun]
(@module_id bigint = 0, @function_id bigint = 0)
RETURNS nvarchar(max)
AS
BEGIN
declare @s nvarchar(max)
set @s =’’
declare @pf bigint
select @pf = address from
[dbo].[functions]
where module_id = @module_id and function_id = @function_id
declare @stemp nvarchar(max)
declare @mid bigint, @basic_id bigint
declare kk cursor for select module_id, id from
[dbo].[basic_blocks]
where module_id = @module_id and parent_function = @pf
open kk
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fetch next from kk into @mid,@basic_id
while (@@fetch_status=0)
begin
set @stemp =’’
set @stemp = [dbo].[GetBasicData](@module_id,@basic_id)
set @s =@s + @stemp
fetch next from kk into @mid,@basic_id
end
close kk
deallocate kk
RETURN @s
END
C.4 Database Internal Function: GetBasicData
USE [ida2DB]
GO
SET ANSI_NULLS ON
GO
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON
GO
Create FUNCTION [dbo].[GetBasicData]
(@module_id bigint, @basic_block_id bigint)
RETURNS nvarchar(max)
AS
BEGIN
DECLARE @Result nvarchar(max)
set @Result=’’
SELECT @Result = @Result+data
FROM [dbo].[instructions]
where module_id =@module_id and basic_block_id =@basic_block_id
RETURN @Result
END
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Appendix D
Ida2DB schema
D.1 Basic Tables
No. Table Name Explanation
1 Modules Basic information of analysed object
2 Functions All the functions,including the import functions
3 Basic blocks Basic blocks in functions
4 Instructions Instructions at some address
5 Callgraph Callers and Callees
6 Control flow graph Links between basic blocks
7 Operand strings The operand strings as shown by IDA
8 Expression tree Expressions composing the operands as a tree
9 Operand tuples Maps addresses to the operands used by the instruction
at such location
10 Expression substitutions Allows to replace any part of the expression tree of an operand
with a string, variable names are handled through this table
11 Operand expressions Relates the operands to the expressions composing them
12 Address references Contains all references, both to code and data labeled
with their type
13 Address comments Comment String Information
14 Sections Sections information
15 Strings windows String window of IDA
16 Function length Function length information
17 Statistic table Statistical information
18 FileDateTime Date and time information of executable files
Table D.1. Basic Tables
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D.2 Tables Description
Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Module id int identity No Record no of the analysed file
Name nvarchar 256 no Real name of the analysed file
Md5 nchar 32 No
Sha1 nchar 40 No
Comment nvarchar 1000 Yes Comment
Entry point bigint no The entry point of the executable
Import time datetime no The time when the file being analysed
Filetype nvarchar 256 no The type of file
Platform nvarchar 256 no The platform of file
Family nvarchar 256 no The family information
Variant nvarchar 256 no The variant information of the file
PK Module id
Table D.2. Modules
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Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Function id bigint Identity No
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Section name nvarchar 256 No The section name that
function belongs to
Address bigint No The start address of function
Name nvarchar 1000 No The name of function
Function type int No The type of function
Name md5 nchar 32 No
Cyclomatic complexity bigint No Complexity of function
PK Function id
Unique Module id + address
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Function type values: function standard=0
function library=1
function imported=2
function thunk=3
function exported=4
Table D.3. Functions
Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Basic block id bigint identity No
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Id bigint No The no of basic block
Parent function bigint No The function address that this basic
block belongs to
Address bigint No The start address of this basic block
PK Basic block id
Unique Module id + id + parent function
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Table D.4. Basic blocks
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Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Instruction id bigint identity No
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Basic block id bigint The no of basic block that this
t instruction belongs to
Address bigint No The address of this instruction
Mnemonic nvarchar 32 Yes Mnemonic
Sequence int Yes
Data nvarchar(MAX) Yes Reserved
PK Instruction id
Unique Module id + basic block id + address
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Table D.5. Instructions
Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Callgraph id bigint identity No The no of callgraph
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Src bigint No The start address of caller
Src basic block id bigint No No of basic block of caller that revokes
Src address bigint No The address of instruction that revokes
Dst bigint No The start address of callee
PK Callgraph id
Unique Module id + Callgraph id
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Table D.6. Callgraph
251
Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Control flow graph id bigint identity No The no of Control flow graph
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Parent function bigint No The start address of function that
this control flow graph belongs to
Src bigint No The no of source basic block
Dst bigint No ng
Kind int NO Kind
PK Control flow graph id
Unique Module id + Control flow graph id
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Kind values: branch type true=0 )
branch type false=1
branch type unconditional=2
branch type switch=3
Table D.7. Control flow graph
Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Operand string id bigint identity No
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Str nvarchar 1000 Yes Expression of operand
PK Operand string id
Unique Module id + Operand string id
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Table D.8. Operand strings
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Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Expression tree id bigint identity No
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Expr type int No Type of expression
Symbol nvarchar 256 Yes Symbol of expression
Immediate bigint Yes Immediate
position int No Reserved
parent id bigint Yes The no of parent node
PK Expression tree id
Unique Module id + Expression tree id
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Expr type values: node type mnemonic id=0
node type symbol id=1
node type immediate int id=2
node type immediate float id=3
node type operator id=4
Table D.9. Expression tree
Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Operand tuple id bigint identity No
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
address bigint No The address of instruction that
operand belongs to
Operand id bigint No The no of operand
Position int No The position of operand in an
instruction,starts from 0
PK Operand tuple id
Unique Module id + address + position
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Table D.10. Operand tuples
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Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Expression substitution id bigint identity No Record no
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Address bigint No The address of instruction
Operand id bigint No The no of operand
Expr id bigint No The no of expression
of that operand
Replacement nvarchar 1000 Yes The new one
PK Expression substitution id
Unique Module id + Expression substitution id
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Table D.11. Expression substitution
Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Operand expression id bigint identity No Record no
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Operand id bigint No The no of operand
Expr id bigint No The no of expressions that
compose the operand
PK Operand expression id
Unique Module id + Operand expression id
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Table D.12. Operand expression
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Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Address reference id bigint identity No Record no
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Address bigint No The address of source instruction
Target bigint No The address of destination instruction
Kind int No The no of expression
PK Address reference id
Unique Module id + Address reference id
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Kind values: conditional branch true=0
conditional branch false=1
unconditional branch=2
branch switch=3
call direct=4
call indirect=5
call indirect virtual=6
data=7
data string=8
Table D.13. Address reference
Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Address comments id bigint identity No Record no
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Address bigint No Address information
Comment nvarchar 1000 Yes Comment
PK Address comments id
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Table D.14. Address comments
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Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Section id bigint identity No Record no
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Name nchar 256 No Section name
Base bigint No Base address of section
Start address bigint No Start address of section
End address bigint No End address of section
Length int No Length of section data
Data nvarchar(MAX) yes Data(original format)
PK Section id
Unique Module id + name
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Table D.15. Sections
Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
String window id bigint identity No Record no
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Section name nvarchar 30 yes The section name that function
belongs to
Address bigint yes address of string
Strlength bigint yes length of string
Strtype Int yes type of string
String nvarchar MAX Yes String information
data nvarchar MAX Yes Data(Hex format)
PK String window id
Unique Module id + Section name + address
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Strtype values: C=0
Pascal=1
Pascal,2 byte length=2
Unicode=3
Pascal,4 byte length=4
Pascal style Unicode,2 byte length=5
Pascal style Unicode,4 byte length=6
Table D.16. Strings window
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Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Function id bigint identity No Record no
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Funlen bigint No Function length in bytes
Unique Module id + Function id
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Table D.17. Function length
Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Statistic table id int identity No Record no
Module id int No Record no of the analysed file
Num function int No The number of functions
the analysed file
Num import function int No The number of import functions of
the analysed file
Num basic block int No The number of basic blocks of
the analysed file
Sum cc int No The sum value of Cyclomatic
complexity of all the functions
of the analysed file
Max cc int No The maximum value of Cyclomatic
complexity of all the functions
of the analysed file
Min cc int No The minimum value of Cyclomatic
complexity of all the functions
of the analysed file
Avg cc int No The average value of Cyclomatic
complexity of all the functions
of the analysed file
Num instruction int No The number of instructions
of the analysed file
OEP int No The original entry point
of the analysed file
Num section int No The number of sections
of the analysed file
Num string int No The number of strings
of the analysed file
PK Statistic table id
FK Module id(references modules:module id)
Table D.18. Statistic table
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Column name Type Length Is Null Explanation
Module id int identity No Record no of the analysed file
name nvarchar 256 no Real name of the analysed file
md5 nchar 32 No
Sha1 nchar 40 No
Comment nvarchar 1000 Yes Comment
entry point bigint no The entry point of the executable
Import time datetime no The time when the file being analysed
Filetype nvarchar 256 no The type of file
Platform nvarchar 256 no The platform of file
Family nvarchar 256 no The family information
Variant nvarchar 256 no The variant information of the file
FTimeStamp nvarchar 256 no The date time information of the file
PK Module id
Table D.19. Filedatetime
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